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Cover
USS Augusta in Narragansett Bay, 2
May 1941, a watercolor painting by the
marine artist Ian Marshall. The scene
shows the heavy cruiser USS Augusta
(CA 31) on the day that Admiral Ernest
J. King broke his four-star flag in
Augusta as Commander in Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet. The ship is moored to a
buoy on the Jamestown side of the bay
(that is, near Conanicut Island, visible to
the left), Admiral King’s preferred loca-
tion; the Naval War College and a signal
tower next to Pringle Hall are in the dis-
tant background (to the right), and two
ship’s boats are approaching—perhaps
from the Newport, Rhode Island, fleet
landing, or from other ships—to join
three already riding to a boom. The
cruiser was to be in Newport nearly con-
tinuously until January 1942, when King
became Chief of Naval Operations. The
tower and the tall antennas visible be-
yond the College complex were removed
in the 1960s and ’70s.
The painting was commissioned by the
Naval War College Museum, using funds
provided by the Naval War College Foun-
dation, to record a local scene not other-
wise visually recorded in the Museum’s
collections. The painting, delivered on 29
September 2008, hung in the Museum’s
Predators and Guard Dogs: An Exhibit of
the Works of Ian Marshall from 12 Feb-
ruary to 30 June 2009 and then joined the
permanent collection, in a new display
case installed through the generosity of
Robert Alvine’s gift to the Foundation
and Museum.
Born in Fife, Scotland, and originally
trained as an architect, Ian Marshall lives
today on Mount Desert Island in Maine.
He is the author of five books illustrated
by his meticulously accurate historical
ship paintings, and his work hangs in the
permanent collections of many museums
in the United States and Europe.
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FROM THE EDITORS
At this writing, the outcome and repercussions of the current crisis of regime in
Iran are entirely uncertain. The disputed election of 12 June has clearly set in
motion events that threaten to erode the fundamental legitimacy of the Islamic
Republic, but the regime has so far demonstrated its determination to ride out
the crisis whatever the human or political costs. From the vantage point of
Washington, it is too early to conclude that the security calculus in the Middle
East has changed in any significant way as a result of all this, in spite of some
hopeful signs. Indeed, it would be prudent to contemplate the possibility that an
Iranian regime of diminished legitimacy will be tempted to recoup its prestige
internally and in the region by a course of military adventurism and confronta-
tion with the United States. In this perspective, Daniel Gouré and Rebecca
Grant, in their “U.S. Naval Options for Influencing Iran,” provide a useful and
timely analysis of the American naval presence in or near the Persian Gulf and
the ways it could be used or altered to “shape” the strategic behavior of the Ira-
nian regime through various phases of a hypothetical conflict.
This issue features three articles under our familiar “Asia Rising” rubric. Evan
S.Medeiros analyzes the results of a recent study of the perceptions and attitudes
of friends and allies of the United States in East Asia with respect to the rising
power and regional profile of the People’s Republic of China. His conclusion is
that on the whole the United States has not been fundamentally disadvantaged
as a result of this development, contrary to a common view of the matter. Two
articles then address from complementary perspectives an issue of critical im-
portance for the United States Navy. In “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chi-
nese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Andrew S. Erickson and
DavidD.Yang provide a detailed survey and analysis of the Chinese open-source
military and technical literature concerning antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)
and the manner in which they might be employed against U.S. carrier battle
groups in the western Pacific in the event of a conflict, while Eric Hagt andMat-
thew Durnin review Chinese thinking concerning the intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance architecture supporting a putative ASBM capability, again
on the basis of open-source Chinese materials. Both papers were prepared for a
conference on Chinese aerospace development sponsored by the China
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Maritime Studies Institute of the Naval War College and held in Newport in De-
cember 2008.
Naval leadership has always been an important dimension of education, both
formal and informal, at the Naval War College. Over the last several years, it has
received renewed and intensive attention through the work of the College of
Operational and Strategic Leadership and the Stockdale Group student research
effort associated with it. In support of this ongoing work, Professors John
Hattendorf and Bruce Elleman have edited a volume of essays on famous Ameri-
can admirals, Nineteen Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and
Diplomatic Naval Leadership in the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, due to be
jointly published in the fall by the Naval War College Press and the U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. Wayne P. Hughes’s insightful essay on the leadership of
Admiral Raymond Spruance during the war in the Pacific provides a sampling
of the contents of this outstanding collection. Spruance, the victor of the battle
of Midway, is also a past president of the Naval War College.
The battle of Midway (4–7 June 1942) is the point of reference for Jeremy
Black’s account of the strategic opportunities afforded the Axis powers by the
weakness of the British position in India and the Indian Ocean in the early years
of World War II. The failure of the Japanese to take advantage of these opportu-
nities (in particular by occupying Ceylon) in favor of confronting the American
navy in the Central Pacific, Black argues, is symptomatic of the larger failure in
coalition warfare that contributed so centrally to the Axis defeat.
On 7–8 April 2009, the International Law Department (ILD) of the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies held a workshop on countering piracy with some fifty le-
gal and policy experts from around the world, to revisit conventional thinking
on this pressing topic and explore new approaches. The final report of the work-
shop, prepared by Commander James Kraska of the ILD faculty, is reproduced
(with some modifications) here. The high point of this event occurred when
several participants joined a U.S. government interagency conference call to dis-
cuss how to deal with the hostage standoff involving the M/V Maersk Alabama.
WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL ARTICLE PRIZES
The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the
annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing
in the Naval War College Review.
The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the
best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the Review in the pre-
ceding publishing year. Cash awards are funded through the generosity of the
Naval War College Foundation.
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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• First place: Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the
Lamps of China?” Spring 2008 ($1,000, shared between coauthors)
• Second place: James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the United
States in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Strategic Triangle?” Summer 2008
($650, shared between coauthors)
• Third place: William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,”
Summer 2008 ($350).
The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for
the author of the best historical article appearing the Review in the same period.
This year’s winner is Robert J. Hanyok, for “‘Catching the Fox Unaware’: Japa-
nese Radio Denial and Deception and the Attack on Pearl Harbor” (Autumn
2008, $500). In addition, “Fortuitous Endeavor: Intelligence and Deception in
Operation TORCH” (also in Autumn 2008), by John Patch, received honorable
mention.
FORTHCOMING FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
The sixteenth in our Historical Monograph series, Dr. Evelyn Cherpak’s Three
Splendid Little Wars: The Diary of Joseph K. Taussig, 1898–1901, is now in press.
This diary, Professor John B. Hattendorf writes in his foreword, is “a valuable
glimpse of the initial stage of a naval officer’s professional military education
just a little over a century ago.” It will be sold online by the U.S. Government
Bookstore, http://bookstore.gpo.gov/.
The next (number 34) in our Newport Papers monograph series, Somalia . . .
From the Sea, by Gary J. Ohls, also in press, has been posted on our website. Dr.
Ohls, of the Naval Postgraduate School, has written an account of the repeated
U.S. attempts in the 1990s, in the framework of newly developed expeditionary
doctrine, to rescue Somalia from the chaos and starvation that had engulfed it.
These attempts were, as Dr. Hattendorf notes, to leave “a bitter impression that
influenced American foreign policy and military thinking for some time
thereafter.”
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 7
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Com-
mander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in interna-
tional relations from the University of Southern Califor-
nia, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Com-
manding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquar-
ters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Direc-
tor, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Taking Stock
AS I WATCH THE MORNING SUN come up over Narragansett Bay and
the Claiborne Pell Bridge, let me share some thoughts with our
readers, the Navy leadership, and, of course, our students. We at the College are
preparing to embark on our 125th year here in Newport.
With every passing day, I am more and more convinced of the value of the ed-
ucation that we provide for our naval officers, as well as for the international of-
ficers, for officers of our sister services, and for the agencies of government.
Contrary to recent discussions in blogs and the press, I also believe that we are
offering the best courses on strategy anywhere. Our students will not be out-
classed by those educated at major research universities. In fact, our student
body is made up of serving professionals, many right off the front lines of cur-
rent conflicts. This is one of the factors that make us truly unique. The students’
experience enriches the curriculum and represents a vital component of our ed-
ucational enterprise.
Admiral Turner’s words from his convocation speech still ring true almost 40
years later: “Another sample of the ineffectiveness of our military educational
system is our increasing reliance on civilians and on ‘think tanks’ to do our
thinking for us. Do not misunderstand. These people have done outstanding
work for us. We very much need their help and stimulation into the future. We
must, however, produce military men who are a match for the best of the civilian
strategists or we will abdicate control of our profession.”
I recently read a criticism of our military today that we are not taking more
“institutional risk”—with the implied remedy of closing the war colleges, con-
sidered by some as “second rate”—to put more effort into today’s fight. It is my
recollection that George C. Marshall once said that closing Leavenworth was one
15
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of his biggest mistakes during the Second World War. What some would call
“presentism,” or thinking that the way the world is today is the way it will always
be, is a very shortsighted view. The corollary would be to ask what the “return on
investment” on this education is. We, after all, are called to serve as good stew-
ards of the taxpayers’ dollars, and we are accountable for what we’re doing in
Newport. We absolutely must carefully husband the scarce resources entrusted
to us and plan effectively. The importance of constantly assessing return on in-
vestment was underlined to me on a recent visit to a well known company’s exec-
utive education center, which is also used by the firm’s chief executives as a place
they meet to discuss big changes. When I asked the question about return on in-
vestment, I got a quizzical look and the answer “No one has ever asked me that
question.” I was floored.
Education is not training. It is about conveying bodies of knowledge, devel-
oping lifelong habits of thought and learning, critical thinking skills, and the
ability to solve highly ambiguous and formless problems. In our case, the stu-
dent body brings in tremendous experience. It’s like flint to the steel of our dis-
tinguished faculty: you need both to make fire, and that’s the deal. I recently
approved a plan to place a Naval War College “alumni hall of fame” in Spruance
Hall. What really struck me was the number of Medal of Honor recipients on
that list of alumni from the Second World War.1 It is a long list and a familiar one
to naval officers who know the Navy’s history. Additionally, we expect to add the
hundreds of international officers to this list, graduates from Newport, who
have risen to positions of high responsibility in their governments—that is quite
an impressive list too.
Of course, today there are other options in the “path to jointness”—National
Defense University, as well as the other fine service institutions at Leavenworth,
Quantico, Maxwell, and Carlisle. As we pursue a more joint force, it’s only nor-
mal, then, that the number of senior leaders coming exclusively to Newport be-
comes smaller. That said, the current military commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and now in Europe, as well as our ambassador in Iraq, are today all Naval War
College graduates.
So what?
As Sun Tzu puts it in the opening lines of The Art of War: “War is a matter of
vital importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road to survival
or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.” Churchill’s view was that
skilled planners must have a thorough education on strategy, and that requires
time at a war college. Otherwise, as he stated of the Royal Navy’s leadership dur-
ing the First World War, the service will have only captains of ships rather than
captains of war.2
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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So, in the aggregate, the Naval War College is working to ensure that we naval
officers do not abdicate control of our profession, while getting our arms
around what’s going on in the world and helping the Chief of Naval Operations
determine what the Navy should look like in the future. It’s about anticipat-
ing—both the international environment and what we should be doing about it.
We have the facilities, the faculty, the analysts, the seasoned professionals in the
student body, and the concepts to game what we anticipate—as we have done in
Newport for over a hundred years. A recent YouTube video makes the statement
“We are living in exponential times.”3 There is much truth in that. To quote Er-
nest, Lord Rutherford, in the face of complex and quickly changing world events
and decreasing budgets, “We don’t have money, so we have to think.”4 My bet is
on Naval War College graduates.
JAMES P. WISECUP
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
NOTE S
1. Eighty-nine of ninety flag officers who served
in the Second World War were graduates of
this institution, and some, like Raymond A.
Spruance and Richmond K. Turner, also
served on the faculty.
2. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis,
1911–1914 (London: Butterworth, 1923), p.
93.
3. Karl Fisch, Scott McLeod, and Jeff Brenman,
YouTube: Did You Know? 3.0, 2008.
4. Ernest, Lord Rutherford, of New Zealand, a
famous nuclear scientist and a Nobel Prize
winner in chemistry.
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U.S. NAVAL OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCING IRAN
Daniel Gouré and Rebecca Grant
This article is intended to explore the range of options the U.S. Navy can pro-vide to policy makers in developing a strategic approach to Iran. The Barack
Obama administration has taken power just as a delicate change is beginning in
the region. The American land, air, and naval presence in the Persian Gulf will
diminish as forces return from Iraq. Simultaneously, the Obama administration
will be trying to elicit from Iran an agreement not to develop a nuclear weapons
program. At the same time, the new administration is committed to restructur-
ing significantly U.S. armed forces. Changes in the naval presence in the region
need to be considered not only with respect to domestic constituencies but also
in light of the nation’s security interests in the region.
The subsequent analysis focuses on the range of policy-relevant options the
U.S. Navy can provide, short of war, that could help shape Iran’s behavior.
“Shaping” as a strategy can be defined as the performance of a set of continuous,
long-term, integrated actions—with a broad spectrum of governmental,
nongovernmental, and international partners—that seeks to influence the be-
havior of target nations and thereby maintain or enhance stability, prevent or
mitigate crises, and enable other operations when crises occur. Actions short of
war designed to influence the behavior of another nation fall under the rubric of
shaping operations. With the end of the Cold War, shaping operations became a
more important part of the Navy’s array of activities.
The Navy’s 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower identified
shaping as one of the critical element of naval operations.
This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea
and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide
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the United States the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military
footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing
of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political re-
percussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces
can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation,
de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts.1
Navy leaders have never been shy about extolling the ability of maritime
forces to shape behavior and influence events. “The Navy’s role in global influ-
ence and deterrence will grow significantly in the future,” Admiral John
Nathman, former Commander, Fleet Forces Command, has said. “You can go up
to 12 nautical miles [to a country’s shoreline] without asking permission. You
come with no footprint. And you deliver a message that can be broad, subtle,
persistent, credible or powerful. The Navy can do that.”2
Demand for Navy shaping operations has risen steadily over the past several
years. All joint forces are engaged in shaping actions, which range from theater
security cooperation and shaping to more elaborate options to deter and seize
the initiative.
When thinking about deterring Iran, one thinks quickly of Navy options. In
fact, there is both a valuable historical legacy and an important niche role for the
Navy in operations to counter Iran at various levels of engagement. The same
warships on scheduled deployment rotation can shift from presence to deter-
rence to the countering of aggression. Day in and day out, Navy forces help set
the limits of Iranian military action in the Gulf.
Few question the idea that unique Navy capabilities to shape and deter have
special strategic significance. Yet there is little awareness in the broader policy
community of the impact that naval presence can have on the situation in the
Persian Gulf over the longer term and during crises. Nor has it been made clear
to decision makers that Iran’s leadership is aware of our naval actions and factors
the presence and operations of the U.S. Navy into its strategic calculations.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN
The United States has struggled to manage the dangers posed by the revolution-
ary regime in Tehran for nearly thirty years. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution,
the central policy objective of the United States has been to change the behavior
of the regime. It has sought to do so by a combination of means, including a
larger military presence in the region, enhanced support for regional allies (in-
cluding, for a time, Iran’s principal adversary, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq), economic
leverage, targeted sanctions, and limited engagement.
The George W. Bush administration was very clear about its security issues
with Iran:
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The behavior of the Iranian regime poses as serious a set of challenges to the interna-
tional community as any problem we face today. Iran’s nuclear ambitions; its sup-
port for terrorism; and its efforts to undermine hopes for stability in Iraq and
Afghanistan, including lethal backing for groups attacking American troops, are all
deeply troubling. So are its destructive actions in Lebanon, its longstanding rejection
of a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians, and the profoundly repugnant
rhetoric of its leaders about Israel, the Holocaust, and so much else. Compounding
these concerns is Iran’s deteriorating record on human rights.3
The approach the Bush administration took, like that of its predecessors for the
past thirty years, was largely focused on shaping Iranian behavior.
Our policy toward Iran is clear and focused. First and foremost, we have demon-
strated to the Iranian regime that its provocative and destabilizing policies will entail
painful costs for Iran, including financial hardship, diplomatic isolation, and long-
term detriment to Iran’s prestige and fundamental national interests. Secondly, and
equally importantly, we are working to convince the regime that another, more con-
structive course is available to it.4
Even though only recently in office, the Obama administration has made it
clear that Iran will be a principal focus of its foreign policy. The Obama adminis-
tration appears to hold objectives with respect to Iran very similar to those of the
Bush administration. Foremost on its list of objectives is to prevent Iran from ac-
quiring a nuclear weapon. In a recent television interview President Obama
said, “Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges.” He specifically men-
tioned that country’s support for Lebanese Shia party Hizballah and its nuclear
enrichment program.5
While current U.S. intelligence estimates assert that Iran currently does not
have an active nuclear weapons program, they suggest that this situation could
change rapidly. According to retired admiral Dennis Blair, “We assess Iran has
the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear
weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nu-
clear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing
nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.”6
Current American policy has three basic threads: more negotiations (includ-
ing direct talks), tougher sanctions, and the threat of military action. The goal is
to shape Iranian behavior so as to make a resort to direct military force unneces-
sary. In particular, this means encouraging Iran to enter into direct talks with the
United States and its allies. Ultimately, it is hoped, the diplomatic process will
see Iran moderate its revolutionary stance, forgo the development of nuclear
weapons, and integrate itself into the community of nations. President Obama
is seeking what he terms “a new beginning” with Iran, one that emphasizes di-
plomacy. At the same time, the administration has sought to reinforce the
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international coalition against Iran’s nuclear program. According to recent press
reports, the new administration has sent a secret letter to the Russian govern-
ment offering to halt development of a ballistic-missile interceptor system in
Eastern Europe, provided that Russia assist in halting Iran’s effort to build nu-
clear warheads and ballistic missiles.7 The president has said that no option,
including the use of force, is off the table with respect to halting the Iranian
nuclear program.
Supporting the policy threads is an important factor in the operation of U.S.
military forces. American military forces can play a large role in shaping Iranian
behavior. Given their inherent
flexibility, sovereign basing, and
tremendous mobility, U.S. naval
forces are particularly well suited
to contributing to shaping activi-
ties. Equally important, the same forces engaged in shaping operations can rap-
idly shift into combat mode, providing high-value military resources to the
theater commander.
Iran’s long-standing foreign-policy goals are to preserve the Islamic regime,
safeguard Iran’s sovereignty, defend its nuclear ambitions, and expand its influ-
ence in the region and the Islamic world. Iranian leaders perceive that regional
developments—including the removal of Saddam and the Taliban, challenges
facing the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increased influence of
Hamas and Hizballah, and, until recently, higher oil revenues—have given Teh-
ran more opportunities and freedom to pursue its objective of becoming a re-
gional power. This perception has produced a more assertive Iranian foreign
policy, in which Tehran has focused on expanding ties in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Levant to influence and exploit more effectively regional political, economic,
and security developments. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear-weapon capability is an-
other element in its more assertive foreign policy.8
In pursuing its policy objectives vis-à-vis Iran, Washington clearly prefers to
rely on a shaping strategy over the direct use of military force. But such a strategy
presupposes that Iran is amenable to being shaped. There are some who argue
that the Iranian leadership is not susceptible to influence, whether by “carrots”
or “sticks.” This would mean that there is no hope of shaping Iranian behavior in
general or, more specifically, of influencing Iran’s decisions on matters of
security and defense.
There, however, is no evidence to support this contention. According to one
leading American authority,
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Although the specifics of Iran’s policies vary considerably, in almost all cases there
has been a shift toward prudence. Particularly near Iran’s own borders, the Islamic
regime has tended to support the status quo with regard to territorial integrity and
has shown a preference for working with governments over substate movements.
Moreover, Iran has tried to contain unrest abroad and has tacitly supported repres-
sion by Turkey and Russia, even when this involved suppressing Muslims. Tehran
has also curtailed ties to most Islamist movements, keeping its network intact but not
pushing for the overthrow of governments.
Iran has also shown prudence in its military posture, including its quest for WMD
[weapons of mass destruction]. Iran’s military budgets have been modest, focused
more on defense than on offense. Despite the geostrategic and other imperatives
driving Iran to acquire WMD, it has done so in a quiet and deliberate manner, avoid-
ing alarm and preventing the United States from developing a strong coalition to
stop its acquisition.9
In fact, Iran has demonstrated a rather nuanced approach to dealing with its
neighbors and with states involved in the region, including the United States.
This suggests that the leadership in Tehran can be influenced and that a process
of shaping its behavior through a mixture of carrots and sticks could be effective
in moderating the regime’s behavior.10
The challenge for the Obama administration will be to find the right kind of
shaping strategy, one that provides signals that Iranian leaders will understand.
As will be discussed below, the U.S. Navy provides a range of options, with vary-
ing degrees of visibility that can contribute to American efforts to shape Iranian
behavior in peacetime or in crisis.
NAVAL OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCING IRAN
The U.S. Navy can be an enormously powerful instrument of policy. There is no
question that in the event of conflict with Iran, the Navy could exert tremendous
pressure through its ability to contest and counter Iranian military moves in the
waters around the Strait of Hormuz. Equally important, it has many potential
opportunities to influence Iran during peacetime and in a crisis. The utility of
naval forces comes from their ability to exert control through Phase 0* presence
and to dominate but contain conflict in Phase II actions. As joint doctrine makes
clear, phases III and beyond require a joint approach. However, as case studies
demonstrate, the Navy has a powerful role in options just short of major conflict.
The ensuing discussion will examine naval options for influencing Iran short of
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those involving a deliberate conflict. Prospective options are grouped by
joint-campaign “phase.” Under each phase, a number of prospective options are
identified.
Shaping the Regional Environment (Phase 0)
Unlike the other services, the Navy has extensive direct experience with the Ira-
nian military and the Revolutionary Guard. American and Iranian warships
pass in close proximity on a regular basis. When operating in the enclosed envi-
ronment of the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to interact with other parties using
the same space, including potential adversaries. This is an important base on
which to develop influence or shaping options. At the same time, all parties in
the region are quite sensitive to changes in that presence. Changes in the number
and types of naval vessels deployed inevitably send messages to friends and foes
alike.
American diplomats view the deployment of naval forces as adding to the ef-
fectiveness of political actions. These forces provide for reassurance of allies, act
as a warning to would-be aggressors, and serve as clear evidence of U.S. interest
in and commitment to the region. One senior diplomat makes the point very
succinctly: “We have stationed two carrier battle groups in the Gulf to reassure
our friends in the Arab world that it remains an area of vital importance to us.”11
Friends and allies of the United States in the Persian Gulf clearly perceive the
presence of its naval forces as deterring potential aggressors. They are not above
using that presence for their own purposes. “Do you think those U.S. warships
are out there on vacation?” Saudi king Abdullah is said to have asked Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during a March 2007 summit meeting.12
The presence of U.S. naval force can shape the regional environment in many
ways. One that is often overlooked is the ability of naval assets to collect intelli-
gence on a wide range of activities. “Maritime domain awareness,” the develop-
ment of a “common operating picture” of the movement of ships and aircraft, is
a critical tool supporting both national and homeland security. Intelligence can
provide warning of emerging dangers, allowing the United States to act to head
them off. The presence of Navy platforms may, in some instances, engender re-
straint on the part of adversaries out of a fear of detection. The U.S. Navy uses a
wide range of assets, including surface vessels, manned and unmanned aerial
platforms, and submarines, to collect intelligence.
Managing the Balance of Forces. The most straightforward way in which the
U.S. Navy can shape the regional environment in the Persian Gulf is by altering
its dispositions in that area. Both the quantity and quality of deployed forces can
be adjusted in response to circumstances. In effect, force deployments can be
treated as a political-military “rheostat” to help establish a more stable
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environment. A change in naval force levels or the character of deployed forces
can communicate a number of messages simultaneously. The most obvious
change in force posture is associated with the movement of carrier battle groups.
With respect to deployment of two carriers to the Persian Gulf in April 2008,
Lieutenant General Carter Ham, Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
said:
It allows us to do a couple of things, by doing that. First, it provides some additional
capability to our commanders in the region for additional air power, which is always
a good thing. It allows us also to demonstrate to our friends and allies in the region a
commitment to security in the region. And importantly, from a military—from a
tactical standpoint, operating two carriers in the same maritime and same airspace si-
multaneously allows us to practice some tactics, techniques and procedures which are
very, very useful to us in a relatively constrained area.13
The U.S. Navy has a range of other assets that it can deploy in the Persian
Gulf to ensure an adequate balance of forces. These include both SSNs and
SSGNs (respectively, nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile–armed sub-
marines). Also, expeditionary strike groups could provide a responsive
land-attack capability, something particularly valuable during the latter stages
of an exit from Iraq.
As U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq and the region, in fact, Washington
may see it as advisable to increase its naval presence in the region in order to
maintain a stable level of military power. Such force deployments can be cali-
brated to provide additional sea-control, land-attack, and amphibious capa-
bilities as needed. The United States has plans to maintain land-based rapid
response forces in Kuwait for the duration of the mission in Iraq and probably
thereafter. Sea-based forces could complement those deployed on land.
It is important that the U.S. government articulate the general strategy and
purpose behind its long-term force deployment plans. Also, the United States
should make explicit the kinds of conditions that would alter these plans. In
the past, the routine reliefs on station of one carrier strike group for another
have been exaggerated in the media as preparations for an attack on Iran.
There is some value in uncertainty. But there is also a value in clarity.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense need to consider what would constitute a stable and robust presence in
the Gulf area, and they should consider making the general character of that
capability known publicly. Changes in naval force deployments could be iden-
tified as contributing to the maintenance of a stable balance of forces in the re-
gion. Moreover, in the event Iran seeks to increase its military capabilities,
additional naval forces could be deployed to counterbalance them and
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maintain overall stability. At the same time, not all deployments should be
“telegraphed” to Tehran. Altering deployments to the Gulf region on a some-
what unpredictable schedule provides CENTCOM another tool with which to
“communicate” with Iran and potentially deter it by maintaining an element
of tactical and operational uncertainty, while at same time demonstrating stra-
tegic (that is, naval) depth.
The new administration is currently developing its own national security
strategy and related force posture requirements, and associated defense budgets.
It is likely that tightening budgets will force reductions in current force levels. In
making choices of where to reduce forces, it will be important that the adminis-
tration recognize two facts. First, the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf is
one way by which the United States exerts influence over the states in the region;
a robust naval presence in the region is required if the Navy is to perform the
multitude of missions it has been assigned. In addition, the character of the na-
val forces deployed is important in American efforts to signal Iran that Tehran
does not have a free hand in the region and that its options for using force to
achieve its regional objectives are quite limited: “The Middle East isn’t a region
to be dominated by Iran. The [Persian] Gulf isn’t a body of water to be con-
trolled by Iran. That’s why we’ve seen the United States station two carrier battle
groups in the region.”14
Second, because of the distances involved, for every ship deployed in the Per-
sian Gulf, the Navy needs at least three more in the fleet to allow for rotation,
steaming time, and maintenance. Even seemingly small reductions in the size of
the fleet can have enormous consequences for the U.S. Navy’s presence in the
Persian Gulf.
Confidence-Building Measures. Since the late 1970s, the Persian Gulf has been
an arena of extraordinary tensions. Since that time the U.S. Navy has been en-
gaged in two declared conflicts—DESERT SHIELD/STORM and Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM—several individual military engagements, and a host of other mili-
tary operations. In addition, the region has seen internal conflicts, such as the
1980–88 Iran-Iraq War. American naval forces and those of some two dozen na-
vies have continually navigated the congested waters of the Gulf. It is no surprise
that incidents involving military forces, such as the Exocet missile strike on the
USS Stark (FFG 31) in May 1987 and the January 2008 confrontation between
Iranian patrols boats and U.S. Navy warships, continue to occur.
It is all too easy to think that the only U.S. naval options for influencing Iran
are those intended to counter the latter’s negative behavior. Far more intriguing
is the possibility of employing the American naval presence in the region in ways
that might encourage positive behavior. Given the parlous state of the current
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relationship between Washington and Tehran, efforts to develop a more positive
relationship should start with small, concrete steps that benefit both sides and
demonstrate the potential for cooperative endeavors.
Iran and the United States have been in a state of nearly unrelieved confronta-
tion for almost thirty years. Since the Iranian revolution, the United States and
the Islamic Republic of Iran have
had virtually no direct communi-
cations. Even their indirect en-
gagements have been limited.
This lack of communications is
dangerous for all parties. The U.S.
Chief of Naval Operations, Admi-
ral Gary Roughead, observes, “I do not have a direct link with my counterpart in
the Iranian Navy. I don’t have a way to communicate directly with the Iranian
Navy or Guard.”15 Even more challenging is the gulf that exists between the U.S.
Navy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which also maintains
a significant naval force. Recent incidents involving U.S. naval vessels in the Per-
sian Gulf have involved IRGC units, not forces of the Iranian navy.
The reality is, however, that Iran and the United States do talk to one another
constantly. They do so in the context of the day-to-day operations in the Persian
Gulf that both refuse to talk about. These are not formal communications but
rather the tactical exchanges necessitated by the operation of ships in close prox-
imity; in the cramped waters of the Persian Gulf, American and Iranian military
forces communicate daily. As one senior U.S. naval officer has pointed out, “We
are operating very close to their territorial waters in a very confined space with a
tremendous amount of traffic, be it the small dhows, be it the supertankers go-
ing up to the oil platforms. . . . The margin of error is smaller in that the space is
more confined. That would be the case even if anyone was your ally, just because
of the sheer small size of the Arabian Gulf.”16
One approach that can be employed to shape the region’s political environ-
ment and, at the same time, address specific issues is the development of
confidence-building measures (CBMs). These measures are intended to reduce
fear and suspicion and to make the behavior of states more predictable. Typi-
cally, CBMs involve the exchange of information, particularly regarding the sta-
tus and activities of armed forces, and the creation of agreed mechanisms to
verify this information.
A recent study by a reputable nonprofit institution identified naval CBMs as
one avenue for establishing at some level official communications between Iran
and the United States and at the same time addressing immediate, practical se-
curity issues. The study proposed an effort to articulate CBMs related to major
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security issues. Related to this proposal was another that CBMs start with practi-
cal and operational challenges in areas of common interest, such as incidents at
sea, drug trafficking, and border control.17 Success in these areas would result in
a number of benefits for U.S. security and that of the region. Agreed-upon “rules
of the road” and communications channels for dealing with incidents at sea or
interdiction of drug trafficking would benefit U.S. naval operations in the
Persian Gulf.
The United States could also seek to cooperate with Iran on a limited basis in
carefully selected areas. It would be unwise to push immediately for an “inci-
dents at sea” agreement between the United States and Iran. Instead, the United
States should explore the possibility of a series of more limited measures to build
up a history of cooperative activities with Iran. One of these might be
counternarcotics and countersmuggling. Such cooperation could begin most
simply with the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard offering to keep the Iranian navy ap-
prised of American patrol activities. This could then be expanded to exchanges
of information on illicit activities and possibly by a U.S. offer to provide Iran
with data from tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plat-
forms. This type of cooperation was successfully undertaken by Great Britain in
the 1990s.18
The United States could pursue discussions with Iran on CBMs not directly
but through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although the GCC states
and Iran have often been in opposition, they share a common interest in safe
passage through the Gulf. In addition, by leading any discussions with Iran the
GCC would provide something of a buffer to the low-level U.S.-Iranian dialogue
that would naturally occur. The focus should be on engaging the Iranian navy
and not the IRGC. Discussions should be very low-key and designed to address
issues of mutual interest.
Operate with Allies. As discussed above, the new American naval strategy places
great emphasis on cooperation with allies and the development of indigenous
naval capabilities. This is an area that has seen tremendous progress since 2001,
driven by the demands of the war on terror. The U.S. Navy has conducted nu-
merous exercises involving global allies as well as nations in the Middle East.
Many of these exercises are focused on operations other than war, such as
humanitarian assistance and civil support.
Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence,
creating security and removing conditions for conflict. Maritime ballistic missile de-
fense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of protection to forward-
deployed forces and friends and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture
planned for defense of the United States. Our advantage in space—upon which much
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of our ability to operate in a networked, dispersed fashion depends—must be pro-
tected and extended. We will use forward based and forward deployed forces,
space-based assets, sea-based strategic deterrence and other initiatives to deter those
who wish us harm.19
Numerous examples of what the Navy has been doing to improve coopera-
tion with U.S. allies could be mentioned. In November 2007 it began a series of
exercises in the Gulf and nearby waters with a five-day crisis-response exercise
involving an aircraft carrier, two assault ships, and other amphibious ships, as
well as air and medical forces. The start of the exercises coincided with an agree-
ment of world powers in London to move ahead with a third round of sanctions
against Iran. Tehran tried to address their concerns about its nuclear program.
The purposes of the exercises were described by a Navy spokesman: “Our pri-
mary goal is to enforce maritime security including the free flow of commerce
through the Gulf for all regional partners. . . . We are committed to keeping the
Strait of Hormuz open to ensure that there is a free flow of commerce through-
out the region.”20
Cooperative activities and exercises can also be conducted to address sce-
narios other than potential conflicts. In 2007 the U.S. Navy participated in a
disaster-response exercise in the region. The first phase was a tabletop dis-
cussion that focused on planning, after which operational assets moved into
action and USS Wasp (LHD 1) transported relief supplies and equipment
ashore to a staging base in Bahrain. The exercise scenario involved a tropical cy-
clone striking a notional regional nation, destroying its critical infrastructure,
shutting down its international airport and desalination and electrical plants,
and displacing thousands of citizens. The scenario also included an oil spill from
a damaged tanker at sea. According to Rear Admiral Terence E. McKnight, Com-
bined Task Force (CTF) 59 commander, “One cannot predict when or where a
natural disaster is going to take place. But we can train to improve our response
when a host nation requests our assistance. Coalition forces are committed to
helping a host nation that requests our assistance by providing support, security
and stability to the region.”21
The Navy is aggressively conducting maritime security operations in the re-
gion, evolutions intended to combat sea-based and other illegal activities, such
as hijacking, piracy, and human trafficking. The CENTCOM Coalition Mari-
time Forces Component and its subordinate combined task forces (150, 152, and
158) are designed to conduct multinational coalition security activities. Creat-
ing combined maritime forces is important in signaling to adversaries the
United States is not acting alone. CTF 150, established near the beginning of
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, with logistics facilities at Djibouti, is tasked to
monitor, inspect, board, and stop suspect shipping off the Horn of Africa.
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Countries recently contributing to CTF 150 include Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, aside from the United States;
other nations that have participated are Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. The command of the task force rotates
among the participating navies, usually between four to six months at a time.
The task force usually comprises fourteen or fifteen vessels.
CTF 152, established in March 2004, is responsible for conducting maritime
security operations in the central and southern Persian Gulf. CTF 158 is an in-
ternational naval task group set up to operate in Iraqi waters. It consists of assets
from the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, the Royal Australian Navy, and the
Singaporean navy working alongside elements of the Iraqi navy and the Iraqi
marines.
Cooperation involves far more than simply hosting American forces. A wide
range of advisory, training, and exercise activity takes place with southern Gulf
states, as well as British and sometimes French forces, at the multilateral level.22
Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) conducts maritime security
conferences and symposiums in its area of responsibility, such as the Maritime
Infrastructure Protection Symposium, in Bahrain 26–28 February 2008.
NAVCENT’s deployed forces are operationally assigned to the Fifth Fleet, units
of which conduct mine-hunting and sweeping exercises and live operations,
mine-countermeasures surveys, and explosive ordnance disposal. These activ-
ities help ensure the sea lines of communication remain open, guaranteeing
the free flow of commerce into and out of the region.
A lack of interoperability, specialization, and orientation around key mis-
sions leaves most southern Gulf navies with only limited ability to cooperate in
these activities. So does a lack of effective airborne surveillance and of modern
mine and antisubmarine warfare capabilities.23 Saudi Arabia is planning a major
modernization program for its Eastern, or Persian Gulf, Fleet that would include
surface combatants, helicopters, seagoing tugs, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The Littoral Combat Ship would be an excellent candidate for this program, and
its sale would help achieve interoperability. To achieve interoperability, an in-
crease in the number of training exercises with regional navies, either at the bi-
lateral or multilateral level, is needed. Also required will be standard operating
procedures, doctrine, and a common data link for shared and improved situa-
tional awareness.24
Maritime Domain Awareness. While the U.S. Navy has many options for Phase
0, some gaps have been identified. An important policy recommendation would
be to consider improvements that would enhance shaping operations. One of
these is to boost surveillance capabilities and improve allied participation to
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establish and maintain maritime domain awareness. Such tasks as maintaining
tracks on nonemitting vessels that do not respond to hails can make a major dif-
ference in the maritime environment. Data for the maritime picture can be fed
by many types of surveillance sensors and platforms. What is needed is a careful
fusion of information into a common picture, followed by dissemination to
those who need it.
One of the most powerful tools available to the United States in shaping re-
gional security environments and empowering local allies is its ability to provide
“enablers” that enhance the operational effectiveness of friendly forces. Exam-
ples include sensors and surveillance systems, communications capabilities, en-
gineering and logistics functions, simulators, and mission planning. Among the
most important enablers are the ISR systems that contribute to maritime
domain awareness.
Deterring Hostile Actions (Phase I)
A central focus of U.S. military deployments in the Persian Gulf is to deter Iran
from taking actions deemed inimical to American interests. The presence of U.S.
naval forces in the Gulf, and since 1991 in Kuwait, is a visible demonstration of
the interest of the United States in the region and of commitment to secure its
national interests and defend allies.
Iran’s actions of principal concern to the United States include its nuclear
program, support for extremist groups in the region, assistance to anti-U.S.
forces in Iraq, and efforts to undermine U.S. allies. In addition, Iran’s efforts to
develop asymmetric capabilities designed to hold U.S. forces and allies in the re-
gion at risk or to contest movement in the Gulf must also be considered as po-
tentially destabilizing. American planners must consider the possibility that
Iran may threaten to resort to military force should the pressures on Tehran to
change its behaviors become intolerable.
Deterrence must include a clear message to Iran that it cannot alter the strate-
gic situation in the region through the use of force, however much it may try. In
recent years, Iran has engaged in a series of information operations intended to
create the impression that it is capable of exerting its military power in the Per-
sian Gulf. Iranian sources claim that the Islamic Republic’s navy can close the
Gulf. To accomplish this, Iran is relying on a strategy of asymmetric warfare—in
essence, guerrilla warfare at sea.25
The United States, together with its allies, needs to conduct its own informa-
tion campaign. This campaign should be accompanied by clear demonstra-
tions—through exercises, fleet deployments, and cooperative activities with
allies—that the United States can rapidly defeat Iran’s asymmetric warfare
strategy.
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The heart of deterrence and dissuasion is the promise of unacceptable
consequences. The recipient of the deterrent/dissuasion message must con-
sider either his fate too painful or his gain too small to justify his current be-
havior. In other words, he must be confronted by the likelihood that the
opponent will impose unacceptable costs or negate the effects of his actions.
Deterrence theory suggests a number of potential options: preemption/first
strike, retaliation, and defenses, either alone or in combination. It may be
possible to threaten preemption or retaliation with conventional forces even
against a nuclear-armed adversary, although the persuasiveness of a
nonnuclear response to a nuclear threat is uncertain.
It is important that a deterrence/dissuasion strategy be, to the greatest extent
possible, collective in nature, involving U.S. allies in the region. Obviously, the
support of allies would be important to the implementation of most deterrent
threats. Equally important, there should be no doubt in the minds of Iran’s lead-
ers that the United States and its allies are in agreement regarding responses to
Iranian actions. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for greater co-
operation among the Gulf nations in the areas of air and missile defense and the
monitoring of local waters as a means of deterring Iran.26 The fact that the
United States and its allies, particularly the GCC states, are undertaking serious
contingency planning should be part of the deterrent message to Iran.
Offensive Deterrent Options. What kinds of offensive military options might
the United States need either to supplement its economic, diplomatic, and other
tools to dissuade Iran from resorting to military force? Options for the use of
force must be credible and appropriate to the nature of the activities to be de-
terred. At the same time, the United States must indicate that it can escalate be-
yond the ability of the Iranian military to respond. Speaking to the idea of using
the threat of disproportionate military action to dissuade hostile Iranian ac-
tions, defense analyst Anthony Cordesman suggests that
this could mean at least demonstrating U.S. capability to carry out far more punitive
strikes. Iran is vulnerable in other areas. The U.S. has no interest in the survival of its
gas facilities, power grid, or refineries. It may have underground nuclear facilities,
but its reactor facility is vulnerable and so are its military production facilities. Asym-
metric warfare is not simply the province of the weak; it is also the province of the
strong.27
Deterrent options often require visibility or public disclosure that are not al-
ways consonant with the secrecy and surprise that operational consideration
would ordinarily warrant. It is reported that most U.S. Navy ships transit the
Strait of Hormuz at night, so as not to attract attention, and rarely in large num-
bers. On at least one occasion, however, a daylight transit was conducted.
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Depending on specific circumstances, one relatively straightforward option
available to the Navy would be to make certain transits during the day or in
relatively large numbers.
Without question, naval forces would play a prominent part in any strike op-
tion against Iran. As noted above, the United States has periodically deployed
carrier battle groups to the Gulf as a reminder of its offensive and defensive ca-
pabilities. The Navy has the option under its Fleet Response Plan to surge carrier
forces to the Gulf. This would be a highly visible and potentially provocative ac-
tion, one that should only be taken when there is a requirement to send the
strongest signal to Tehran.
A possible alternative deterrent option could be to deploy one or more of the
Navy’s four cruise missile–armed submarines to the Gulf region. Unlike the car-
rier option, this would not be a visible deterrent, but it could be accompanied
with an information campaign making clear that the United States was deploy-
ing assets of this type to the region.
Defensive Deterrent Options. Iran has repeatedly sought to pursue its own de-
terrence strategy. This has centered on the threat to contest transit of the Persian
Gulf or otherwise interfere with the flow of oil. The Iranian Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei, has warned, “If the Americans make a wrong move toward
Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans
would not be able to protect energy supply in the region.”28
Iran has deployed a broad range of capabilities to threaten both civilian and
military shipping in the Gulf. This includes a large number of small surface ves-
sels, submarines, sea mines, shore-based antishipping cruise missiles, and
manned aircraft.29 This capability is intended to support an antiaccess strategy.
The former commander of CENTCOM, Admiral William Fallon, has described
Iran’s increasing military capabilities as focused on blocking U.S. military oper-
ations: “Based on my read of their military hardware acquisitions and develop-
ment of tactics . . . they are posturing themselves with the capability to attempt
to deny us the ability to operate in this vicinity.”30
The U.S. Navy could counter Iranian threats to itself or commercial shipping
in the Gulf, thereby potentially deterring not only such attacks but undercutting
a main pillar of Iran’s effort to create its own asymmetric threat. The principal
deterrent the Navy can provide is the capability to surge large and capable forces
into the Gulf region. Such a force must be able to conduct a wide range of mis-
sions, strike a broad range of sea- and land-based targets, conduct antimine and
antisubmarine operations, and engage in comprehensive ISR.
As the Navy surges into the Gulf, it would have to deal with a number of Ira-
nian antiaccess threats. But in order to cope with some threats, such as sea mines
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and small boats, it would be necessary to establish air dominance. The combina-
tion of F/A-18E/Fs, F-18 Growler electronic-warfare aircraft, and, when they are
deployed, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters will give the Navy a powerful contribution
to what will be a joint fight.
Successful air dominance will include area air and missile defense. The de-
fense against cruise missiles is a challenge the Navy is preparing to address. Its
Naval Integrated Fire Control–Counter Air (NIFC-CA) program is a “system of
systems” that will link sensors, aircraft, ships, and even land-based air-defense
missiles to neutralize large numbers of targets at long ranges and all altitudes.
This improvement is essential, because missile defense has become a multilay-
ered problem. Threats come from short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
and combinations of them. Cruise missiles can be launched from land or sea,
further complicating the problem. The Navy needs to improve its capabilities
continuously if it is to maintain unfettered access near Iran.
For example, central to NIFC-CA is the new E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. The
E-2D will not only expand the Navy’s surveillance capability but also, for the
first time, enable naval and joint forces to conduct effective defenses against
cruise missiles. The E-2D will be able to draw threat data from its own sensors
and other ISR systems, establish engagement priorities, and match available
weapons to targets. Demonstrating this capability in the Gulf could be a signifi-
cant deterrent to Iranian aggression.
Iran has an inventory of 195 patrol boats and small surface combatants. Most
of these are armed with, at best, machine guns and small-caliber cannons. Iran
also has three frigates, ten fast attack craft, and another dozen patrol boats
armed with antiship cruise missiles. In a 6 January 2008 incident, five Iranian
high-speed boats reportedly charged U.S. warships and perhaps even threatened
to blow them up. In mid-December 2007, an American warship fired a warning
shot at a small Iranian boat that came too close, causing the Iranians to pull
back.
One experienced naval officer referred to incidents like these as evincing an
Iranian desire to “scrape paint” with a U.S. warship. They convey the deter-
mined, committed face of Iran’s navy. Professional as Iranian naval personnel
are on most occasions, the clear impression conveyed is that Iranian crews can
be very determined and ready to seize opportunities to “shape back,” with pos-
turing activities directed at the United States and other nations.
Navy surface combatants and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft all can be de-
ployed against the Iranian surface threat generally. The United States has a range
of options for dealing with the small-boat threat specifically. In the near future,
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), equipped with the antiship module, will be an
extremely effective means of countering limited Iranian small-boat operations.
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One deterrent option that falls in the U.S. Navy’s domain of expertise is an-
tisubmarine warfare (ASW). Iran has three Russian-built Kilo-class diesel-
electric submarines, armed with advanced torpedoes and mines. More than
half of Iran’s inventory of modern mines is deployable only by the Kilos. The
U.S. Navy is seeking to rehone skills in ASW lost after the end of the Cold War;
it will need them if it is to find and neutralize rapidly Iran’s submarines. Here
the LCS, employing ASW modules, will be extremely effective. So too would be
the Virginia-class SSN, with its improved sonar, mast-mounted sensors, and
weapons systems.
Iran also is seeking to develop a credible missile threat against its neighbors
and to American military bases in the region.31 The deployment of effective mis-
sile defenses could dissuade Iran
from pursuing this option or, at
the very least, reduce its effective-
ness. The United States maintains
at least one Patriot Advanced Ca-
pability 3 (PAC-3) battery in Kuwait and is assisting Israel (which Iran has long
threatened to target) in the development and operation of its long-range missile
defenses.
The U.S. Navy is planning to deploy the Aegis ballistic missile–defense
(BMD) system on dozens of surface combatants. This capability could add im-
measurably to U.S. capabilities to defeat the threat and hence to dissuade Iran
from pursuing a very expensive military program. This effort could begin with a
series of exercises and demonstrations in the Gulf. In June 2008 the U.S. Navy
conducted a coordinated naval missile-defense exercise in the eastern Mediter-
ranean and northern Persian Gulf. This exercise demonstrated the ability to
share data and track ballistic missiles along multiple flight trajectories.32
Missile defenses can also serve to reassure allies, such as Israel, making it po-
tentially less likely that they would react to a perceived threat from Iran with of-
fensive action. But for this assurance to be credible, the United States would have
to station several Aegis-capable ships permanently in the Persian Gulf and pos-
sibly also in the Black Sea. In addition, the Navy would need to increase the
number of Aegis warships equipped with the new antimissile-capable Standard
Missile 2. It has today too few Aegis BMD-capable ships, armed with too few
missiles.
The U.S. Navy can provide deterrence options in addition to sea-based forces.
Navy aerial assets can be deployed from land bases in the region in a display of
American engagement, cooperation with allies, and ability to oppose Iranian
threats. The Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye air-surveillance/command-and-control and
EP-3 intelligence-collection aircraft provide critical support not only to naval
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operations but to CENTCOM’s overall plans and activities. Deploying these air-
craft as early as possible to the Gulf region could demonstrate to Iran the futility
of its strategy of deploying antishipping cruise missiles.
The United States can also contribute to its deterrence objectives by improv-
ing the capabilities of its allies. Washington needs to press the GCC countries to
increase their ability to operate as a combined force both among themselves and
with U.S. forces. Given their small populations, their militaries need to focus on
quality—in other words, technology—over quantity. These nations should be
convinced to invest in air and missile defense capabilities, ISR, mine warfare,
and even ASW. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a modernization program for its East-
ern Fleet that could see acquisition of ten to twelve Littoral Combat Ships plus
helicopters, support ships, and naval tugs. In addition, passive defenses, includ-
ing hardening of critical facilities, communications, command and control in-
frastructure, and airfields, should be encouraged.33
Seize the Initiative/Containing Aggression (Phase II)
The overriding focus of Phase II operations is ensuring the free flow of traffic in
the Persian Gulf. This responsibility was made clear by Admiral Kevin Cosgriff,
former commander of the Fifth Fleet, when in response to reporters’ questions
regarding the possibility that Iran might seek to close the Strait of Hormuz he
declared that this would be equivalent to “saying to the world that 40 percent of
oil is now held hostage by a single country.” Cosgriff went on to declare, “We will
not allow Iran to close it.”34
The primary focus of naval options in Phase II must be preventing Iran from
controlling access to the Persian Gulf and from interfering with the flow of oil. A
secondary focus is to deny Iran the ability to escalate conflict. In order to achieve
both of these objectives, the U.S. Navy must be able to seize the initiative rapidly.
Although a shift from Phase I to Phase II operations would mean that deter-
rence has failed, it is unlikely to have failed completely. As has been seen in the
past, Iranian aggression may be limited. The IRGC may conduct hostile acts but
not the Iranian military. Aggression may take the form of deployment of sea
mines but not of direct attacks on commercial or military vessels. Iran may take
action at sea but not threaten U.S. bases or allies in the region. By ensuring that it
is able to respond at the level of aggression demonstrated by Iran, the U.S. Navy
can help to limit its scope without offering a provocation that could lead to
escalation.
Crisis Communications. One of the important considerations as a crisis evolves
into a confrontation or even outright hostilities is the need to avoid conflict by
mistake or miscommunications. This would be particularly important in the
crowded and often confusing environment of the Persian Gulf. Good crisis
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communication is also important in complex humanitarian situations, where
the movement of U.S. naval forces might be misinterpreted. For that reason, the
U.S. Navy has practiced crisis communications as part of its exercise program in
the region, as well as globally.35
An outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf would take place in the context
of transformed international news media, which would affect how the entire
world responded to the situation. Iran would undertake its own information
campaign to influence the behavior of regional parties and world public opin-
ion. As suggested above, it is important for the U.S. Navy to pursue in peacetime
options to develop better communications with elements of the Iranian mili-
tary. Such options might bear remarkable fruit when it comes to the opening of
hostilities.
Crisis communications must be part of the Navy’s information operations
plan. The most likely scenarios involving an outbreak of hostilities should be
identified and war-gamed. The Navy can provide CENTCOM and the national
command authorities (i.e., the president and secretary of defense) with commu-
nications options to support theater operations and global outreach. It is likely
that the U.S. Navy and Fifth Fleet have developed options for use in an escalating
crisis.
Mine Clearance. One characteristic of past confrontations with Iran has been
that nation’s indirect use of military means. During the so-called Tanker War
of the 1980s, the Iranians engaged in limited operations in the Gulf, using
mines deployed from civilian vessels. Iran could again seek to deploy mines
surreptitiously.
The ability to neutralize rapidly the Iranian air and naval threats in the
Persian Gulf would also be critical to efforts by American naval forces to
counter the Iranian sea-mining capability. The Navy has been conducting
mine warfare exercises in the Gulf primarily using aging Avenger-class
mine-countermeasures ships. The Navy is moving to modular counter-mine
systems embedded on destroyers, submarines, helicopters, and the new Lit-
toral Combat Ship. Additional exercises using more modern systems would
be a valuable demonstration of U.S. capability.
Rapid deployment of minesweeping systems would provide an option for
countering a major Iranian threat. The Navy needs to make it easier to surge
minesweeping capabilities—both the existing vessels and newer, more capa-
ble remote de-mining systems—to the Gulf. The U.S. Navy also should en-
courage the GCC to acquire advanced minesweeping capabilities.
Antisubmarine Warfare. Over the longer term, one of the more potent threats
available to Iran, as noted, is its fleet of Russian-built Kilo-class attack
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submarines, armed with antiship cruise missiles and mines. The U.S. Navy
would have to move extremely rapidly to neutralize this threat, particularly be-
fore the Kilos could lay mines to impede the Persian Gulf shipping channels.36
One possible option would be to destroy the Kilos before they could be de-
ployed. Such a preemptive action could be made conditional on intelligence that
they were preparing to deploy. Precision strikes against Iran’s submarine plat-
forms could be carried out by Navy strike aircraft and cruise missile–armed
ships and submarines.
It would also possible, albeit more difficult, to find, track, and engage the Ki-
los under way. To be successful, the U.S. Navy would have to deploy a significant
number of airborne, surface, and subsurface ASW platforms and defend these
against Iranian air defense and antiship capabilities.
Missile Defense. The Iranian use of ballistic or cruise missiles could be central to
the move from Phase I to Phase II. The ability to deploy theater missile defenses
rapidly to protect American facilities and forces and allied territory could help
control the level of violence and deny Iran the initiative.
Sea-based missile defenses are currently the most widely available, deploy-
able, and flexible capability available to a theater commander. Aegis BMD-
capable ships could be deployed to provide effective missile defenses of the
Gulf region. One or more ships could be routinely deployed in anticipation
of an escalating crisis, providing defense against Iranian preemption. If ships
needed to be deployed to the Gulf after hostilities had started, they would be
made part of a task force, for protection against other Iranian threats. Of
course, any ships deployed would have to be on constant guard for such
threats as antiship cruise missiles. A robust, credible ability to deal with the
most sophisticated antiship cruise missiles on the market is vital for main-
taining shaping options.
For the longer term, the Navy could have additional missile defense capabili-
ties such as a replacement for the cancelled Kinetic Energy Interceptor or a
marinized version of the Theater High-Altitude Air Defense System. Such a sys-
tem could be deployed in the Black Sea or eastern Mediterranean to defend Eu-
rope and the United States against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.
Blockade. What might be done short of war were Iran to move aggressively to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability? One of the most powerful (yet poten-
tially dangerous) options is a blockade. In 2008, resolutions were introduced
in both houses of Congress calling for increased pressure on the government of
Iran by, among other means, prohibiting the import of refined petroleum
products.37 Such a blockade would be an obvious possibility should Iran at-
tempt to interfere with the flow of oil or seek to close the Persian Gulf entirely.
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But it would also be a potential “weapon of last resort,” for use if nonmilitary ef-
forts to halt Iran’s nuclear program failed.
Once Iran actually built nuclear weapons, a blockade would be a riskier op-
tion. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, a blockade might
still be a useful option should Iran seek to use its nascent nuclear capability as a
shield behind which to attack its neighbors or interfere with the free flow of
commerce in the Gulf. The recent United Nations resolution allowing mem-
bers states to halt and even board North Korean ships suspected of carrying
contraband materials is an example of a “blockadelike” action taken against a
state that has demonstrated some nuclear-weapons capabilities.
Operationally, such an effort would be well within the capacity of the U.S.
Navy. It would involve continuing global surveillance to identify cargoes and
ships bound for Iran. Halting and inspecting ships is something at which the
Navy is very good.
HOLDING FAST TO MARITIME OPTIONS
It is clear that the U.S. Navy has already made and continues to make a signifi-
cant contribution to shaping the strategic behavior of Iran. The Navy can pro-
vide options for the theater commander and the national authorities across the
spectrum of conflict. What is particularly important is the number and variety
of options available to support early shaping activities.
In Phase 0 the Navy can take a leading role in providing means for opening
communications with elements of the Iranian military. The development of
confidence-building measures would both reduce risks inherent in conduct-
ing day-to-day operations in the Gulf and provide an opening for improved
communications. The Navy can also have a major positive impact on the secu-
rity of allies in the region through cooperative exercises, educational activities,
and the extension of maritime domain awareness. Enhanced cooperation with
allies would appear to be the most important option in both Phase 0 and Phase
I. In these phases naval forces would be expected to operate in conjunction
with other elements of U.S. power, such as the State Department. In the event
of conflict with Iran, the Navy—though it would operate with joint and com-
bined forces—would have perhaps the most important strategic role of all U.S.
forces. It will be required to ensure that the Gulf remains open to friendly mili-
tary and commercial traffic and that the movement of oil is not interdicted.
The Navy needs to focus on ensuring that it can deal with the most stressing
threats to movement in and through the Gulf, specifically sea mines, Iranian
submarines and missile-armed patrol craft, and nuisance (even suicide) at-
tacks by small, high-speed boats. An additional important role for the Navy is
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the provision of effective missile defense; the ability to neutralize that threat
will contribute significantly to deterrence of Iranian aggression.
If the adversarial situation between the United States and Iran persists, the
United States will have to address the potential improvements that Iran is likely
to make in its military capabilities. Among these would be “triple-digit” surface-
to-air missiles, advanced sea-skimming cruise missiles with passive radar seek-
ers, and more capable ballistic missiles. The counter to these threats would be
more and better air and missile defenses.
Cynics often point out that military power is a blunt instrument. In the case
of Navy shaping operations short of war, recent experience shows the set of tools
to be in fact remarkably fine and well adapted to their tasks. Keeping the Strait of
Hormuz open, providing an operational architecture for allies, and hemming in
Iranian military options constitute major roles for today’s U.S. Navy. Given the
high-stakes diplomacy under way now, holding fast to maritime options is
indispensable.
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THE NEW SECURITY DRAMA IN EAST ASIA
The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners to China’s Rise
Evan S. Medeiros
In the theater of East Asia, a geopolitical drama is unfolding. The growing pres-ence of China in regional economic and security affairs—generically referred to
as the “rise of China”—is changing interstate rela-
tions. While the major powers in East Asia are the pro-
tagonists, there are no bit players in this drama. Think
King Lear, not Macbeth. China’s rise is affecting the
perceptions, interests, and policies of all nations
throughout East Asia. For the United States, the re-
sponses of its allies and security partners are uniquely
consequential. These countries are the foundation of
American presence in the region as well as the edifice
of a regional security architecture that has produced
decades of relative stability and prosperity.1
Much of the prevailing research about regional re-
sponses to the rise of China makes this drama sound
like a slowly unfolding tragedy for the United States.
Many argue that China is rapidly gaining regional in-
fluence at the expense of the United States. The use of
superlatives abounds in the description of China’s rise
in East Asia, with the unproven implication that this
uniformly redounds to Beijing’s benefit and to Ameri-
can disadvantage. Joshua Kurlantzick notably argued
that China’s “charm offensive” is allowing it to dis-
place the United States as the dominant power in East
Asia.2
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To understand and evaluate these evolving dynamics, the RAND Corpora-
tion conducted a year-long study of the responses of U.S. allies and security
partners in East Asia.3 The study sought to answer four questions: How have
these nations responded to China? What forces are driving these reactions? How
will the drivers change? What are the implications for American regional secu-
rity interests? The study examined the responses to China of the five U.S. allies in
the Asia-Pacific and of Singapore, a major security partner.4 The RAND study
analyzed the responses of these six nations in four areas: domestic politics and
public opinion, economic policy, foreign policy, and defense policy. This
structure allowed the study to explore a range of national responses as well as
responses across each functional area (e.g., defense policy), generating conclu-
sions about both country-specific and regionwide responses to China. This ar-
ticle highlights the most salient findings from this research.
OVERALL REGIONAL RESPONSES TO CHINA’S RISE
In contrast to much of the current research, China’s growing presence and inter-
actions with U.S. allies and security partners are not fundamentally transform-
ing the security order in the Asia-Pacific. China is having an influence on these
relationships, but these changes are not as rapid or comprehensive as many
presume.
First, the foundation of the U.S. alliances in Asia continues to endure. No al-
lies or major security partners see China as a viable strategic alternative to the
United States. The United States remains the security partner of choice, largely
because it is the one nation seen as possessing the capability and resolve to bal-
ance China. Its allies and partners prefer that Washington do the “heavy lifting”
of deterring China and, ultimately, preventing Chinese domination of regional
affairs. U.S. allies are all intensely pursuing engagement strategies with China,
driven principally by an economic logic. They want to benefit from China’s large
and growing economy, especially during the current global recession. But these
goals exist alongside concerns about China’s long-term intentions, particularly
its military modernization plans. A recent project by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies that uniquely polled elites throughout Asia confirmed this
duality. The study found that China was ranked first as the “greatest threat to
peace and stability in the next 10 years” and second as the “greatest force for
peace and stability” in the next ten years.5
Second, China is affecting American relationships with its allies and security
partners. On the one hand, China’s rise makes some U.S. security commitments
more relevant. These countries can interact with China more confidently be-
cause they know (and Chinese leaders see) that the U.S. commitments to them
and to involvement in Asia continue. On the other hand, allies and partners are
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also positioning themselves to benefit from both the United States and China.
This is a recalibration more than a transformation. None of these nations want
to choose between the United States and China, and all reject having to make
such a choice. Also, some of these nations use their interactions with China to
generate leverage in dealings with the United States. Some of the smaller, middle
powers in East Asia, like the Philippines and Thailand, have attempted such
strategies. On balance, U.S. allies and security partners want continued Ameri-
can involvement in the region but sometimes only in certain ways, at certain
times, and on particular issues.
Third, China is undoubtedly gaining influence with U.S. allies and partners
in East Asia—in the defined sense of looming larger in their economic, diplo-
matic, and defense policies decisions. This is a natural and inevitable trend.
The key question is how it is manifesting itself in these states’ regional behav-
iors. Our research found that U.S. allies and partners in Asia have become
more sensitive to some of China’s preferences and interests, especially on
China’s self-identified “core interests” (hexin liyi), which now include both
Taiwan and Tibet.6 There have been several instances in which specific nations
have canceled visits and changed policies on these issues due to Chinese inter-
vention. But this too is not terribly surprising. Sovereignty issues resonate with
many postcolonial states in Asia and, more important, changes in Taiwan or Ti-
bet policy are seldom costly for these states in the sense of undermining their
material interests. Thus, these behaviors are not leading indicators of wholesale
accommodation to China.
A related indicator of Chinese influence on these states is that Beijing has
been effective at precluding the emergence of “anti-China” containment efforts,
to the extent that there was ever a push for such an approach. China has been ef-
fective at accumulating “defensive influence,” persuading nations to avoid tak-
ing actions China deems to be threatening. There is very little evidence that
China has accumulated “offensive influence,” in the sense of policies that could
effectively degrade or dismantle U.S. alliances or security partnerships in the re-
gion. In the late 1990s, China tried and failed to offer an alternative regional se-
curity architecture, with the promotion of its “New Security Concept.” Few
nations were interested, or now are, in jumping onto this strategic bandwagon,
even in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 and the disillusionment
with American responses to it. More recent Chinese attempts to push U.S. allies
have backfired, alienating regional states and enhancing their coordination with
the United States. Prominent examples include Singapore in 2004 and South
Korea in 2006.7
In assessing China’s rise in East Asia, two additional considerations are note-
worthy. First, China’s growing presence and interactions in the region do not
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directly translate into influence—that is, using incentives and sanctions to alter
other states’ behavior. Many analysts too often mistake presence for influence.
The fact that countries are trading more with China and negotiating with it in
regional organizations does not, ipso facto, imply that China can change these
states’ policies, especially when policy changes require a state to compromise its
material interests.
Second, the regional consensus favoring engagement with China has a tenta-
tive quality. There is creeping uncertainty about China’s future: some nations
fear a weak China, and some fear a strong China. Few are willing to bet their fu-
tures on Beijing’s assurances about a “peaceful rise.” China’s large and growing
economy (even during the current global recession) is not a geopolitical “tractor
beam.” While China’s economy looms large for all nations, fears of China as a
competitive threat have motivated much diversification in trade relations. There
are nagging concerns among regional leaders about Chinese military modern-
ization. As People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities improve, such as with
the likely future deployment of China’s first aircraft carrier, and as the PLA con-
ducts more out-of-area operations, these nagging concerns could evolve into
closer security coordination with the United States and its allies. The recent
statement of concern about China’s growing defense budget by South Korea’s
president during new security consultations with Australia is instructive in this
regard.
A final regional response to China’s rise is a nonevent—the lack of a regional
rush, over the last decade, to increase military budgets and modernize conven-
tional forces in response to concerns about China’s military. The military bud-
gets of Japan and South Korea have remained relatively flat in real terms, with
gradual increases in South Korean defense spending. Southeast Asian militaries’
budgets did not substantially increase either in the last decade; many just re-
turned to the spending levels of the period prior to the Asian financial crisis (see
figures 1 and 2). There are even some notable examples of a deep atrophy in ex-
ternal defense capabilities, such as in the Philippines. That said, Asia could be on
the cusp of a limited change in this past trend. Australia’s recently released de-
fense white paper calls for a substantial increase in naval capabilities, especially
submarines, in reaction to China’s sustained naval expansion and the Chinese
navy’s growing presence in the South and East China seas. But most East Asian
states are not likely to initiate major procurement programs in the next five
years; many are suffering from the global economic crisis, allocating scarce gov-
ernment resources to much-needed economic stimulus programs.
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COUNTRY-SPECIFIC REACTIONS TO CHINA
The particular responses of individual countries provide greater texture for un-
derstanding these trends.8 Those of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thai-
land, Singapore, and Australia are summarized below.
Japan
The rise of China in East Asia has clearly stirred Japan’s competitive impulses, but
its posture toward China remains characterized by considerable ambivalence and
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FIGURE 1
TOTAL DEFENSE BUDGETS IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA, 1997–2007
Source: The data for figures 1 and 2 are from Australia Defence Intelligence Organization, Defence Economic Trends in the
Asia-Pacific (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2007), available at www.defence.gov.au/dio/documents/2007_DET.pdf.
FIGURE 2
DEFENSE BUDGETS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1997–2007
47
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
marked by growing anxiety. Many Japanese leaders are more willing than in the
past to cite China explicitly as a potential military threat, and the two countries
have engaged in heated disputes over territorial boundaries, historical issues, and
regional leadership. These three sets of issues will drive competition between
China and Japan in the coming years. Japan has edged closer to the United
States and strengthened ties with other regional states, from India to Australia
to Taiwan—moves that are increasingly justified by reference to China. Tokyo
has also demonstrated a new willingness to use its military forces to, for exam-
ple, patrol ocean areas disputed with Beijing.
At the same time, Japan’s businessmen and economic planners remain con-
vinced that their nation’s economic well-being is tied to continued trade and in-
vestment with China. This remains the case during the current global recession;
many in Japan viewed China as having pulled it out of the last recession, which
began in the 1990s, and as being able to pull it out of the current one as well. A
broad alliance of business, political, and media actors have supported the out-
reach to China since the prime ministership (2001–2006) of Junichiro Koizumi,
and Beijing has reciprocated by taking a more conciliatory posture. Many strate-
gists and politicians also foresee damage to Japan’s position in Asia should a cold
war develop between Tokyo and Beijing.
The long-term prognosis for Sino-Japanese relations is highly uncertain, and
there are certainly grounds for concern about future instability. For the first
time, both China and Japan are unified internally, possess substantial and grow-
ing economic and military capabilities, and are capable of influencing events be-
yond their borders. At the same time, the United States is pushing for Japan to
assume a larger global role, especially in military terms. Domestically, the de-
mise of the Socialist Party during the mid-1990s nudged the political center of
domestic politics to the right. Japan’s emergence from fifteen years of sluggish
economic growth helped usher in the rise of nationalist sentiments that remain
today. At the same time, a new breed of popular politicians has challenged the
long-dominant bureaucracy for control of national policy, including foreign
policy.
South Korea
The most basic—but not the most complete—answer to the question of what is
driving South Korea’s response to China is a generally benign view of China and
the perceived economic benefits of stable relations with it. Given these condi-
tions, there is considerable sensitivity toward China in South Korea today and
reluctance either to challenge major Chinese interests or needlessly stimulate
Chinese sensitivities. At the same time, growing concerns and anxieties about
Chinese economic policy making and diplomacy show that the honeymoon in
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China–South Korean relations is decidedly over. The forces holding the relation-
ship back, if not driving it in the opposite direction, include uncertainties about
China’s medium- to long-term intentions (especially regarding China’s military
modernization and its growing influence in North Korea), awareness of poten-
tial South Korean vulnerability to Chinese economic or other pressure, a widely
shared awareness of the importance of the United States, and a continuing gap
between South Korean aspirations and capabilities.
These cross-pressures suggest that, first, South Korea will continue to ex-
pand ties with China, with trade and investment leading the charge to the ex-
tent possible during a global recession. South Korea is likely to emphasize
solving actual problems between the two countries, such as implementing
confidence and security-building measures that could improve prospects for
peace on the Korean Peninsula. By geography alone, sensitivity toward some
Chinese interests will remain a characteristic of South Korean policies. Fur-
thermore, the irritants in and constraints on the relationship will also con-
tinue, and an occasional spike in tensions is to be expected. As China continues
to ensconce itself in North Korea, issues pertaining to the North could come to
have as many negatives as positives for bilateral relations. Even short of this, a
new strategic alignment between South Korea and China is not likely, in the
absence of some major external event. South Korea will likely seek to maintain
good relations with China on the basis of—rather than instead of—a contin-
ued close alliance with the United States. Another North Korean nuclear test,
or clear Chinese unwillingness or inability to bring the North to resolve the
nuclear issue peacefully, would reinforce this inclination.
This mixed picture suggests that barring unexpected developments, South
Korea will stick with the United States, even at critical decision points that test
the U.S.–South Korean alliance, as was the case with American Iraq policy. For
Washington the real policy challenge is that China’s rise may complicate its ef-
forts to expand U.S.–South Korean security cooperation. Domestic politics in
Seoul will strongly influence this. South Korean agreement to participate in
American military operations based out of its homeland will be particularly dif-
ficult to obtain, although this will depend heavily on the context in Korean do-
mestic politics, bilateral relations, and international relations. The key to the
future of the relationship will be reconfiguring the alliance correctly.
The Philippines
The Philippines’ response to China is strongly defined by the country’s funda-
mental and myriad weaknesses. Chronic political instability, debilitating do-
mestic insurgencies, and deteriorating external defense capabilities have left the
Philippines unable to ensure stability within the main islands, let alone to
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protect its offshore territorial claims vis-à-vis China. These weaknesses have
spurred Philippine efforts to reestablish close defense ties with the United States,
mainly to cope with its own severe internal security challenges. Philippine lead-
ers no longer view China as a major security threat, as they did in the mid-1990s.
This ambivalence about China has been reflected in a severe atrophy of Philip-
pine air and naval capabilities in the last five to ten years. However, distrust of
China’s ultimate intentions remains and is growing in some quarters, driven in
part by domestic politics. Since 2007, China policy has emerged as a politically
sensitive issue, constraining Manila’s engagement with Beijing and lubricating
interaction with Washington. Rebuilding of the Philippines’ external defense ca-
pabilities remains a long-term goal, however.
The Philippine economy is less dependent on trade with China (and on in-
ternational trade, more generally) than are the economies of some of its South-
east Asia neighbors (e.g., Singapore and Thailand). Like other Asian
economies, however, China has become a major destination for Philippine ex-
ports, which motivates a perception that trade with China is important to the
Philippines’ future economic growth. This calculation could be changing as
the China-centered processing trade rapidly declines due to the current global
recession. A broad consensus in the Philippines over China’s importance as an
economic partner has, for the past five years, helped to strengthen bilateral
ties. Yet the view that China is an important future economic partner is mixed
with an incipient sense that China is also a competitive economic threat.
While there are forces driving the Philippines’ response to China, it is im-
portant to stress that these forces are not “driving” Philippine policy any-
where in particular. The leadership is heavily focused on internal challenges,
and the public is relatively inattentive to China and, for that matter, most
other foreign-policy issues. To the extent that China has gained popular and
elite attention, it has been linked to politically charged corruption scandals
that fuel popular concerns about becoming too close to China.
Thailand
Thailand has a long tradition of “bending with the wind.” In today’s East Asia,
that means accommodating—and seeking advantage from—both China and
the United States. Among the six nations examined in the RAND study, Thai-
land was the most likely and willing to accommodate China. Thaksin
Shinawatra, the former prime minister, modified this approach by trying to
“blow the wind” as well as bend with it. He strengthened political and military,
as well as economic, ties with China at the same time as he was taking bold new
steps to buttress Bangkok’s alliance with the United States. His successors, how-
ever, have returned to a more muted style of foreign policy—to the extent they
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have the time or resources to focus on foreign policy amid sustained political in-
stability. The post-Thaksin governments have de-emphasized bold initiatives,
particularly on the strategic and military fronts, and have refocused Bangkok’s
diplomacy on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Absent the
reemergence of a political leader with a strong foreign policy vision and the po-
litical space to pursue it, Bangkok will continue to deepen gradually its eco-
nomic, political, and, to a lesser extent, military relationships with Beijing, as
well as with Washington.
While Thai foreign policy has seldom been all in one direction, several
long-term trends suggest that relations with China have become more impor-
tant to Thailand in the last decade. China’s value as a trade and investment part-
ner has grown substantially, but recent declines in trade with China could alter
this calculation. Thailand has acquired some military hardware from China, and
the two nations have conducted two joint military exercises. But these trends
pale in comparison to the scope of Thailand’s economic and security coopera-
tion with the United States.
There are also limits to the Thai-Chinese relationship. Despite Thailand’s
past efforts to engage Burma (thereby removing a source of tension with
Beijing), Burma’s recent instability has once again made it an issue between
Beijing and Bangkok. Thai leaders are intensely focused on establishing stability
at home, a seemingly endless task since the 2006 coup. When they do focus on
foreign policy, they state that they are committed to a balanced posture between
China and the United States. Thai policy makers recognize the long-standing
material and symbolic benefits of the U.S. alliance. Bangkok is also working to
develop options with other countries. Economically, it has strengthened ties
with India, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Politically and militarily, it coop-
erates with India, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as with the United
States and China.
China’s regional behavior will be the largest variable in the evolution of Thai
attitudes toward the rise of China; China has been heavy-handed with Thailand
regarding its interaction with Taiwan and Tibet authorities. Events in Burma,
the success or failure of ongoing negotiations with the United States and Japan
for free trade agreements, and the future of political reform in Thailand are also
important variables, albeit less widely appreciated ones.
Singapore
Singapore shows less ambivalence about the rise of China than do most South-
east Asian countries. The country’s small size, geostrategic vulnerability, and
continuing concerns about long-term Chinese intentions propel it toward a
close, strategic relationship with the United States, despite its close ethnic links
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to China. Singaporean leaders see the United States as both the principal stabi-
lizer in East Asia and the only realistic counterweight to potential Chinese asser-
tiveness. Keeping the United States actively engaged and forward deployed in the
region is a central Singaporean objective. China’s rise, the spread of Islamic ex-
tremism, and heightened concerns about stability in neighboring countries have
prompted Singapore to strengthen security cooperation further with the United
States. At the same time, Singapore has expanded security links with the United
Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and other nations with stakes in Asia’s stability.
The benefits Singapore receives from increasing trade and investment with
China, as well as from China’s broader economic integration in the region, also
drive bilateral relations. These policies are balanced, however, by Singapore’s
corresponding efforts to diversify its economic relationships to avoid excessive
dependence on China. Singapore is doing so by negotiating a range of free trade
agreements, in particular with Japan and the United States, as a means of coun-
tering China’s intensive economic diplomacy; this also helps Singapore entrench
the former countries economically in Southeast Asia.
Because of the relative clarity of Singapore’s long-term vision, the future of
Singapore’s relationship with China has a greater level of certainty than that of
any other Southeast Asian nation. As China becomes more powerful,
Singaporean leaders will do everything they can to ensure a continued balance
of power in the region, one in which China does not dominate economic or se-
curity affairs. This strategy will almost surely guarantee continued close diplo-
matic and security relations with the United States and other U.S. allies.
However, in the absence of unprovoked Chinese aggression, Singapore will nei-
ther encourage nor support “containment” or an explicitly “anti-China” balanc-
ing coalition.
Australia
There are distinct cross-pressures in Australian-Chinese relations. First, rapidly
growing merchandise trade (mainly in natural resources) and the perception
among Australian policy makers that China is key to future prosperity have been
the major drivers of bilateral relations. Second, few in Australia see conflict with
China as likely or inevitable. Australia wants to avoid being drawn into a re-
gional rivalry with China. Third, Australian policy makers possess a deep uncer-
tainty, mixed with a growing concern, about China’s role in Asian economic and
security affairs. Recent Chinese investments in Australia’s resource sector have
prompted a debate about overreliance on China. Beijing’s diplomatic activism,
especially in the South Pacific, and its military modernization are generating
worries among Australian policy makers and strategists.
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How will these cross-pressures play out? Canberra will continue to expand its
bilateral relations with Beijing, with economic ties at the fore, albeit more tenta-
tively than in the past ten years. Concerns about Chinese investment in Australia
and limited access of Australian businesses to key sectors of China’s economy are
now emerging. As China looms larger in Australia’s foreign policy, Canberra will
continue to be sensitive to, and will accommodate, some of Beijing’s interests,
such as its policies on Taiwan. Australia’s concerns about China’s diplomatic and
military behaviors in Asia will persist. This in turn will limit the expansion of
Chinese-Australian relations and enable greater alliance cooperation with both
the United States and other regional powers. Australia’s recent security-policy
coordination with Japan and South Korea is notable in this regard.
Under the John Howard administration (1996–2007), Australia’s concerns
about China motivated a series of foreign and defense policies that expanded al-
liance cooperation and sought to ensure that the United States would remain
highly influential in the Asia-Pacific region. The new Labor Party government,
led by Kevin Rudd, has pursued a similar approach. Rudd chose to distinguish
his foreign policy from that of his predecessor on global issues—such as Iraq
policy, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change—rather than on China
policy. Kevin Rudd has made it clear that while China may be an increasingly im-
portant “partner” for Australia, the United States is a “strategic ally.” He believes
that a strong alliance bolsters Australia’s position in Asia and that the alliance
contributes to broader regional stability.
A new and more complex stage in Australia’s relations with China (and the
United States) began this year with the publication in May 2009 of a new defense
white paper, which is Rudd’s first and the nation’s first since 2000.9 This impor-
tant document cited China’s improving power-projection capabilities and un-
certainty about both American defense capabilities and the U.S. role in Asia to
justify a significant increase in defense procurement. The white paper called for
acquiring up to twelve conventional submarines, additional amphibious lift,
and land-attack cruise missiles (among other items).10 Unsurprisingly, Beijing
reacted negatively to this assessment, assuming that this procurement was di-
rected at countering Chinese military capabilities. Washington continues to di-
gest the explicit and implicit messages from one of its most stalwart allies in the
Asia-Pacific. American strategists should be concerned that some in Australia
view U.S. defense strategy and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s proposed
cuts as indicating an eventual inability to maintain robust power projection into
the western Pacific.11
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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
The global financial crisis and resulting recession raise numerous questions
about economic and security relationships in the Asia-Pacific, including about
China’s relative influence over U.S. allies and partners. Many commentators
have speculated that the current crisis is a strategic tipping point akin to the era
just after World War II in which the United States eclipsed Britain as the global
economic hegemon. I would recommend much caution in accepting such dire
assessments.
First, it is far too early to make such grandiose conclusions about the effects of
the crisis on the global balance of power. It remains uncertain how severe and
lasting the crisis will be, especially among East Asian economies. Key questions
remain unanswered: Who will be hurt the most? Who will recover the fastest,
and how? Which states or institutions will help East Asian states recover? It is
likely that both the United States and China will play roles—individually, jointly,
and in concert with international organizations.
Second, it is uncertain that this crisis increases China’s economic clout while
diminishing that of the United States. China’s economy was challenged by the
crisis in ways that highlight existing questions about the sustainability of its cur-
rent growth model, which emphasizes exports and investment over consump-
tion. The steep declines in aggregate external demand from the United States
and European Union (EU) triggered rapid and dramatic declines in China’s ex-
ports and imports beginning in fall 2008. This in turn led to a reduction in ex-
ports as a driver of growth, leaving consumption and investment to carry much
of the load. This is the first time in the last thirty years that China has experi-
enced a sustained and deep decline in total trade. The economic effects—both
direct and indirect—of this on employment and trade-related investment are
highly uncertain. This could prove to be a constraint on Beijing’s ability to sus-
tain a moderate level of growth while stimulating greater domestic demand.
Beijing is addressing its predicament through a four-trillion-RMB stimulus
package, which seeks to increase internal demand (e.g., consumption and in-
vestment) to replace the loss of external demand (e.g., exports). The stimulus
package is facilitated by a wave of spending financed by central and local govern-
ment on infrastructure and real estate projects. (Total bank lending in the first
quarter of 2009 was more than in all of 2008!) To boost internal demand, Beijing
is making added efforts to stimulate domestic consumption, especially in the ru-
ral areas, as part of its economic restructuring and, ultimately, the rebalancing of
the Chinese economy. Analyses by major international investment banks indi-
cate that China’s initial stimulus is working, which has led many of them to re-
vise upward their estimates of Chinese growth in gross domestic product from
around 6.5 percent to 7.0–7.5 percent for 2009. In other words, China will
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almost certainly recover from the crisis faster than the United States and other
major Western economies.
But China’s approach may not be as beneficial to its economy as initial indi-
cators suggest; time will tell. China’s direct and indirect stimulus spending is
probably not sustainable for more than two or three years, given the scope of
deficit spending and related bank loans. Government-directed bank lending
has been so intensive in 2009 alone that many now worry that China is fueling
a new wave of bad debts, which would gut the last round of successful bank re-
form, initiated in the late 1990s. A key determinant of China’s success will be
its ability to stimulate domestic consumption as a driver of growth and not
simply rely on government-funded investment in order to transition from a
short-term policy response to global recession to a long-term strategy for sus-
tainable growth.12
Lastly, it remains decidedly unclear that China’s projected quick recovery will
aid struggling East Asian economies. China’s stimulus package may not position
it to emerge as a new engine of regional prosperity. In other words, China will
not necessarily be East Asia’s economic savior. Due to the declines in Chinese
imports and exports (as a result of recessions in the United States and EU), the
regional network of processing trade in East Asia seems to be unraveling. Asian
economies that are both trade dependent and heavily involved in processing
trade with China—namely, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and
some South Korean sectors—will not enjoy the benefits of stimulus-driven
growth in China. These economies are suffering the most right now, and unlike
after the Asian financial crisis, they cannot simply export their way to renewed
growth. By contrast, regional economies whose trade with China is in capital
goods and commodities, such as Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and other sectors in
South Korea, will benefit from China’s stimulus package. This situation could,
over time, result in an adjustment in some regional perceptions of the perils of
overreliance on trade with China, leading to diversification in trading partners
and bilateral relations.
China does possess an important economic tool that it could use to be viewed
once again as the fulcrum of regional growth: outward direct investment. China
has the world’s largest foreign-exchange reserves, and as a result of reforms initi-
ated in the late 1990s, its major banks and some corporations are de-leveraged
and quite profitable—at least for now. Thus, the government has substantial fi-
nancial resources it could use to invest in East Asia and globally. As the United
States and Japan found in past decades, investment in countries can, over time,
produce political influence by employing local people and creating a political
constituency in favor of the investing nation. There are incipient indicators that
China is ramping up its overseas investments—taking advantage of cheap prices
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and needy companies. For example, China has accelerated its acquisition of
ownership stakes in resource-producing companies in Australia, Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Brazil. Chinese outward direct investment will be an important
variable to watch in assessing its mechanisms and channels for translating eco-
nomic capabilities into political influence.
WHICH WAY WILL THEY GO?
The preceding analysis suggests several preliminary conclusions about this
evolving geopolitical drama in East Asia. These conclusions represent neither a
climax nor a denouement but a developing plotline.
First, the United States remains well positioned to achieve its long-standing
regional objectives, however the Barack Obama administration chooses to char-
acterize them. The United States does not face a crisis of confidence, and the
foundations of its influence endure. It is still early days in Asia’s response to
China; most countries are still coming to terms with what it means for China to
be a more influential actor. This has prompted an abundance of reactions, in-
cluding many contradictory ones. Accordingly, there is still abundant
geopolitical space for Washington to expand and improve its security partner-
ships in the region. If the United States is to do so, its Asia policy needs persistent
attention. Although the George W. Bush administration’s Asia policy left the re-
gion in fine condition, renovation of regional relationships is needed. In the face
of China’s rise (as well as the growing prominence of India and Japan), the
United States needs to improve the legitimacy of its role and the credibility of its
commitments in the Asia-Pacific. That effort will require an adaptation to the
changing constellation of the equities of U.S. allies and security partners. None
want to provoke China or be drawn into a containment effort; none want China
to dominate the region; none want the United States to leave or even substan-
tially draw down its presence; and all want China to play a major role in manag-
ing regional challenges. American policy needs to reflect these changing
regional realities.
A second major finding of RAND’s work on regional reactions to China was
that there was no strong correlation between high levels of economic integration
with China and accommodation of it. Japan, Singapore, and Australia all have
large, growing, and highly complementary trade and investment relations with
China. Their trade with China represents a larger share of their total world trade
than that of other East Asian nations, and the business communities in these
countries have been, on balance, bullish about China.
However, this is not reflected in their foreign and security policy making in
any direct manner. Policy makers in all three nations harbor deep uncertainty
about China’s future and have growing concerns about its emergence as a
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regional security threat. The governments in all three countries have responded
in part by enhancing their alliance links with the United States, each other, and
others in Asia. Australia has begun to improve its regional power-projection ca-
pabilities in particular ways. A distinct diplomatic priority in all three nations is
ensuring that the United States remains active and influential in East Asia, so
that China does not dominate. For Tokyo and Canberra, Chinese defense mod-
ernization is increasingly a factor in their military procurement and planning, a
set of assumptions that is poised to become more prominent as the PLA deploys
additional power-projection capabilities and increasingly operates outside
China’s littoral.
A third important finding is that domestic politics matters a lot in deter-
mining nations’ responses to China’s rise. For most East Asian states, China’s
rise generates a variety of contradictory reactions, some drawing them toward
China and others making them wary. What determines which way they go? A
key independent variable is domestic politics. The political conditions in East
Asian nations and, especially, the views of political leaders mediate the extent
to which diplomatic and economic interactions with China result in accom-
modation of China, alienation from the United States, or both. The changes in
South Korean responses to China following the 2008 election of Lee
Myung-bak offer a prominent example. Although relations with China had
not fundamentally changed by early 2008, President Lee reoriented South Ko-
rea more toward the United States and created a permissive environment for
questioning Korea’s growing reliance on China. Lee has now positioned South
Korea as yet another medium-sized regional power raising concerns about
Chinese military modernization. Ultimately, the perspectives and preferences
of these nations’ top leaders will have a defining influence on how they re-
spond to the myriad of challenges posed by China as well as by U.S. policy in
East Asia.
NOTE S
This article is adapted from a paper delivered
at “American Foreign Policy: Regional Per-
spectives,” a workshop sponsored by the Wil-
liam B. Ruger Chair of National Security
Economics, 13–15 May 2009, at the Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island. It ap-
pears, in the present version, in the proceed-
ings of that conference, available at www
.usnwc.edu/academics/courses/nsdm/
rugerpapers.aspx.
1. To be sure, a growing number of voices have
called into question the permanence of the
U.S.-based security architecture in East Asia.
These perspectives call American presence in
East Asia a historical aberration following
World War II, and they view its current pres-
ence as outdated, given the alleged accelera-
tion in regionalism. See Kishore Mahbubani,
“America’s Place in the Asian Century,” Cur-
rent History (May 2008), pp. 195–99.
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2. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How
China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2007).
Interestingly, Kurlantzick seems to have
stepped back from some of his book’s main
conclusions; see his “So Far, It Just Isn’t
Looking Like Asia’s Century,” Washington
Post, 7 September 2008.
3. See Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric
Heginbotham, Norman D. Levin, Julia F.
Lowell, Angel Rabasa, and Somi Seong, Pa-
cific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and
Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2008).
4. The United States has concluded mutual de-
fense treaties with five countries in the
Asia-Pacific: Australia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), the Philippines, and
Thailand.
5. Bates Gill, Michael Green, Kiyoto Tsuji, and
William Watts, Strategic Views on Asian Re-
gionalism: Survey Results and Analysis (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, February 2009), pp.
4–7.
6. In his first major speech in the United States,
State Councillor Dai Bingguo characterized
the issue of Tibet as a core national interest.
He stated, “Taiwan and Tibet-related issues
concern China’s core interests. The Chinese
people have an unshakable determination to
defend our core interests.” See Dai Bingguo,
“Address at the Dinner Marking the 30th An-
niversary of the Establishment of China-US
Diplomatic Relations Hosted by the
Brookings Institution” (Brookings Institu-
tion, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2008),
available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/.
7. In 2004, China publicly and strongly criti-
cized Prime Minister–elect Lee Hsien Long
for a visit to Taiwan following his election
but before his inauguration. China’s loud and
harsh rhetoric raised alarm bells in Singapore
about China’s growing assertiveness. In re-
sponse, Singapore subsequently took several
steps to broaden its defense and diplomatic
ties to the United States. It also took mea-
sures to constrain China’s diplomatic influ-
ence in East Asia, including leading the
charge in 2004–2005 to eliminate China’s
control over the location and agenda of, and
participants in, the East Asia Summit. Singa-
pore did not radically alter its Taiwan policy
in response to Chinese pressure; Singapore
continues to train its military forces at facili-
ties in Taiwan.
A similar course of events transpired in South
Korea in 2006, when then–Chinese ambassa-
dor to South Korea Ning Fukui publicly
warned South Korean policy makers to re-
strict the geographic scope of operations for
U.S. forces based in Korea to the defense of
the peninsula and not other regional contin-
gencies, such as a Taiwan conflict. This state-
ment piqued latent but growing sensitivities
in Seoul about China’s meddling in South
Korean foreign policy and China’s growing
assertiveness. This event contributed to a
change in the national conversation in South
Korea about the challenges and threats posed
by a rising China. The 2007 change in gov-
ernment created a more permissive political
environment for the reflection of these con-
cerns in national policy making.
8. This section draws from the summary of
Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents, pp.
xviii–xxiii.
9. Australia’s Department of Defence then pub-
lished biennial “updates” to the 2000 white
paper—in 2003, 2005, and 2007. For copies
see merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html.
10. Australian Department of Defence, Defending
Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force
2030 (Canberra: Department of Defence,
May 2009).
11. For an example of this view see Andrew
Shearer, “Australia Bulks Up,” Wall Street
Journal Asia, 6 May 2009.
12. Patrick Chovanec, “Undoing Chinese Bank
Reform,” Wall Street Journal Asia, 7 May
2009.
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or China, the ability to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group from intervening 
in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis is critical. Beijing’s immediate strategic 
concerns have been defi ned with a high level of clarity. The Chinese are inter-
ested in achieving an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability because it of-
fers them the prospect of limiting the ability of other nations, particularly the 
United States, to exert military infl uence on China’s maritime periphery, which 
contains several disputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing. ASBMs 
are regarded as a means by which technologically limited developing countries 
can overcome by asymmetric means their qualitative inferiority in conventional 
combat platforms, because the gap between offense and defense is the greatest 
here.
Today, China may be closer than ever to attaining this capability. In addition 
to numerous outside reports suggesting Chinese efforts in this area, technical 
and operationally focused discussions on the topic are 
appearing in increasing numbers and in a widening 
array of Chinese sources, some clearly authoritative. 
This suggests that China may be close to testing and 
fi elding an ASBM system—a weapon that no other 
country currently possesses, since the United States 
relinquished a distantly related capability in 1988. In 
the view of Chinese and Western analysts, even the 
mere perception that China might have realized an 
ASBM capability could represent a paradigm shift, 
Dr. Erickson is an associate professor at the China 
Maritime Studies Institute, Strategic Research De-
partment, Naval War College. His coedited volume 
on evolving maritime roles for Chinese aerospace 
power will be published by Naval Institute Press. Mr. 
Yang is an associate political scientist at the RAND 
Corporation. He is currently completing his doctoral 
dissertation in politics at Princeton University. Previ-
ously a visiting research fellow at Stanford University, 
he began his career as an avionics software engineer 
at Lockheed.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009, Vol. 62, No. 4
F
Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang
Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile
USING THE LAND TO CONTROL THE SEA?
59
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
 54 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
with profound consequences for deterrence, military operations, arms control, 
and the balance of power in the western Pacifi c.
Although open sources do not claim that China currently has a proven ASBM 
capability, U.S. government sources have stated consistently that Beijing is de-
veloping an ASBM based on a variant of the land-based DF-21/CSS-5 medium-
range ballistic missile (MRBM). The DF-21’s 1,500-kilometer-plus range could 
hold ships at risk in a large maritime area, far beyond Taiwan and into the west-
ern Pacifi c.1 According to a 2006 unclassifi ed assessment by the U.S. Offi ce of 
Naval Intelligence, “China is equipping theater ballistic missiles [TBMs] with 
maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with radar or IR [infrared] seekers to 
provide the accuracy necessary to attack a ship at sea.”2 If viable, such missiles, 
with “high-reentry speed (Mach 10–12) [and] radical maneuvers,” would be ex-
traordinarily diffi cult to defend against, whatever ballistic missile defense the 
United States might deploy.3 Targeting a carrier with submunitions could enable 
China to render it operationally ineffective without sinking it, thereby achieving 
its objectives with a (perceived) lower risk of escalation. If not countered effec-
tively, the very impression of such a risk might deter carrier strike groups from 
entering the region in the fi rst place (fi gure 1).
FIGURE 1
MAXIMUM RANGE OF A DF-21/CSS-5 ASBM FROM LAUNCH LOCATIONS
IN MAINLAND CHINA
Note the large area potentially covered, far beyond Taiwan and the fi rst island chain into the western Pacifi c. This covers nearly all the maritime areas in which China has 
disputed claims, and provides a substantial strategic buffer zone for most. As published in Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic 
of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress, p. 29.
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China has also been working on a sophisticated network of ground- and 
space-based sensors, including over-the-horizon radars and electronic signals 
detection equipment. While fi nding an aircraft carrier has been likened to fi nd-
ing a needle in a haystack, this particular needle has a large radar cross section, 
emits radio waves, and is surrounded by airplanes. Simply looking for the big-
gest radar refl ection to target will tend to locate the largest ship—and the largest 
ship will usually be an aircraft carrier.4
While the ASBM issue has been discussed for nearly a decade in Chinese of-
fi cial reports and commentaries in various venues, it has only recently garnered 
widespread public attention in the United States, primarily in reaction to two 
Chinese articles;5 these articles were recently translated, posted, and analyzed 
on an infl uential blog affi liated with the U.S. Naval Institute, then covered wide-
ly by the media.6 But these articles represent merely the tip of a much larger ice-
berg. In what follows, we will survey open-source Chinese writings on ASBMs to 
investigate and assess Chinese views on developing, fi elding, and ultimately (in 
a worst-case scenario) using such a system.
EARLY CONCEPTIONS
For over three decades, Chinese leaders and strategists have been thinking of 
using land-based missiles to hit threatening targets at sea. In 1972, Vice Premier 
Zhang Chunqiao had signifi cant infl uence over China’s national decision mak-
ing as one of the Gang of Four, a faction led by Chairman Mao Zedong’s wife, 
Jiang Qing. In an important speech in April of that year he declared, “We are 
continentalists. Now guided missiles are well developed. Installed on shore, they 
can hit any target, and there is no need to build a big navy.”7 By focusing on a 
specifi c missile technology, as China had done so successfully since the 1950s, 
Zhang apparently believed, it would be possible to achieve a transformative stra-
tegic effect while devoting China’s limited resources to more pressing priori-
ties. Zhang’s political career did not survive Mao’s passing, and in the ensuing 
decades China took signifi cant steps toward building the “big navy” that Zhang 
decried. Meanwhile, however, ballistic missile development remained a key Chi-
nese focus. The American MaRVed Pershing II TBM—deployed in 1983—was 
studied intensively by the Chinese beginning in the late 1970s, with over fi fty 
related commentaries appearing on this subject.8 Such articles faded from more 
serious technical publications by the early 1990s, possibly because of the retire-
ment of the Pershing IIs following ratifi cation of the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in May 1988, as well as any efforts to avoid 
drawing attention to Chinese application of such technology. In any case, the 
Pershing II inspired Chinese research in this area and has been cited in Chinese 
sources as infl uencing the development of China’s family of ballistic missiles.9
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In recent years, Beijing has sought to threaten credibly U.S. military access to 
strategically vital areas along China’s maritime periphery, particularly those sur-
rounding Taiwan. Despite progress toward this end, however, Chinese naval and 
maritime analysts have written consistently that their nation’s naval capabilities 
are still insuffi cient to address critical operational threats. Civilian leaders ap-
pear to have supported substantial naval development in keeping with China’s 
commercial maritime revolution but continue to prioritize national economic 
development over military expansion and wish to avoid emulating Soviet mis-
takes by devoting an unsustainable portion of national resources to the latter. 
For all these reasons, a widespread but targeted military modernization effort 
is under way that draws on earlier People’s Liberation Army (PLA) traditions of 
pursuing military objectives from a position of relative weakness. As part of this 
larger effort, a more balanced version of Zhang’s “vision” of ground-launched 
antiship missile development is apparently being pursued. What must be em-
phasized is that the idea of striking a ship from land is not new and that the idea 
of “using the land to control the sea” (以陆制海) in this way is very appealing to 
China, given its geostrategic situation.10
This effort has assumed new urgency as part of a larger effort to deter U.S. 
carrier strike groups from intervening in a potential confl ict over Taiwan. If 
China deploys a successful ASBM in the near future, rapid progress in its devel-
opment will be traced in part to the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, which further 
underscored Chinese feelings of helplessness against American naval power. 
The deployment of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and Independence (CV 62) car-
rier battle groups in response to Chinese missile tests and military exercises in 
the Taiwan Strait was a move that China could not counter.11 We cannot know 
at this time how the events of 1995–96 affected the precise calculations of Chi-
nese leaders, but they seem to have given a major boost to PLA development in 
general, and PLA Navy (PLAN) development in particular.12 Moreover, there is 
specifi c evidence that a new impetus was given to ASBM-related research and 
development at this time (fi gure 2). As Colonel Larry Wortzel (Ret.), U.S. Army 
attaché in Beijing from 1995 to 1997, recently testifi ed, “The fi rst time a senior 
Chinese military offi cer of the General Staff Department mentioned ballistic 
missiles attacking carriers was after our two carriers showed up, and he put his 
arm around my shoulder and said we’re going to sink your carriers with ballistic 
missiles, and we had a long conversation about it. I don’t know if they were doing 
research before that, but . . . the fi rst time it got thrown in my face was 1996.”13
DISCUSSIONS OF ASBMS IN THE CHINESE LITERATURE: AN OVERVIEW
Given the sensitivity of the issue, relevant statements on ASBM development by 
top Chinese leaders are currently lacking. But there are ample data to consider 
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at other levels. Chinese writings on ASBMs in the open-source literature can 
be divided into three broad categories. In descending level of authoritativeness, 
these include
1. PLA doctrinal publications describing how ASBMs might be used in opera-
 tional scenarios
2. Specialized technical analyses of specifi c aspects of such weapons and their
 supporting infrastructure
3. Generalist deliberations and didactic discussions on the technical and op-
 erational feasibility of such weapons.
The fi rst category comprises offi cial military doctrinal publications. These 
sources of guidance for PLA personnel illustrate how PLA analysts are thinking 
about using ASBMs in actual operational scenarios. They are typically written 
by leading scholars at institutions of professional military education, under the 
editorial guidance of high-ranking active-duty offi cers, or sometimes by retired 
offi cers themselves. Several doctrinal publications of the PLA as a whole and 
of the Second Artillery Corps (China’s strategic missile force) discuss a variety 
of ways in which to use conventional ballistic missiles to deter carrier strike 
FIGURE 2
CHINESE CONCEPTION OF ASBM TARGET DETECTION AND TRACKING, CA. 2000
Source: Chen Haidong et al., “Study of a Guidance Scheme for Reentry Vehicles Attacking Slowly Moving Targets,” p. 6, fi g. 1.
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groups (CSGs). This demonstrates that such a possibility is taken seriously by 
the PLA and suggests that relevant programs are under development, though it 
leaves unclear to what extent the PLA has mastered the necessary technical and 
operational capabilities.
The second category consists of focused technical analyses of specifi c sys-
tems and operations both explicitly and potentially relevant to ASBMs, such as 
calculations of the maneuvering range of reentry vehicles;14 another example is 
the suppression of sea-surface backscattering for maritime surveillance radars.15 
These are written by military and civilian technical analysts, whose names and 
institutions are typically identifi ed, for an audience in their relevant subfi elds. 
Compared to articles on other existing weapons systems (e.g., antiship cruise 
missiles [ASCMs]), these tend to be theoretical papers utilizing mathematical 
models, and it is not clear how readily they can be translated into concrete en-
gineering solutions. But some analysts claim that the theories involved have in-
deed been proved correct, and actual solutions may be contained in other docu-
ments. Together, these fi rst two categories of sources offer good indicators that 
China is pursuing ASBM development seriously; sophisticated intellectual work 
in doctrine and technology would underpin any such efforts.
The third category consists of generalist deliberations on the feasibility of 
such weapons. These are written by a variety of naval and maritime analysts 
(many unidentifi ed), for a broad range of military, defense industrial, and popu-
lar audiences, some perhaps for educational purposes. Tremendous disagree-
ment can be encountered in these sources, even on fundamental issues; they 
demonstrate a range of opinion and debate. More than a few contain technical 
errors and mistaken assumptions; many, however, offer very specifi c details.16 
The authoritativeness of these sources is frequently diffi cult to determine, al-
though many of the commentators are clearly technical experts.17
While there are clearly differences among the sources, then, it is important 
to note that areas exist that they all collectively treat as conventional wisdom, 
issues on which there is no disagreement regardless of forum, institutional af-
fi liation, or individual viewpoint. Chinese commentators agree that an ASBM, 
if it is to be developed, would be based on an upgraded version of an exist-
ing Chinese MRBM, such as the DF-21/CSS-5.18 A DF-21D variant is reportedly 
closest to an antiship version;19 some Chinese writings say this of the C version;20 
others refer to future modifi cations (e.g., a DF-21E).21 The prototype for such a 
weapon is generally held to be the Pershing II TBM; this is an unusual instance 
in which Chinese analysts do not see Russia as a model for weapons develop-
ment. At a strategic level, Chinese assessments generally concur that ASBMs, 
if realized in practice, would offer a variety of operational effects and value for 
Chinese maritime strategy—particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan. If this vision were 
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achieved, it could impose signifi cant restrictions on U.S. naval operations dur-
ing a Taiwan crisis, especially as there are complementary discussions in Chinese 
writings about holding U.S. theater land bases—such as those on Okinawa—at 
risk. Acknowledgment in Taiwan and the United States of such a change in the 
military balance, Chinese observers believe, would deter Taiwan independence 
and encourage cross-strait reintegration on Beijing’s terms. Finally, there is also 
general agreement as to which are the key technical challenges, including target 
acquisition and terminal guidance.22 To be sure, there is little discussion in the 
Chinese literature about specifi c Chinese capabilities in these areas, only general 
statements of feasibility and implicit assumptions in doctrinal publications that 
ASBMs are available for use or will be soon.
FIGURE 3
SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY? AMERICA’S PERSHING II AND CHINA’S DF-15/CSS-6 AND DF-21/
CSS-5 MISSILES
According to Chinese sources, a Chinese DF-21 ASBM would be based in part on the U.S. Pershing II (left), as is the DF-15 short-range ballistic missile (center). 
The U.S. Pershing II has adjustable control fi ns on its reentry vehicle for terminal maneuver. Positively identifi ed photos of a CSS-5 outside its launch canister 
are not known to exist. But the DF-15B missile pictured here has a reentry vehicle virtually identical to the Pershing II’s. Based on the strong visual resem-
blance, it is possible that the DF-15B employs terminal maneuvering technology similar to that of the Pershing II. The reentry vehicle that China obviously has 
here could easily be mated with a variant of the DF-21/CSS-5 booster (right), which might then produce an effective ASBM. (Photos used with permission 
from China Defense Forum)
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Doctrinal Sources
Apparently authoritative doctrinal writings already describe in some detail how 
ASBMs might be employed. Such references have been hitherto ignored in West-
ern scholarship; this is a case of potentially important information hiding in 
plain sight. There are volumes devoted to missions for the Second Artillery as 
part of PLA joint doctrine; the authors were unable to fi nd any doctrinal writ-
ings suggesting that other services (e.g., the PLAN) would be responsible for 
using conventional ballistic missiles to hit targets at sea.23
Three volumes deserve special scrutiny as perhaps the most authoritative 
writings available on PLA doctrine concerning the use of ballistic missiles in 
operational and tactical scenarios.24 Of these, The Science of Campaigns and 
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns have each been “printed and distrib-
uted to all military forces, colleges, and universities as a training and learning 
reference.”25
The Science of Campaigns was written by researchers at China’s National De-
fense University. The 2006 edition, more sophisticated and joint in orientation 
than its 2000 predecessor, offers a basic overview of conditions under which 
conventional ballistic missiles might be used to “implement sea blockades” and 
“capture localized campaign sea dominance” by “implementing missile fi re-
power assault or fi repower harassment attacks against important targets that 
the enemy depends on for . . . sea-based maneuvering.” This would typically be 
done as part of a joint campaign with such organizations as the PLAN and the 
PLA Air Force, with which there is supposed to be “extremely close coordina-
tion,” although in unspecifi ed contingencies the Second Artillery might operate 
independently. Practical aspects, such as the imperative to “react rapidly” and 
“control the rate of missile consumption,” are emphasized to support a sophisti-
cated strategy aimed at “apply[ing] great psychological pressure on the enemy” 
and making him think “that no rules apply, thereby achieving the maximum 
effectiveness.”26
Even more relevant and sophisticated is The Science of Second Artillery Cam-
paigns. Published by the PLA Press in March 2004 (but completed in May 
2003), it likely serves as a high-level professional military education handbook 
for campaign-level command personnel in the Second Artillery and the PLA in 
general. Its chief editor and his deputy have considerable credibility and exper-
tise as top PLA offi cials. The foreword by the headquarters of the PLA General 
Staff further indicates that this book is the institutional position of the PLA as 
a whole and hence has been accepted by China’s civilian leadership, at least in 
general terms.27
How does the Second Artillery conceive of using ASBMs in operational sce-
narios? The 406-page document describes the use of ASBMs against carriers 
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in some detail and without suggesting that such an approach is aspirational or 
beset with insurmountable diffi culties. In fact, in introducing the section de-
scribing their potential employment, it states that “conventional missile strike 
groups” should be used as an “assassin’s mace” (or silver bullet)—a term com-
monly used in both PLA and less authoritative documents to describe weapons 
that match Chinese strengths with an enemy’s weaknesses.28
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns states that the Second Artillery will 
work with the PLAN to “execute focused naval blockades” and “achieve com-
mand of the seas.”29 Approaching enemy CSGs are envisioned to be the principal 
maritime targets, but “large vessels or large ship formations” more broadly are 
mentioned as well.30 Coordination and precision are seen as essential for “deter-
ring and blocking enemy carrier strike groups”;31 such “operational activities 
need to be coordinated without the slightest difference in time.”32 Coordination 
with the PLAN is also emphasized in the location of sea targets, as well as with 
regard to the notifi cation and demarcation of blockade areas: “the naval intel-
ligence department should ‘relay promptly’ the information obtained by its re-
connaissance about enemy ship activities to the Second Artillery campaign large 
formation.”33 In particular, “information regarding carrier battle groups . . . should 
be gathered on a real time basis.”34 Potential sources of “real-time target intelli-
gence” include “military reconnaissance satellites, domestic and foreign remote 
sensing satellites, and established satellite reconnaissance target image informa-
tion processing systems.”35 While ASBMs are not mentioned explicitly in this 
context, the need for “further real-time intelligence on the dynamic target” to 
be obtained through “various measures and multiple channels” is recognized 
vis-à-vis cruise missiles.36
A two-page section describes fi ve ways to use ASBMs against carrier strike 
groups, a centerpiece of “military intervention by a powerful enemy” and thus 
the proper “focal point for attacks.”37 Such tactics as fi ring intimidation salvos, 
destroying shipborne aircraft with submunitions, or disabling with electromag-
netic pulses the sensor systems of Aegis destroyers are designed to make CSGs 
retreat or render them inoperable. More specifi cally, this passage of the Second 
Artillery doctrine describes
“Firepower harassment [strikes]” (• 火力袭扰), which involve hitting “carrier 
battle groups.”
“Frontal fi repower deterrence” (• 前方火力慑阻), which involves fi ring 
intimidation salvos in front of a CSG’s advance “to serve as a warning.”
“Flank fi repower expulsion” (• 翼侧火力驱赶), which combines interception 
of a CSG by PLAN forces with intimidation salvos “launched toward the 
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enemy carrier battle group opposite our relatively threatened fl ank” to force
 it away from the vulnerable area.
“Concentrated fi re assault” (• 集火突击), which entails targeting the carrier 
as a center of fl ight operations: “When many carrier-borne aircraft are used 
in continuous air strikes against our coast, in order to halt the powerful air 
raids, the enemy’s core carrier should be struck as with a ‘heavy hammer.’ 
The conventional missile forces should be a select group carrying sensitive 
penetrating submunitions and, using the ‘concentrated fi repower assault’ 
method, a wide-coverage strike against the enemy’s core carrier should be 
executed, striving to destroy the enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control 
tower [island] and other easily damaged and vital positions.”
“Information assault” (• 信息攻击), which entails attacking the carrier strike 
group’s command and control system electromagnetically to disable it: 
“Directed against the enemy’s command and control system or weak links in 
the Aegis system, conventional missiles carrying antiradiation submunitions 
or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) submunitions can be used when enemy 
radar is being used and their command systems are working, with antiradia-
tion submunitions striking radar stations and EMP submunitions paralyzing 
the enemy’s command and control system.”38
A third document, Intimidation Warfare, edited by Lieutenant General Zhao 
Xijun, Second Artillery deputy commander from 1996 to 2003, echoes many 
of the statements on strategic signaling outlined in Science of Second Artillery 
Campaigns. It sheds additional light on China’s possible calculus and tactics in 
various scenarios. Zhao’s team emphasizes the value of demonstration training, 
tests, and other measures to infl uence the enemy, in part by infl uencing media 
coverage.39
Zhao’s team also suggests four methods to deter enemy ships without hitting 
them directly. “Proximity . . . sea deterrence strike” involves test launches that 
impact near a sea-based target. “Two-fl anked convergence proximity (or criti-
cal) deterrence strike [两翼夹击抵近 (临界) 威慑打击]” involves launching two 
or more missiles to bracket or encircle a target. “Island crossing attack deter-
rence strike [越岛攻击威慑打击]” exploits the psychological impact of missiles 
overfl ying “strategic targets” when fi ghting an enemy controlling an island (e.g., 
Taiwan?). “Proximity aircraft carrier deterrence strike [抵近航空威慑打击]” 
involves “the launching of missiles toward the fl anks or the front of the aircraft 
carrier battle groups that have entered one’s territorial waters, [to] demonstrate 
one’s ability and resolve to implement destructive strikes against the aircraft 
carrier, thereby producing psychological shocks in the enemy and forcing it to 
leave one’s territorial waters.”40
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Particularly noteworthy of the wide variety of uses suggested for ASBMs 
against carriers and possibly other surface vessels in this publication and in Sci-
ence of Second Artillery Campaigns is that at least several would appear to place 
less of a premium on warhead accuracy, depending on how literally such con-
cepts as bracketing and encirclement are interpreted. Rather, missile range and 
defense penetration capability would seem to be the key factors. If a MaRV were 
known to defeat terminal defenses and a demonstration shot defeated the SM-3 
interceptor,* only guidance failure would seem to stand in the way of a success-
ful Chinese strike.
Science of Second Artillery Campaigns states that TBMs extend the Second 
Artillery’s strike range, and it seems to assume that the Second Artillery would 
have ASBM inventory suffi cient to permit numerous warning shots. Horizontal 
escalation in the short run, it argues implicitly, can achieve de-escalation in the 
long run. Although the Second Artillery’s view is that such tactics would be ef-
fective, unless it were communicated effectively ahead of time that these were 
merely warning shots, they could easily be misinterpreted as failed attempts to 
strike the target and thus have the exact opposite result of China’s intent—that 
is, escalation instead of de-escalation. This potential problem is addressed, in 
a fashion, in Science of Second Artillery Campaigns: one section emphasizes the 
need for “no-fl y” and “restricted navigation zones” and calls for the use of “very 
precise missiles in order to prevent errors in precision or losing control of the 
missile when it is in fl ight such that it enters enemy territory (or an enemy-
occupied island), or such that it directly strikes an enemy aircraft carrier.” Oth-
erwise, such errors “could cause the nature of deterrence to change, giving the 
enemy an excuse to use force.”41
Technical Sources
Having considered how the Second Artillery thinks about using ASBMs, it is 
time to examine in detail possible approaches to, and technical challenges in, 
developing them. The Second Artillery dominates available technical ASBM as-
sessments, implying that it may largely control any Chinese ASBM programs. As 
the PLA’s strategic rocket force, with “equal attention devoted to” (and the vast 
majority of its recent acquisitions in) conventional forces, and 78.2 percent of its 
cadres now holding bachelor’s degrees or above, it would seem the logical choice 
to handle such a challenging new mission.42 The vast majority of available tech-
nical articles devoted explicitly to ASBM issues are authored in full or in part by 
individuals associated with the Second Artillery Engineering College in Xi’an, 
suggesting that this institution may be playing a major role in developing ASBM-
related programs. Technical analyses also come from civilian institutions in 
* The RIM-161 naval surface-launched anti–ballistic missile interceptor, a variant of the U.S. Navy’s Stand-
 ard Missile (SM) series.
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Xi’an, itself a major defense industry hub, as well, implying some division of 
intellectual labor.43 The most prolifi c contributor is the PLA-uniformed civilian 
Tan Shoulin, a leading professor at the Second Artillery Engineering College in 
the Department of Command and Support, who advises master’s students and 
specializes in “missile weapon fi repower applications.”
Second in institutional prominence is the Second Artillery Equipment De-
partment, in Beijing—with some related publication by the Second Artillery 
Equipment Research Institute as well. Such involvement may suggest that some 
degree of procurement, or at least active consideration thereof, is under way. 
Occasional participation can also be seen from individuals associated with units 
presumably associated with Second Artillery bases. Such strategic locations as 
Taiyuan, with its Military Representative Offi ce in Factory 247, also make ap-
pearances. Academic institutions in other places—such as the National Univer-
sity of Defense Science and Technology in Changsha and the Beijing Institute of 
Technology’s School of Aerospace Science and Engineering—appear to make 
contributions as well.
Chinese researchers are studying the problems of target tracking and termi-
nal guidance associated with ASBMs. Technical studies, such as a recent paper 
by State Oceanic Administration scientists on using synthetic-aperture radar to 
detect surface ships, suggest that the Chinese have developed substantial exper-
tise in the use of such hardware.44 A recent paper by researchers at Dalian Naval 
Academy offers a regimen of tests and data fusion to “achieve our goals of moni-
toring and identifying ships in large-scale sea areas by using space-borne optical 
sensors.”45 A study by researchers at Beijing Institute of Technology simulates 
terminal targeting of a moving aircraft carrier using adjoint equations and non-
dimensional analysis but states that guidance precision-enhancing technologies 
still need to be developed.46 A mathematical study by researchers at the Second 
Artillery Engineering College appears designed to demonstrate conceptual fea-
sibility.47 Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College and Second 
Artillery Base 55, Unit 96311, Huaihua (Jingzhou), offer a theoretical explora-
tion of the ability of TBMs with terminal-phase guidance and maneuvering ca-
pabilities to attack aircraft carriers.48
Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College and the National 
Defense Science and Technology University offer a mathematical model of a 
type of terminal guidance, based on a prediction model of a carrier’s movement. 
Modeling suggests that this method can allow warhead precision to achieve a 
CEP* of about twelve meters under the most ideal conditions.49
* Circular error probability—broadly, the distance from an aim point within which a missile has a 50 percent
  probability of striking.
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In a related paper, researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College 
and the Second Artillery Equipment Department present a model for predicting 
the movement of a CSG that can provide targeting information for land-based 
TBMs. For the needs of TBM targeting, it would be suffi cient to provide predic-
tions with a precision measured in kilometers within a time frame of “tens of 
minutes.” The paper demonstrates the feasibility of such a forecast system and 
provides two maps depicting the notional location of an aircraft carrier south-
southeast of Taiwan, at the latitude of Hainan Island.50
How to cause maximum damage to a carrier most effectively is another com-
mon research topic.51 For example, a PhD and a master’s student at the Second 
Artillery Engineering College offer a theoretical model for calculating damage 
effects on large targets with many components—say, a carrier strike group.52 
The discussions in a large proportion of technical articles focus on the delivery 
of submunitions by homing ballistic missiles to disable fl ight operations from 
carriers, while not addressing directly the problems of target acquisition and 
guidance. Research on submunitions appears to be extremely widespread and 
sophisticated, with many writings on how to use them against carrier-based 
aircraft and against runways at air bases (e.g., those of Taiwan). A pathbreak-
ing U.S. article by William S. Murray provides compelling evidence that the 
Second Artillery has already developed considerable competence in the latter 
mission.53
Defeating U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) is also seen by many Chinese 
researchers as essential to attacking a carrier strike group successfully, and it has 
attracted considerable study.54 Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering 
College offer a theoretical model of reentry-vehicle maneuvering using “moving 
mass center” control methods. This involves changing the center of gravity of 
a warhead by adjusting movable masses within the warhead, thereby modify-
ing its atmospheric fl ight path. The aerodynamic profi le of the warhead would 
remain unchanged, and the method can be used in conjunction with fi ns and 
other conventional control surfaces.55
Technical experts working on technical solutions are focused on very nar-
row, specifi c issues. One wonders, however, whether their political leaders have 
“gamed out” the scenarios and considered the consequences as technical ca-
pabilities progress. The danger with a lopsided focus is that without a proper 
understanding of the potential strategic risks involved, technical achievements 
can have dangerous consequences. According to some interpretations, China’s 
11 January 2007 antisatellite test offers a cautionary example of Beijing’s civilian 
leadership approving the trial of a weapon long in development without under-
standing fully its scope or strategic ramifi cations.56
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Whatever the exact strategic calculations (or lack thereof) of the political 
leadership (authoritative sources are silent on the point), the ASBM issue has 
been vigorously debated by Chinese commentators in various unoffi cial venues. 
Some of these individuals may be privy to internal deliberations or even play 
roles in shaping policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. When politics 
or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to the fore, they may become caught up in 
larger competitions of ideas. But even the views of those not directly involved in 
the policy process often matter; their ideas may inform policy makers directly 
or even be adopted. Some analyses may well be informed by parallel debates in 
offi cial circles, and even be designed to help justify or “socialize” already estab-
lished policies—for instance, through didactic exploration of important con-
cepts. For that, we turn to the generalist literature.
Generalist Literature
Though, as we have seen, the doctrinal literature is the most demonstrably 
authoritative category of open-source writings, with technical literature often 
roughly equivalent, care must be taken in extrapolating actual capabilities from 
these sources. Available Second Artillery technical articles and mathematical 
feasibility studies devoted explicitly to ASBM issues do not detail concrete Chi-
nese capabilities.57 Even doctrine may refl ect aspirations or projected capabili-
ties rather than the existence of hardware and infrastructure. In fact, Chinese 
doctrinal publications often discuss theoretical capabilities as if they existed, 
which U.S. joint publications typically do not.
For all these reasons, it is useful to examine the less clearly authoritative but 
more diverse and detailed generalist literature, with its widespread debate on all 
major aspects of ASBM development and employment, for indications of chal-
lenges and dilemmas that China might face. Regardless of the actual status of 
Chinese ASBM development, these opinions matter: perfecting and deploying 
such a weapon would entail resolving a wide variety of complexities and policy 
considerations and transcending many industrial and bureaucratic boundaries. 
Any remaining challenges in the technical data fusion required for ASBM guid-
ance and targeting may pale in comparison to the bureaucratic “data fusion” 
needed if such a program is to succeed over time and such a weapon is to func-
tion effectively in combat.58
Strategic Rationale and Scenarios. There is broad (though not complete) consisten-
cy in the generalist literature concerning the operational effects of ASBMs and their 
potential value for Chinese maritime strategy writ large. Antiship ballistic missiles 
are promoted as a means to overcome conventional inferiority (by exploiting tech-
nological asymmetry), deter intervention, give China more maneuvering space, and 
offer both escalation control and an “assassin’s mace” for victory if deterrence fails.
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Of supreme importance to Beijing is Taiwan’s political status. At the strate-
gic level, Beijing seeks to deter Taipei from declaring independence, progres-
sively constrain its political space, and encourage eventual reunifi cation, with a 
wide variety of hard- and soft-power tools. Tactical ballistic missiles are thought 
by one analyst to offer China a “third” alternative to the risk of engaging in 
outright attack, on one hand, and the limitations of soft power, on the other. 
Termed “attacking without entering,” a TBM campaign is seen by this observer 
as increasing China’s strategic options while limiting Taiwan’s.59 In addition to 
their psychological and deterrent effects, ASBMs (as a category of tactical bal-
listic missiles) are believed to offer China a way to exert hard-power pressure 
and convey strategic signals in scenarios that do not rise to the level of war. This 
would seem in concert with Chinese strategic writings, which often express con-
siderable confi dence that China can manage strategic escalation in measured 
increments with a high degree of certainty. At the operational level, facing the 
possibility of intervention by a technologically more advanced navy in the event 
of a Taiwan confl ict, the PLA seeks an asymmetric “silver bullet” that will (ide-
ally) forestall intervention in the fi rst place or, in a worst-case scenario, offer the 
ability to attack platforms that are perceived to threaten China. Antiship ballis-
tic missiles promise to further this strategy at far lower cost than force-on-force 
approaches. Three PLA offi cers from the Second Artillery Command Academy 
declare that “guided missile forces are the silver bullet for achieving victory in 
limited high-technology war.”60
A professor and a student at the Air Force Engineering Academy evoke an 
analogous concept when they write that ballistic missiles enjoy a higher proba-
bility of penetration than other antiaccess weapons: “Tactical ballistic missiles” 
have become “the ‘poor country’s atom bomb.’”61
In addition, TBMs are regarded by their proponents as an important instru-
ment in China’s overall strategic tool kit. One of the most nuanced analyses on 
the issue, an article published in the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 
(CSIC) journal Shipborne Weapons, states that tactical missiles “provide China 
with more maneuvering space for military and political strategic operations on 
its eastern, maritime fl ank.”62 More specifi cally, the creation of a
tactical ballistic missile maritime strike system . . . will establish for China in any 
high-intensity confl ict in its coastal waters an asymmetry, in its favor, in the deliv-
erance of fi repower and so will remedy to some extent China’s qualitative inferior-
ity in traditional naval platforms. Further, the existence of this asymmetry would 
set up for both sides a psychological “upper limit” on the scale of confl ict. This 
would enable both parties to return more easily “to rationality,” thereby creating 
more space for maneuver in the resolution of maritime confl icts.63
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Skeptics writing in another CSIC publication, Modern Ships, by contrast, re-
ject both of these points, arguing that ASBMs offer limited power-projection 
capabilities, are highly escalatory if employed, and might in fact trigger nuclear 
retaliation.64
How Chinese strategists assess the impact of ASBMs for various confl ict sce-
narios is far more diffi cult to evaluate. Few articles address this topic. One that 
does states that “the PLA must use all of its electronic warfare and reconnais-
sance assets properly, must neutralize enemy antimissile systems and missile 
sensor systems, and should use electronic jamming on the enemy fl eet. Such 
combined kinetic and electronic attacks help the PLA attack an enemy fl eet . . . 
with a combination of explosive, antiradiation, and fake warheads to deceive 
enemy radar and sensor systems and defeat a deployed battle group or one in 
port.”65
A 2007 article offers a minutely detailed scenario of a notional attack se-
quence. But it is divorced from larger strategic events, based on some question-
able assumptions, and written by a journalist with no professional background 
in defense affairs.66 No known sources mention directly any scenarios beyond 
Taiwan.
In any case, the concept hinges on technical feasibility (the subject of the 
next section of this article). Chinese discussions of ASBM employment typically 
center on their use to deny U.S. carrier strike groups access to waters relevant to 
a Taiwan confl ict, presumably to the east of the island, and hence to the airspace 
over the strait and even over the island itself. The idea seems to be to hold carri-
ers back through deterrence and to attack them if they come forward.
At the same time, ASBMs are recognized to have signifi cant limitations, even 
potential dangers. According to one analyst, they “cannot replace aircraft car-
riers, submarines, and other traditional naval weapons”: they “can be used to 
destroy enemy forces at sea but not to achieve absolute sea control, let alone to 
project maritime power.”67 Two writers in Modern Ships go much farther, declar-
ing that while ASBMs are technically possible, their employment in practice is 
fraught with diffi culties. These can be overcome, in their view, if one is dealing 
with a minor power, but not with a superpower like the United States.68 One 
claim they make, as have others, is that reducing the speed of the warhead in 
the terminal reentry phase in order to operate its guidance radar makes it more 
vulnerable to anti–ballistic missile interceptors. To some extent this depends 
on one’s assessment of the maneuverability of the warhead in its terminal entry 
phase, but the authors of the Modern Ships article are highly skeptical. They 
acknowledge that the problem may be overcome to some extent in a saturated 
attack, but they insist that the Aegis defense system is designed to deal with just 
that. They also point to the relatively high costs of ballistic missiles. Further, 
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they suggest that the use of ballistic missiles in a saturation attack would “likely 
lead to the scenario described by ancient Chinese strategists, in which the weap-
on in question becomes unusable in practice” because its use would be highly 
escalatory: “Apply little force, and no real harm can be done to the enemy; apply 
great force, and the fi rst harm is done to the self.”69
Even if ASBMs were indeed successfully developed, by virtue of an over-
whelming investment of resources and energy, the Modern Ships authors con-
tend, a critical problem would remain: whether anyone would dare use such 
weapons in an actual confl ict scenario.70 The authors seem to suggest that while 
conventional tactical missiles could be used against Taiwan with little risk, 
their employment against U.S. carriers would immediately create a grave politi-
cal problem: “Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, all the major nuclear 
powers have developed ballistic missile warning systems against possible nucle-
ar attacks, and there has not been a single precedent of a major nuclear power 
attacking another with ballistic missiles.”71 As no technology today is capable of 
distinguishing between a conventional and a nuclear warhead prior to detona-
tion upon impact, the authors worry that any ballistic-missile attack against 
another nuclear power might activate its strategic retaliation mechanisms and 
trigger a nuclear confl ict. The Modern Ships authors emphasize that in any con-
fl ict scenario, the extreme psychological duress to which the military personnel 
of both sides would be subjected would make it particularly dangerous to em-
ploy ballistic missiles, as any small mistake in judgment might trigger a nuclear 
Armageddon.72 Even absent any misperception, sinking a ship that is a symbol 
of American power and has a crew of thousands could provoke a very serious 
response. Of course, elements of the PLA, and even their civilian leaders in a cri-
sis, might be less cautious than these analysts. Another writer, having reviewed 
their performance in battle since the 1960s, concludes that TBMs are indeed, as 
others have argued, an “assassin’s mace,” a silver bullet.73 A Chinese interlocutor 
has told one of the present authors that the Second Artillery is itself considering 
placing nuclear and conventional warheads interchangeably on the same types 
of missiles—for example, the DF-21—so that they will “possess both nuclear 
and conventional [核常兼备]” capabilities. This last may be evidence of open 
debate, of manipulation of American opinion, or of sensitization of the United 
States to operational implications. If the latter, there is a clear risk of mispercep-
tions in the event of launch in a confl ict.
The question of operational control is not addressed directly in the open 
sources, but the content of doctrinal publications, the large number of Second 
Artillery offi cers writing on the topic, and the current responsibility of that arm 
for the vast majority of nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles suggest that 
the Second Artillery is likely to have sole responsibility for ground-based ASBMs. 
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(The possibility of rivalry and divergence of viewpoints that may result between 
the Second Artillery and the PLAN will be addressed later in this article.)
Technological Feasibility: Convergence and Divergence of Views. Chinese doc-
trinal debates about the utility of ASBMs are closely related to widespread dis-
agreements over their technical feasibility. Analysts generally concur that fi ve 
major technical challenges must be surmounted to achieve a functioning ASBM: 
detection, tracking, penetration of target defenses, hitting a moving target, and 
causing suffi cient damage (fi gure 4).
Detection: Pessimists claim that carriers are too small relative to the potential 
search area to be easily detected by satellite images. Optimists maintain that 
carriers—with their broad constellation of electromagnetic signals—can be de-
tected in a variety of ways, such as with space-borne sensors.
Tracking: Skeptics maintain that requisite satellite coverage is unattainable, 
as are suffi cient naval vessels and surveillance craft, as well as overseas bases 
for signals intelligence. They believe that China’s other tracking methods are 
inadequate, even in aggregate. Strangely, they seem to overlook the possibility 
that China’s combination of land-based radars and satellites—perhaps aug-
mented temporarily with deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles and launches 
of (micro)satellites—might be suffi cient to track and target carrier strike groups 
within a certain zone off China’s coastal waters from which it believed essential 
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FIGURE 4
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF ASBM FLIGHT TRAJECTORY WITH MIDCOURSE AND TERMINAL 
GUIDANCE
Note the depiction of control fi ns on the reentry vehicle, which would be critical to steering the ASBM through terminal maneuvers to evade countermeasures 
and home in on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different from most ballistic missiles, which have a fi xed trajectory. Published by individuals affi liated 
with the Second Artillery Engineering College and a Second Artillery base in a Chinese technical journal.
Source: Tan Shoulin, Zhang Daqiao, and Diao Guoxiu, “Determination and Evaluation of Effective Range for Terminal Guidance Ballistic Missile(s) Attacking 
Aircraft Carrier(s),” pp. 6–9, republished in Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to 
Congress, p. 21.
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to exclude them in combat.74 Both Chinese and Western sources, for instance, 
suggest that China already has relevant over-the-horizon (OTH) backscatter 
sky-wave and OTH surface-wave radars.75
Target defense penetration: The claims of skeptics that slowing the warhead 
for terminal guidance makes it prohibitively vulnerable to interception seem 
unpersuasive based on known physics principles. A wide variety of Chinese 
sources suggest using multiaxis saturation attacks (e.g., involving submarine-
launched cruise missiles as well) to overwhelm CSG defenses, apparently with-
out acknowledging the diffi culty of coordinating them.
Hitting a moving target: How to strike a CSG that moves during the processes 
of location, data transmission, and ASBM delivery? Skeptics contend that bal-
listic missiles are less accurate than cruise missiles and that while a ballistic 
missile’s trajectory is fi xed, its target is mobile and may escape between launch 
and impact. But researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College main-
tain that as long as the initial ASBM trajectory is reasonably accurate, appro-
priate homing corrections can be made. Other researchers suggest improving 
precision with passive radiation homing and by activating terminal guidance at 
higher altitude to allow the seeker to scan a larger sea area. One researcher rec-
ommends selecting opportune moments for attack: “Even a tiger takes a nap [老
虎也有打盹的时候].”76 Thus, they contend, carriers can be targeted when fl ight 
operations or at-sea replenishment impede their mobility.
Causing suffi cient damage: While a few experts make a show of detailing car-
rier damage-control equipment, one wonders from their tone if they are not 
being a bit disingenuous. The conventional wisdom seems to be that a multiaxis 
saturation attack (to defeat defenses) or submunitions (to distribute damage), 
delivered accurately, can achieve a mission kill by targeting critical exposed ar-
eas, such as the carrier’s aircraft, island, or C4ISR* equipment.
ASSESSMENTS
Available Chinese literature follows a logical pattern of ever-widening concen-
tric circles of awareness and, to a lesser extent, involvement. This supports the 
axiom that the longer something goes on, the more likely people are to hear 
about it. At the center, authoritative PLA publications assume an (eventual?) 
ASBM capability. Farther out, a variety of institutes are working to validate spe-
cifi c concepts and perhaps also technologies to support such a capability. Be-
yond these inner circles, a wide range of individuals, whose access to internal 
information probably varies markedly, are beginning to weigh in with diverse 
opinions and institutional interests. Few writers in the generalist literature make 
a balanced, nonpartisan argument along the lines that ASBMs are feasible but 
* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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a bad idea or a good idea but technically infeasible. This suggests a general pat-
tern of institutional biases and competition, with individuals favoring precisely 
the outcomes that would benefi t their organizations most. These opinions and 
interests matter. Many of the projections of technological “hurdles” outlined 
above are either demonstrably pessimistic or will likely be obviated anyway over 
the next few years as China continues its rapid aerospace development. Rather, 
China’s ASBM future may be a policy, not a technical, question. For now, as ca-
pabilities are being developed, technical discussion is being elevated to strategic 
discussion, but that could well change if Beijing’s leaders ask one day: Now that 
we have an ASBM capability, what can we do with it?
Nonetheless, debate continues in China’s generalist literature over the techni-
cal feasibility of ASBM operations, with only two writers claiming directly that 
China has ASBM capabilities.77 This may suggest that there is ongoing disagree-
ment in China concerning how to develop these weapons at present and how 
they could best be placed into operation. Now that China has what could be 
termed a public and military-intellectual complex, organizations analysts and 
policy entrepreneurs may be jockeying for position in an attempt to infl uence 
the course of decision making on the part of at least two of China’s armed ser-
vices, its military leadership, and ultimately its civilian authorities.
The overall discussion seen so far is best characterized as “contentious.” The 
three technical challenges most consistently emphasized are real-time satellite 
reconnaissance, target tracking in terminal reentry, and terminal maneuvering. 
Some problems that are presented as insurmountable by some analysts are ap-
proached more sanguinely by others. Foreign subject-matter experts could glean 
signifi cant insights from the multitude of relevant Chinese technical studies.
Particularly noteworthy is that direct claims of existing Chinese capabilities 
in these areas are extremely limited. In other words, the focus of the discus-
sion is on feasibility rather than actual Chinese capabilities. Researchers at the 
Second Artillery Engineering College make a variety of feasibility claims, in 
one instance stating specifi cally that the technical hurdles to successful ASBM 
employment have already been resolved, but they cite English-language techni-
cal papers as authority for this particular point (though they use sophisticated 
Chinese sources to support other details of their argument).78 Again, they em-
phasize technical feasibility without reference to current Chinese capabilities. It 
is likely that some Chinese authors do not know what those capabilities actually 
are, while others cannot say.
Several other issues, though not directly addressed by the Chinese authors 
surveyed, may merit further attention.
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Possible Interservice Rivalry
A noticeable pattern in the tone of ASBM analyses may be interpreted as signs 
of Second Artillery–PLAN bureaucratic competition. Momentum, direction, 
and contention about programs may refl ect diverse institutional interests. The 
Second Artillery produces many technical analyses, but not a single one appears 
pessimistic. Articles written by analysts and students associated with the Second 
Artillery tend to take the feasibility of ASBM development for granted, perhaps 
because an ASBM program would be (or now is) controlled by the Second Artil-
lery, thereby furthering its institutional interests.
By contrast, the vast majority of analyses affi liated with the PLAN and the 
state shipbuilding industry suggest that ASBM development is technically prob-
lematic or that use would have dangerous unintended consequences.79 Perhaps 
this is because ground-launched ASBMs would not be controlled by the navy 
and could divert resources otherwise earmarked for naval development. The 
PLAN may also be lobbying hard to begin serious aircraft carrier development 
of its own and does not want this effort undermined by constant emphasis on 
carrier vulnerabilities—which have played a major role in previous Chinese car-
rier discussions, at least at the generalist level. We may thus be witnessing some 
elements of Chinese bureaucratic resource-allocation politics, cloaked in strate-
gic debate and the fl ag.
In an interesting suggestion of at least some cooperation between the Second 
Artillery and the PLAN on antiship ballistic missiles, however, an individual 
from the Navy Representative Offi ce in Chengdu, Sichuan, is a coauthor with re-
searchers from the Second Artillery Engineering College on two ASBM-specifi c 
articles. This is precisely the sort of interaction that one would expect if the 
Second Artillery were charged with directly developing and testing an ASBM, 
in which case the PLAN would second representatives to relevant Second Ar-
tillery facilities to make sure that weapons produced addressed PLAN needs.80 
Moreover, such PLAN-affi liated institutions as the Dalian Naval Academy and 
the State Oceanographic Administration conduct extensive research on related 
topics like ship detection and tracking.
Pressing questions remain, however. What role would the PLAN play in op-
erations that clearly affect its geographic area of responsibility? How would 
joint operations be coordinated among the Second Artillery, the PLAN, and 
other services—particularly given the PLA’s previous limited ability in joint 
operations?
Cost-Effectiveness
Beijing’s actual development and deployment of ASBMs, and implications for 
any bureaucratic competition between the Second Artillery and the PLAN, will 
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also hinge on decision makers’ perceptions of their relative effi cacy and cost-
effectiveness (e.g., vis-à-vis cruise missiles), as well as their marginal develop-
ment cost. The relative cost-effectiveness of various antiaccess weapons can be 
derived from both physical principles and Western and Soviet experience, both 
of which have been widely discussed in open literature.
Many Chinese analysts have regarded such traditional weapons as attack sub-
marines and antiship cruise missiles as the primary weapons against carriers, 
with no more than cursory references to ASBMs. Other Chinese sources claim 
that cruise missiles are superior to ballistic missiles for certain missions, par-
ticularly in terms of general use, agility, and target selection. According to the 
U.S. defense analyst Thomas Mahnken, cruise missiles have many advantages 
over ballistic missiles for a country like China: they are cheaper, it is easier to 
make them highly accurate, they require simpler launch platforms and support 
equipment, and they “approach their targets from different azimuths than bal-
listic missiles [and] hug the ground.”81 Further, cruise missiles can be delivered 
by aircraft, as well as by ships, submarines, and ground launchers.
ASBM advocates make several strong points, however. Cruise missiles have 
a variety of disadvantages, including the much longer time of fl ight (with obvi-
ous targeting implications); the need to fl y long ranges at high altitudes, where 
they are much more vulnerable to being shot down; conversely, low operational 
ceilings at long ranges (thus making it harder to fl y over mountains, such as Tai-
wan’s); shorter maximum ranges than ballistic missiles; and diffi culty in identi-
fying targets correctly. In an interesting example of PLAN-affi liated individuals 
claiming that ASBMs have advantages, researchers from the Naval Aeronautical 
Engineering Institute use mathematical analysis to calculate that “when using 
ballistic missiles to carry out attack operations on [naval vessel formations], the 
probability of penetration can reach 95%.” This is a much higher success rate 
than those they calculate for cruise missiles.82
Antiship cruise missiles must often be fi red from aircraft, surface vessels, 
or submarines that approach close to enemy forces to compensate for reduced 
range. This, and their relatively long fl ight times, increases their vulnerability 
(albeit less so for submarine launches), and hence also their cost. However, the 
ASCM shooters themselves are not necessarily more expensive just because they 
are vulnerable and might be lost in combat; some (e.g., the Type 022 Houbei 
missile catamaran) are likely considered disposable, with loss in combat as-
sumed. A mobile land-based ASBM, though requiring substantial development 
and infrastructure investment, would be much less vulnerable to destruction 
before launch. Two Chinese observers estimate the unit cost of an ASBM and its 
launcher to be $5–$10.5 million—several times that of the most expensive U.S. 
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cruise missiles if their launch platform is not included, but far less than the cost 
of interceptors to defeat it.83
Other Chinese authors have addressed the cost-effectiveness issue only in 
passing. One analyst insists that cost-effectiveness should not be understood 
along conventional lines in such confl ict scenarios and that if the technology 
is indeed feasible, the cost issue will not necessarily be so salient.84 The discus-
sion is often interwoven with analyses of which weapons can best target aircraft 
carriers. Here, the primary comparison is between ASBMs and cruise missiles. 
One analyst states that “ballistic missiles, given the same tactical parameters, 
offer more outstanding penetration capability and cost-effectiveness than cruise 
missiles,” both of which are superior to aircraft in this regard.85 This assess-
ment is augmented by another observer, who states that “supersonic antiship 
guided missiles that use ramjet engines are not very useful due to their restricted 
ranges.” Moreover, “it will be very diffi cult to surpass or even catch up to the 
United States and Russia in developing cruise missiles. Thus, it will be very dif-
fi cult for our cruise missiles to become a deadly weapon to carry out fatal attacks 
against aircraft carrier formations.”86 Chinese planners may therefore favor de-
velopment of ASBMs as a means of “poor man’s sea denial,” over such complex, 
expensive approaches as a fl eet of aircraft carriers and accompanying long-range 
aircraft.87
A Coercive Quarantine?
Synthesizing the considerations above, it is possible that to the extent that tacti-
cal ballistic missiles are employed as antiship weapons, they would most likely 
be used as part of a multiservice combined-arms operation, as an added compo-
nent of a saturation attack to overwhelm the carrier’s defensive systems. For this 
purpose, targeting precision would not be as important, and the more general 
Chinese tradition of numbers over accuracy could be employed to good effect. 
While coordinating such an attack would be complex and diffi cult, there could 
be signifi cant benefi ts if such issues could be surmounted. If a carrier detected 
an incoming ballistic missile, it would likely engage it with its air-defense assets 
regardless of the attacking missile’s presumed accuracy. This could divert car-
rier defense systems from other threats, such as other ASBMs or simultaneous 
cruise missile volleys, and perhaps exhaust scarce interceptors. To escape this 
problem, carriers may opt to stay out of the range of the TBMs. As one analyst 
writing in the Kanwa Asian Defense Review puts it, “For the Chinese military 
forces, the practical signifi cance of striking the aircraft carrier lies in that the 
attacks can play the role of ‘coercive [quarantine]’ even if the missiles cannot 
[always] accurately hit the targets, that is, to keep the U.S. aircraft carrier battle 
groups out of the Taiwan Strait combat theater.”88
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Messages for the U.S. Military?
How and to what extent might Beijing be seeking to infl uence strategic communi-
cations regarding ASBMs? Information manipulation should certainly be expect-
ed; discussion is likely regulated to send a desired signal. This is in keeping with 
the attention to deception and perception management outlined in a variety of 
PLA publications, including Science of Second Artillery Campaigns.89 Within such 
a conception, different explanations for Chinese writings on ASBMs are possible; 
to the extent that they are manipulated, they could represent, respectively, a highly 
cost-effective partial deterrent until the capability is fully realized, a refl ection of 
ongoing ambivalence and debate, a targeted effort to obscure actual capabilities, 
or a statement of conditional intent.
Strategic articles might well be manipulated to obscure or divert attention 
from an extant capability or one in rapid development. Consider the sheer vol-
ume of highly specifi c Chinese technical writings from a wide variety of im-
portant civilian and military institutes over the past decade—seemingly on all 
areas of direct relevance to ASBM development and even use—virtually all of 
them stating that various component capabilities are either under development 
or at least technically feasible. Manipulating a few strategic articles in journals 
known to be read outside China, by comparison, might be a particularly effec-
tive instrument in an information campaign. It is even possible that there is an 
effort to send a measured signal—that China may be preparing certain capa-
bilities but has not yet made defi nitive plans for their deployment, the actual 
realization of which will be calibrated in response to American strategic actions 
(e.g., vis-à-vis Taiwan).
In any case, should its capabilities be developed suffi ciently, Beijing might 
emulate former Second Artillery deputy commander Lieutenant General Zhao 
Xijun’s logic and reveal a dramatic weapon test to the world—with or with-
out advance warning—in some way geared to infl uencing offi cial and public 
opinion in the United States, Taiwan, and Japan. Such an unprecedented public 
demonstration could be used to signal either growing Chinese power during a 
time of stability or Beijing’s resolve in a time of diplomatic tension or crisis.90 
Alternatively, unpublicized fl ight tests could be conducted to deter foreign mili-
taries without alarming foreign publics (though classifi ed information might 
ultimately be leaked to them).
In any case, some sort of fl ight tests would be necessary to generate Chinese 
confi dence in ASBM capabilities. The fact of a hit, however manipulated and 
revealed, could change the strategic equation—much as the effi cacy of the 20–21 
July 1921 test-bombing of the battleship Ostfriesland was hotly contested by the 
U.S. Navy (and remains debated to this day) yet altered service budgets imme-
diately and helped catalyze development of what later became the U.S. Air Force. 
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Is there today a Chinese equivalent of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell eager to 
promote such a test to further the cause of Second Artillery and China’s pioneer-
ing of new ways of war?
However the Chinese internal debate on ASBM development progresses, the 
strategic stakes will be high; this will be a debate worth following.
IMPLICATIONS
While there is ongoing disagreement as to their feasibility and effi cacy, the idea of 
developing antiship ballistic missiles is clearly appealing to many in China, par-
ticularly in the Second Artillery. Any successful Chinese deployment of ASBMs 
would likely infl uence PLA thinking by
Reinforcing continental approaches to maritime security—“using the land to •
control the sea”
Reinforcing centralized approaches to command•
Increasing emphasis on multiaxis saturation attacks•
Increasing confi dence in China’s ability to restrict U.S. Navy operations, and •
to control escalation.
All does not hinge on putative ASBM capability: demonstration of other an-
tiaccess capabilities (e.g., streaming antiship cruise missile attacks) that a tech-
nologically capable nation like China is clearly capable of mastering could have 
substantial effect. But ASBMs pose a threat qualitatively different from that of 
antiship cruise missiles: the United States has not had decades to address the 
problem, interception is far more complex and time sensitive, and launch plat-
forms cannot be targeted (“shooting the archer instead of the arrow”) without 
contemplating highly escalatory strikes in mainland China.
Chinese leaders do not seek war. Rather, they want to defend what they per-
ceive to be their nation’s core territorial interests and to ensure a stable environ-
ment for domestic economic development. If they develop an ASBM, then, they 
would likely hope that it could prevent U.S. projection of military power in ways 
that were inimical to China’s interests. They would thus hope to achieve deter-
rence without going to war. That said, America has its own national interests, in-
cluding maintaining freedom of navigation, reassuring such key regional allies 
as Japan and South Korea, preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait, and safeguard-
ing Taiwan’s democracy. A demonstrated Chinese ASBM capability, particularly 
if the Chinese side failed to offer explanations and reassurances, could threaten 
these interests and be strategically destabilizing. This would necessitate Ameri-
can development and demonstration of robust countermeasures that Beijing 
would come to regret.91
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Herein lies one more way in which Chinese open-source discussions of ASBMs 
are signifi cant, and must be addressed. Chinese public intellectuals are often 
tasked by their government with making unoffi cial statements to gauge inter-
national response to potential initiatives, as was the case in December 2008 be-
fore a far more positive historic fi rst—the PLAN’s counterpiracy deployment to 
the Gulf of Aden. If some Chinese are currently sending such “trial balloons” 
with regard to ASBM development, but U.S. interlocutors appear to be unaware, 
distracted, or indifferent, this will only strengthen the hand of those pushing 
such programs forward. Measured expression of U.S. concern, resolve, and ca-
pability, on the other hand, might infl uence Chinese decision-making regarding 
ASBM development in a more positive direction—for example, by informing 
and empowering the voices of government organizations with more to lose than 
the Second Artillery in provoking the United States—or at least slow the pace to 
give time for a more measured reaction. Just as American policy makers must 
now discuss how best to prepare for this potential capability, they should work 
to ensure that their Chinese counterparts have an analogous policy debate—in 
parallel to the ongoing debate in open sources regarding whether China should 
develop and deploy an ASBM, and the doctrinal and usage implications if it 
does. While China will ultimately keep its own counsel, like any nation, such 
efforts should at least ensure that any decisions in favor of ASBM development 
are made with full awareness of the contingent costs, risks, and consequences. 
To facilitate this process, two areas require particular investment of political 
and human capital:
Increased research to understand the trajectory of both Chinese ASBM •
efforts and the attendant policy discourse92
Bilateral strategic dialogue at all levels (particularly tracks 1.5 and 2).•
Responding to the unprecedented strategic challenge presented by an ASBM 
capability would require the American military and civilian leadership to face hard 
truths, and continue to develop innovative new capabilities. The United States has 
many options here, and it must be prepared to exercise them. The most perilous 
approach would be to neglect such military innovation while continuing to insist 
that the United States maintained its ability to keep the peace, when in fact the 
military capabilities that underpin that ability were diminishing, at least in a rela-
tive sense. Such a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality would erode America’s 
regional credibility and fuel Chinese overconfi dence. The prospect of document-
ing that discrepancy publicly might motivate China to conduct a demonstration 
of an ASBM; a successful test could create the impression that American power-
projection capabilities—and the regional credibility that depends on them—had 
been dramatically diminished. Managing the proper response to this potential 
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“game changer” will demand close scrutiny from scholars, analysts, and policy 
makers alike, as it will critically infl uence America’s place in the Pacifi c for de-
cades to come.
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hina’s pursuit of an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) has been called a po-
tential “game changer,” a weapon that could single-handedly shift the stra-
tegic balance with the United States. A retired U.S. Navy rear admiral asserted as 
early as 2005 that an ASBM capability could represent “the strategic equivalent 
of China’s acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964.”1 Whether or not this is accurate, 
an effective ASBM capability would undoubtedly constitute a formidable anti-
access weapon against the U.S. Navy in the western Pacifi c, particularly during a 
confl ict over Taiwan.2 However, as the Chinese literature demonstrates, it would 
mean more than that. Fully operational ASBM capability along with essential 
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance) support would be a barometer of China’s greater 
military modernization effort, a potential instrument for regional strategic am-
bitions, and perhaps an important element in tipping the long-term maritime 
strategic balance with respect to the United States.
Given China’s overall inferiority in long-range air 
and naval power, an ASBM would afford a power-
ful asymmetric means that could help deter the U.S. 
forces on their way to a zone of confl ict near China’s 
littoral borders. However, the ASBM represents more 
than just a single weapon platform. Rather, it is seen 
as “a system of systems” and a key step in achieving 
high-tech and information war capabilities.3 This is 
because the ability to launch a land-based ballistic 
missile at a moving target thousands of kilometers 
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away requires a wide range of support and information technologies far beyond 
just the missile itself. Certainly, the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is 
the core component of this system, and the technological demands in maneu-
vering, guidance, and homing to defeat defenses and fi nd its moving target at sea 
are formidable. However, an effective ASBM would also require the ability to de-
tect, identify, and track the target using some combination of land, sea, air, and 
space-based surveillance assets. Aside from the immediate software and hard-
ware, all of these functions would have to be highly integrated, fast reacting, and 
suffi ciently fl exible to attack the world’s most sophisticated and best defended 
naval target in the world today—a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group (CSG).
China’s interest in ASBM capability seems logical on the basis of its per-
ceptions of its strategic environment and as a natural outgrowth of its robust 
missile program. Yet at what stage is its development? While Andrew Erickson 
and David Yang (earlier in this issue) survey the Chinese literature regarding 
the strategic, policy, and doctrinal dimensions of the ASBM system, this ar-
ticle examines the development of several key components of the system and 
their operational readiness. It does so on the basis of the literature, supported 
by qualitative modeling where direct discussions of the system are particularly 
lacking, such as for space-based targeting.4 Finally, the article addresses some of 
the implications for the U.S. Navy and the naval strategic balance between the 
United States and China.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rarely discusses openly the develop-
ment of major new weapon systems, but the ASBM appears to be an exception. 
In an annual academic conference sponsored by the Second Artillery Engineer-
ing College, the proceedings clearly state that “in order to pierce the armor of a 
carrier . . . China is developing a new boost-glide ballistic missile . . . equipped 
with terminal guidance systems.”5 This startlingly direct admission reveals 
the level of commitment to the program within the military branch primar-
ily developing it. However, the building of such a system should not come as 
a surprise. As Erickson and Yang make clear, China’s military appears keenly 
interested in an ASBM capability, for a variety of reasons. Most important, the 
antiship ballistic missile comports with China’s perception of its security envi-
ronment and its strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. military. An ASBM 
could afford China a formidable asymmetric weapon against the United States 
in the western Pacifi c and would be particularly relevant to a confl ict over Tai-
wan. Moreover, an ASBM program is a feasible application for China’s mature 
and sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile technological developments.
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THE KILL CHAIN
While the concept of an ASBM system is evident at high-level discussions in the 
military, the ability to operationalize what is described as “a system of systems” 
involves a series of capabilities that go far beyond just the core missile compo-
nents.6 A complete ASBM system will require the ability to detect, identify, track, 
target, and engage a threat and then perform damage assessment upon it—the 
“kill chain.”7 Each of these sensor-to-shooter steps must be executed in a time-
sensitive manner, since the intended target would be maneuverable—a U.S. air-
craft carrier (or carrier strike group, comprising the carrier, its escorts, other 
missile-carrying ships, and support and other vessels assigned to its embarked 
commander). A complete kill chain entails a wide range of technologies, from 
penetration aids on board the missile, space-based and other sensors, data pro-
cessing and exchange networks, and other infrastructure to achieve a high de-
gree of integration of both the weapon platform and its command and control.8
The relevant literature stresses three technical challenges that would have to 
be resolved if China is to achieve an effective and reliable ASBM capability: fi rst, 
ensuring that an ASBM can defeat American missile defenses; second, equip-
ping a ballistic-missile weapon system to track and hit a moving target in its 
terminal phase; and last, providing accurate, real-time geolocation tracking and 
targeting data—particularly using space-based assets—to the missile system 
prior to launch.
The Missile’s Mission
There is little doubt that a variant of the Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) missile is the can-
didate for the ASBM.9 Moreover, much of the work to adapt the DF-21 for such 
a mission appears to have been developed in the late 1990s, such as an ablative 
shield against aerodynamic heating during reentry, vibration resistance, and op-
timization of the payload.10 There is also discussion of adding a third stage to 
the missile, not only to increase its range but to provide extra maneuverability in 
midcourse fl ight (discussed below).11 The third stage appears to be in develop-
ment, although several documents suggest that the missile and its maneuvering 
capabilities remain in the early research and experimental stages.12
Chinese sources go into detail about various methods of maneuvering dur-
ing a ballistic missile’s midcourse phase.13 Maneuvering increases the missile’s 
terminal target-seeking coverage so as to hit a moving target at sea. However, the 
impact of U.S. missile defenses—primarily the sea-based Aegis system equipped 
with SM-3, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Kinetic 
Energy Interceptor—on the missile’s survivability is also discussed.14 A number 
of measures are suggested to defeat them. Altering the missile’s fl ight path by 
employing a wavelike trajectory rather than a traditional parabolic fl ight path is 
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one method.15 In this scenario, the additional third stage of the DF-21 missile, 
with its hybrid liquid-solid fuel booster, is ignited several times to effect several 
wave patterns in the missile’s midcourse fl ight (see fi gure 1). Other methods 
include weaving, spiraling, spinning, and gliding—all of which would alter the 
traditional parabolic fl ight path of the ballistic missile and boost the missile’s 
penetration capabilities against American missile defenses, which depend heav-
ily on prediction of a missile’s fl ight trajectory.16
Controlled maneuvering in space should not be a “bottleneck technology,” 
according to one source, since China has already demonstrated real progress 
in “orbital maneuvering and docking” under the Shenzhou program.17 How-
ever, other publications suggest that research and experiments involving wave 
and gliding trajectories began only in 2003, de novo, and there is no evidence 
that China has made breakthroughs in this area.18 Moreover, the academic treat-
ments of these exo-atmospheric maneuvers appear to be largely theoretical in 
nature.19 For instance, they do not systematically address the problem of how to 
“maintain guidance [for the target] during the whole trajectory,” which other 
articles insist is a technical challenge China must overcome.20 In fact, the tech-
nical discussion does not directly connect midcourse maneuvering with the 
ASBM system, as several general analyses do, suggesting that such linkage is 
only conceptual. Also, the omission of alternative, traditional countermeasures 
and decoys seems impractical;21 a number of prominent American specialists 
believe that China would likely be able to defeat midcourse interceptors using 
FIGURE 1
WAVE TRAJECTORY
Source: Gu Liangxian, Gong Chunlin, and Wu Wuhua, “Design and Optimization of Wavy Trajectory for Ballistic Missiles.”
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relatively low-tech means.22 The simplest countermeasure of all may be simply 
to launch a salvo of missiles; U.S. missile defenses would not likely be able to 
destroy them all.23
China has already demonstrated many of the core technologies required for 
such a system. While adapting off-the-shelf technologies to an ASBM system 
is both logical progression and feasible, the literature appears ambiguous as to 
their application to a new environment (penetrating missile defenses) and an 
evolved mission (hitting a moving target at sea).
Terminal Guidance and Homing
A second area that has received substantial attention in the technical literature 
is the demand for reentry and terminal guidance of the warhead. Opinions on 
this point appear to vary considerably more than with other aspects of the sys-
tem. Some observers are cautious about such a program, seeing the signifi cant 
technical hurdles inherent in a complex ASBM system. A key issue according to 
most analyses is the speed of the warhead. Reentry into the atmosphere at high 
speed (2.2–5 km/sec) would produce a plasma shield, making homing by ra-
dar and infrared diffi cult.24 However, “to control the missile’s speed in order to 
switch from midstage guidance [inertial] to terminal stage guidance [homing] 
will require an overload that will be diffi cult to achieve.”25 Aside from the dif-
fi culties of controlling the missile’s velocity, a lower terminal speed would make 
the warhead more vulnerable to missile defenses.26 Others fear that the range of 
maneuverability of the carrier could be suffi cient to evade the missile, even with 
active homing systems.27 A number of other constraints to developing a reliable 
ASBM are also discussed. For instance, can the warhead attack its target at the 
desired angle—to pierce the carrier’s armor—given the constraints of the mis-
sile’s trajectory after reentry and the requirements of radar and infrared hom-
ing?28 Also, can the missile carry suffi cient antijamming capabilities?29
Nonetheless, the majority of studies indicate that the technical obstacles are 
well within China’s ability to resolve. For example, controlling the speed of the 
missile after reentry is diffi cult but possible. A number of authors suggest a 
“pulling up” maneuver at an altitude of between twenty-fi ve and fi fty kilome-
ters to level off the ballistic trajectory, positioning the warhead to search for its 
target.30 The change in trajectory would also act as a defense-penetration aid.31 
As for guiding the missile to its target, a number of studies argue that the speed 
and maneuverability of an aircraft carrier are probably too limited to evade an 
MRBM in the terminal phase.32 As fi gure 2, adapted from a Chinese study, illus-
trates, the “kill radius” (the distance the target could deviate from initial posi-
tion and still be struck) of a terminally guided ASBM missile that has reduced 
its speed to allow for active homing to seek its target is approximately twenty 
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kilometers.33 This assumes the missile has accurate prelaunch target coordinates 
(discussed later) and that the missile’s fl ight time (also, the time the carrier has 
to maneuver) is limited to roughly fi fteen minutes. If the system is relying on 
space-based targeting, this is likely an overly optimistic scenario;34 however, as-
suming that it is possible, an aircraft carrier could not evade the missile even 
if traveling at thirty-fi ve knots. Using guidance in both the midcourse (for in-
stance, millimeter-wave radar) and terminal (radar or infrared) phases could 
increase the attack radius to forty kilometers, according to one study.35
Another source draws the conclusion—using a different simulation—that 
the warhead could have a kill radius of one hundred kilometers once terminal 
guidance was engaged.36 In a discussion in Naval and Merchant Ships, Dong Lu 
calculates the maximum distance at which the basic radar terminal guidance of 
a similar missile system, the retired U.S. Pershing II, could detect a carrier that 
had maneuvered for fi fteen minutes, given a scanning height for the missile’s 
radar of nineteen kilometers.37 Terminal guidance of an ASBM would appear 
to be a feasible adaptation of missile systems with which China has had suc-
cess (surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, and antiship cruise missiles).38 Still, 
a number of unique technical obstacles remain, such as the materials needed to 
protect sophisticated guidance systems during reentry;39 the ability to function 
in an environment of higher speed and more severe temperature dynamics than 
FIGURE 2
ASBM KILL RADIUS
Source: Chen Haidong et al., “Study for the Guidance Scheme of Reentry Vehicles Attacking Slowly Moving Targets.”
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in earlier applications;40 and the ability to distinguish a target at unusual angles 
of attack at the distances required for reentry.41
A number of publications view U.S. missile defenses as a primary concern 
for the ASBM in its terminal phase as well as midcourse. Some believe that the 
ASBM will have to slow down considerably in order to locate and maneuver to 
the carrier, making it a much more manageable problem for missile defenses.42 
Others see the diffi culties in fending off electronic jamming and measures 
against active-radar terminal seekers.
In sum, in the available literature on the ASBM that began to proliferate in 
the late 1990s, one can see the rough outline of a technical evolution. Discus-
sions are now less theoretical and conceptual in nature and are instead more 
systematic and detailed. Earlier studies were broader in scope, addressing large 
portions of the kill chain, from launch to target impact.43 Since then, studies 
have become increasingly specifi c, focusing on particular engineering problems, 
within limited ranges of analysis.44 Further, some earlier studies laid out con-
ceptual proposals that contained glaring technical inconsistencies; later docu-
ments have been more concerned with applications and have been underpinned 
by carefully scrutinized simulations.45 Finally, in later publications one can read 
of specifi c research and testing being done on component technologies. For in-
stance, early experiments on high-altitude gliding of the missile frame appear to 
have begun.46 Likewise, testing on “active radar guided weapon systems aimed 
at maritime targets” has been conducted, although not “under heavy sea condi-
tions and a small grazing angle,” as the authors admit would be necessary to an 
operational evaluation.47 Notwithstanding, if these examples may illustrate a 
concrete progression in core components of the ASBM system, they also reveal 
that work on the many secondary technical issues is just beginning. In addition, 
it has been clearly realized that theory and even testing are not substitutes for 
combat experience, of which China has none in this realm.48
Missing Links
To strike any target with an ASBM, China would have fi rst to form an accurate 
idea of its recent location. In the kill-chain formulation, this would comprise 
detecting, identifying, tracking, targeting, and engaging the threat. The Chinese 
literature on this aspect of the ASBM system is generally pessimistic that the 
PLA has enough of the key technologies to realize such a system.
Detecting the carrier at great distances would depend on early-warning sys-
tems, such as sky-wave, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, or electronic signals in-
telligence, that would give a general idea of the target’s geographic coordinates.49 
There is substantial evidence that China has at least one over-the- horizon-
backscatter (OTH-B) system up and running.50 It could be used to identify 
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targets at long range, although with a tracking error of from twenty to forty 
kilometers (substantially lower than the American OTH accuracy, roughly eight 
to thirty kilometers) it would be unable to perform reliable target location inde-
pendently.51 An ASBM attack radius of roughly twenty kilometers, as discussed 
above, would correlate only to the extreme, best-possible performance of Chi-
na’s OTH tracking, and even then only for a stationary carrier. Long-distance 
early warning could also come from electronic and signal intelligence (ELINT 
and SIGINT), whether airborne, shipborne, or space based. China’s ability to 
use airborne and shipborne electronic surveillance would be limited, however, 
since both would require a dangerously close approach to the carrier group. The 
open-source literature is almost completely silent on China’s current on-orbit 
ELINT/SIGINT assets, but indirect evidence indicates that it either does have 
such capabilities or is actively developing them.52
Once the carrier is identifi ed, its position needs to be pinpointed. Long-range 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could gather such information. China is ap-
parently committed to investing in such a program and has several operational 
high- and medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs, with others planned, capable 
of carrying out reconnaissance far out at sea. The Xianglong, currently China’s 
largest UAV, appears to have a combat radius of 2,000–2,500 kilometers (that 
is, a range of 7,500 kilometers), a mission payload of six hundred kilograms, 
and a maximum endurance of ten hours.53 It can also carry electronic jamming 
pods to defend against antiradiation missiles, as well Global Positioning System 
jamming and antijamming capabilities. However, the Xianglong is believed still 
to lack suffi cient high-altitude endurance for an anticarrier mission. Moreover, 
China still lacks C4ISR infrastructure—such as information processing, band-
width capacity, and network support—needed for wide-area surveillance at the 
level of the U.S. Broad Area Maritime System.54 Further, even a fully capable 
UAV could be vulnerable to a carrier group’s formidable air and electronic de-
fenses—assuming the carrier(s) and accompanying ships were not operating in 
electronic silence in order not to announce their approach—before it could pro-
vide targeting information; thus the UAV alone is not a reliable option.55 Theo-
retically, if advanced enough, UAV capabilities would be adequate for targeting 
if combined with other terrestrial cueing systems, such as OTH. However, the 
open-source literature clearly views these capabilities as currently insuffi cient to 
deal with superior U.S. naval power.
Overall, China’s current UAV capabilities and the risks involved in obtain-
ing targeting information from surface combatant vessels or air forces near the 
CSG strongly suggest that the PLA would not depend solely upon these plat-
forms to determine the exact location of the target. Others have surmised that 
the Chinese military could utilize such alternatives as China’s growing fl eet of 
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stealthy submarines, or even merchant fi shing vessels, to supply targeting data.56 
For example, the PLA Navy submarine force, with its increasing number of quiet 
attack submarines, offers another conceivable alternative for tracking targets 
at sea. These are not optimal means, but they are immediately available and 
could be part of an interim capability or emergency backup. To what degree 
these methods would be relied on in a time of confl ict is debatable;57 a robust 
and reliable targeting system to support the ASBM, of which space-based recon-
naissance would be a key element, appears to be a high priority.58 Regardless, 
and given the widespread assumption that space-based targeting is critical, does 
China have enough of the right type of satellites to fi nd a carrier and view it fre-
quently enough to be sure of its location, and if so, can it process and transmit 
the data to the launch pad quickly enough?
Space-Based Targeting
The literature reveals a consensus that a space-based reconnaissance system, 
though critical to the effective operation of conventional missiles, remains 
the weakest link in China’s targeting capabilities.59 Two areas of concern are 
prevalent. The fi rst involves the physical limitations of China’s current space 
infrastructure for reconnaissance. While many Chinese satellites have suffi cient 
imaging resolution (given the size of the target and its radar cross section, reso-
lution demands are not high), the systemwide revisit rate is inadequate for sus-
tained coverage.60 Other articles show a lack of confi dence in China’s ability to 
locate moving targets using imaging satellites, arguing the need for electronic 
surveillance satellites to augment them.61 But the problem is more than quanti-
ty, as others argue: fi tting the various components of C4ISR into a seamless net-
work remains a huge challenge for China.62 This last issue involves technological 
system limitations, but it also entails organizational and bureaucratic barriers 
impeding the ability of disparate space assets to perform highly time-sensitive 
missions.63 In short, the literature strongly indicates that space infrastructure 
for the ASBM targeting likely remains underdeveloped.64
China has a maximum of twenty-two imaging space assets that could poten-
tially assist in identifying, locating, and tracking a carrier group. Only nine of 
the imaging satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) are classifi ed as military; howev-
er, given the dual-use nature of many of the civilian space assets, the possibility 
that other nominally nonmilitary satellites could be tasked in a time of confl ict 
cannot be discounted. The lingering question is how well all of these space as-
sets can be integrated, both within the military and across the civilian/military 
divide. Assuming the best, what time lag would occur in the processing of this 
imagery? While the degree of integration of China’s various dual-use assets is 
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impossible to assess quantitatively and precisely from public sources, a number 
of reported characteristics demonstrate that it is certainly not seamless.
Institutional barriers are frequently identifi ed as a potential obstacle to inte-
grating the diverse ownership and operating arrangements of China’s space as-
sets. This could be particularly acute in applying space assets to a time-sensitive 
mission, such as C4ISR support for an ASBM strike on a U.S. carrier, that would 
require a closely coordinated space architecture.
For instance, how would the two services critical to executing an ASBM mis-
sion—the Second Artillery and the PLA Navy (PLAN)—fi t into the military aero-
space sector, which would provide critical support?65 This issue is compounded 
by the fact that command and control over China’s military space capabilities is 
itself not unifi ed. Nor are the lines of authority clear between the military and 
China’s unique and diverse civilian and government space organization, a fact 
that would have an impact both on the use of space assets and on the real-time 
exchange of data across a large, interagency information network.66
China’s satellite program is highly decentralized. The PLA unquestionably 
plays the most prominent role in overseeing China’s dual-use space infrastruc-
ture; however, many satellites and their application are owned or operated by at 
FIGURE 3
CHINESE SPACE ORGANIZATION
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least a dozen agencies spread across the government, universities, and the quasi-
private sector—in addition to the military.
The primary authority over launch facilities and on-orbit command and con-
trol is the General Armaments Department (GAD), while the overall military 
operation of satellites is the purview of various departments within the General 
Staff Department (GSD). Furthermore, approximately 75 percent of China’s 
space-based assets are essentially under nonmilitary entities, such as the China 
Meteorological Agency, the State Oceanographic Agency, and a number of state-
owned enterprises. These are peacetime operators, and the transfer of authority 
and expertise to the PLA during a time of confl ict is cited as a concern among 
some in the military.67
Achieving commonality would require bridging between essentially coequal 
military bureaucracies (such as GAD and GSD) and different levels of military 
CMC: Central Military Commission    CASC: China Aeronautics Science and Technology Corporation
GPD: General Politics Department    CAST: China Academy of Space Technology
GSD: General Staff Department    CMA: China Meteorological Agency
GAD: General Armaments Department   SOA: State Oceanographic Agency
PLAN: PLA Navy     NCDR: National Committee for Disaster Reductions
PLAAF: PLA Air Force     MLR: Ministry for Land and Resources
MND: Ministry of National Defense    S&T Min: Science and Technology Ministry
MOE: Ministry of Education    SBSM: State Bureau for Surveying & Mapping
BOSTIND: Bureau of Science & Technology Industry for National Defense NRSC: National Remote Sensing Center
MII: Ministry of Industry and Information   CAS: China Academy of Sciences
FIGURE 3 CONTINUED
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bodies (GAD and the Second Artillery, the PLA Air Force, the PLAN, and the 
seven military regions), as well as between military and nonmilitary agencies 
(e.g., the PLAN and the State Oceanographic Agency).68 In short, integration 
of the command and application of on-orbit assets would entail coordination 
horizontally and vertically within the military as well as across military and 
civilian organizations. In theory, the overall control the military has over the 
space program, combined with the improved and soon to be promulgated Na-
tional Defense and Mobilization Law, will likely provide suffi cient authority to 
coordinate command and control over space during a confl ict.69 Nevertheless, 
limiting the transaction cost in working with so many agencies could be critical 
in such time-sensitive demands as an ASBM combat mission. Since the mili-
tary is deeply involved in the space program, lines of authority may be clearer 
than is apparent from open-source evidence, yet the increasingly vociferous 
calls for a more coherent space leadership and legal guarantees applying to time 
of confl ict signal a lack of integration.70 The initial confusion over organizing 
remote-sensing data from domestic and foreign sources during the Wenchuan 
earthquake is, if nothing else, testimony to the diffi culties inherent in such a 
system.71
Moreover, the command structure remains vague within the military itself. 
To take an operational example, the plausible use of space for an ASBM mission 
would require at a minimum a highly coordinated effort between satellite space 
support, missile launch operators, and the navy. No independent PLA organiza-
tion exists to ensure this, although several services are vying for organizational 
leadership of the military space program, including the air force, GAD, GSD, 
and the Second Artillery.72
MODELING: CHINA’S SPACE ISR FOR TARGETING
Assuming that China’s space assets were suffi ciently integrated to support an 
ASBM mission during a confl ict, the question remains as to whether the sum 
of all its satellite capabilities would be large enough to succeed. To be confi dent 
that it can launch an attack on a carrier group at a time of its choosing, China 
would need to update the group’s location as often as possible.73 Its ability to do 
this would depend on the orbits of its satellites and the capabilities of the sensors 
each carries.74
The frequency with which an individual satellite revisits a location depends 
on both its orbit and the maneuverability of its sensors. In the low latitudes 
where a Taiwan-related confl ict would occur, it could take between fi ve and 
twenty-nine days for one of China’s reconnaissance satellites to pass directly 
over the same point twice. However, by pointing its cameras or sensors side-
ways—that is, aiming “off nadir,” not only straight down—a satellite can image 
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from adjacent passes, greatly increasing the revisit rate. The modeling below 
uses two sets of off-nadir angles to provide both average or realistic, as well as 
maximum, scenarios.75
In the task of fi nding a U.S. carrier at sea, China’s satellites would vary in their 
usefulness according to sensor type and resolution. Of the sensors deployed on 
China’s satellites, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is the most useful for hunting 
maritime targets, as it can sweep a relatively wide swath at a resolution good 
enough to image fairly small targets.76 SAR can produce imagery regardless of 
weather or sunlight. Instead of merely looking for a carrier group itself, SAR can 
capture ship wakes trailing over large stretches of ocean, making it particularly 
useful for fi nding moving targets. Multispectral and hyperspectral sensors can 
also be very effective. For instance, they could spot algae and other phospho-
rescent material churned up by ships. Infrared and regular visible-light images 
could also be useful, but they would have relatively narrow foci and could not 
scan vast stretches of ocean.
Like most aspects of the military space program, the exact sensor capabilities 
of China’s satellites are closely guarded secrets. However, general sensor infor-
mation is available for most satellites (see the table). According to open sources, 
only four of China’s satellites in low earth orbit, all in the military Yaogan se-
ries, are equipped with SAR. Other satellites, nominally intended for weather 
monitoring, survey, or other civilian uses, could potentially be of use during a 
confl ict. Satellites like the CBERS, Haiyang, Fengyun, and Huanjing types carry 
multi- and hyperspectral sensors that could be used to locate military targets. 
Satellite Sensor Capabilities
Ziyuan-2A Charge-coupled device (CCD); infrared multispectral scanner; capable of 
generating high-quality (< 3 m resolution)
Jianbing-3B (Ziyuan-2B) High-resolution CCD camera; infrared multispectral scanner
Jianbing-3C (Ziyuan-2C) High-resolution CCD cameras; infrared multispectral scanner
Yaogan-1 SAR (5 m resolution, high resolution: 5 × 5 m target discrimination at 40 km, 
low resolution: 20 m × 20 m at 100 km)
Yaogan-2 Electro-optical; multispectral sensors (1 m resolution)
Yaogan-3 SAR (high resolution: < 5 × 5 m)
Yaogan-4 Electro-optical (0.5 m resolution)
Yaogan-5 SAR
Yaogan-6 SAR (estimated ground resolution of 0.6–1 m)
Tansuo-1 (Shiyan-1) High-resolution electro-optical; near infrared; CCD survey cameras (10 m 
resolution; image swath of 120 km wide)
Tansuo-2 (Shiyan-2) Electro-optical
Shiyan-3 Electro-optical
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Simulation
In the lead-up to an ASBM launch, how good would China’s view from space 
be? Our simulation of the satellite ground tracks and revisit rates of China’s 
imaging satellites (nine military and thirteen civilian) shows that even in a best-
case scenario, coverage is intermittent and punctuated by long blackouts dur-
ing which no imagery can be obtained.77 Counting all twenty-two satellites and 
assuming the widest fi eld of view (that is, up to sixty degrees off nadir), the 
average time between revisits is forty-fi ve minutes, with fourteen passes over 
the selected target areas each day—but with nine gaps in coverage of two hours 
or longer. The worst-case scenario, counting only military-designated satellites 
and imaging a conservative fi eld of view (thirty degrees off nadir or less), gives 
an average of eight passes per day. In both scenarios, however, coverage is not 
evenly distributed, with large gaps of fi ve and a half to ten hours, depending on 
fi eld of view.78 Overall, China was “in the dark” for sixty-nine of the seventy-two 
Satellite Sensor Capabilities
Haiyang-1B Chinese Ocean Color and Thermal Scanner; pixel resolution: 1.1 km (nadir); 
the swath width is ~1,600 km; fi eld of vision (swath pixels per scan line ±55 
degrees at 2,800 km); focal length of optical system: 650 mm for visible near 
infrared, 190 mm for thermal infrared; telescope aperture diameter 200 mm
CBERS-1 Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km); 
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath width: 113 km); infrared multispectral 
scanner (resolution: 80 m); thermal channel: 160 m; swath width: 120 km; off-
nadir capability of ±32 degrees 
CBERS-2 Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km); 
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath: 113 km); infrared multispectral scanner 
(resolution: 80 m); thermal channel: 160 m; swath width: 120 km; off-nadir 
capability of ±32 degrees
CBERS-2B Wide Field Imager camera (spatial resolution: 260 km; ground swath 890 km); 
CCD (spatial resolution: 20 m; swath width: 113 km); high-resolution camera 
(resolution: 2.7 m; swath width: 27 km); also near- infrared bands
Huanjing-1A Multispectral CCD camera (resolution: 30 m; swath 700 km with two cameras); 
infrared sensors (30 m spatial resolution), real-time imaging; optical
Huanjing-1B Hyperspectral; infrared (30 m spatial resolution); real-time imaging; optical 
sensor
Fengyun-1D Visible, infrared, and microwave
Fengyun-3A Spatial resolution of 250 m; 10-channel visible and infrared radiometer (VIRR); 
moderate resolution visible and infrared imager (MODI); microwave radiation 
imager (MWRI), measures thermal microwave emissions using six frequency 
points in dual polarizations; infrared atmospheric sounder (IRAS) 
Chuangxin (CX-102) Microsatellite; electro-optical
Beijing-1 (Tsinghua) Panchromatic image (4 m resolution); multispectral images (32 m resolution); 
infrared band wavelength (774 nm to 900 nm)
CHINESE SATELLITE IMAGING CAPABILITIES CONTINUED
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hours simulated. Still, between the long gaps there were several notable clusters 
of satellite passes in which frequent imagery could be gathered.79 The most opti-
mistic list of all China’s imaging satellites yields three notable periods in which 
up to eight satellites make passes within an hour and a half. These few instances 
of relative operational clarity would be good opportunities for launch, but the 
U.S. Navy would no doubt be conscious of these fl eeting moments and plan its 
maneuvers and defenses accordingly.
Filling the Gaps
In their regular orbits, China’s satellites do not appear capable of gathering time-
ly, on-demand data for targeting; however, in a time of confl ict China would 
employ several measures to boost coverage. First, it would shift satellites into 
more advantageous orbits to gain imagery sooner and more often than their 
regular orbits would allow. But altering orbits is no easy feat, and each move 
requires intensive planning and calculation. We did not model the numerous 
potential rearrangements for this article; however, useful comparisons can be 
derived from other technical studies. Some analyses, restricting fuel expendi-
tures to a reasonable amount, have illustrated that the average time between 
revisits of a designated location can be decreased by 36.4 percent.80 While the 
fuel capacities of China’s military-designated satellites are likely large enough to 
FIGURE 4
SATELLITE SIMULATION (DAY 1)
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allow more fuel for orbital shifts, it should be remembered that because a CSG 
is not a stationary point, orbits would have to be continually changed, in accor-
dance with its suspected location.
China could also plug holes in its coverage by launching microsatellites.81 
These could be technologically similar to the Huanjing or Haiyang series, which 
are effective for maritime reconnaissance and are small enough to launch rela-
tively quickly with small rockets.82 However, microsatellites come with signifi -
cant trade-offs. Their small size and power reserves are not well suited to large, 
electricity-hungry radar systems, and their downlink capabilities are restricted 
by small antennas and limited fi elds of view.83 Some of these challenges may be 
surmountable, with several studies suggesting that networked constellations or 
special antennas could improve microsatellite performance.84 China’s exact ca-
pabilities in these areas are not publicly known, but suffi ce it to say that the PLA 
will face major technological obstacles to integrating microsatellites seamlessly 
into its larger C4ISR picture.
China would also face challenges in putting microsatellites into orbit. Small-
er solid-fuel rocket systems such as the Kaituozhe (Pioneer) are likely under 
development;85 nonetheless, the ability to launch “responsively” and in larger 
numbers is often cited by Chinese strategists as a bottleneck problem for Chi-
na’s military space program, due to limitations in fi xed launch sites as well 
as telemetry, tracking, and control (TTC) stations.86 TTC stations and launch 
facilities are also seen as highly vulnerable to attack. Nevertheless, the ability to 
quickly put small satellites into low earth orbit using small, solid-fuel rockets 
provides signifi cant opportunities to reduce vulnerability. As for the diffi cul-
ties in simultaneously launching larger numbers of satellites, during the last 
several years China has increased its number of satellite launches in short win-
dows of time, with a peak of seven during a four-month period in 2004, dem-
onstrating an ability to maintain a higher tempo of satellite launches and TTC 
activity.87 In addition, the construction of the space launch facility in Hainan 
Island would increase China’s overall launch and TTC capability.88
Long-Term Plans
In the Haiyang and Huanjing series alone, China could launch within the 
next fi ve years between eight and twelve new-generation satellites that would 
be capable of maritime surveillance, and eight to twelve more in the fi ve years 
thereafter. These are tentative estimates, but they are also only the plans cur-
rently made public (a table is available on the Web version of this article, at www
.usnwc.edu/press). Moreover, these estimates do not include satellites launched 
for dedicated military use, such as the Ziyuan or Yaogan series. Information 
on those programs is far less clear, but extrapolating from their rates of launch 
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over the past few years, on-orbit assets of these types could increase from their 
current nine to more than fi fteen within a fi ve-year period. The steady progress 
in the satellite sensor technology and the emphasis placed on remote-sensing 
technology overall in the last two fi ve-year plans and the space white papers 
suggest little reason to doubt that recent trends will continue. In theory, the 
remote-sensing capabilities needed for near-continuous coverage within the 
Asia-Pacifi c region could be achieved within fi ve years and a broader, continu-
ous global coverage within ten years. How much these additional satellites will 
improve China’s ability to pinpoint targets at sea will depend on the degree to 
which they are optimized for such a mission. However, China’s space program 
is highly “dual use” in nature, run by numerous agencies, and applied to many 
missions, both military and civilian; thus, specifi c analysis of its development 
is crucial.
Measuring Up
The most obvious benchmark for China’s space reconnaissance programs is 
parity with those of the United States. Judging from publicly available data, the 
United States has roughly fourteen LEO satellites dedicated to providing imag-
ery.89 While U.S. reconnaissance satellites are technically advanced, the system’s 
temporal resolution is not dramatically better than that of China. Where the 
United States defi nitively leads China is in the area of data processing and inte-
gration. Perhaps the most important aspect of the American space reconnais-
sance system is its ability to pool imagery from a variety of military, civilian, and 
commercial services and distribute it in a timely fashion. Within fi ve minutes of 
its capture by a satellite, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency can begin 
analyzing an image and can then transmit it to fi eld commanders within sec-
onds.90 Reports from 2003 operations in Iraq put the time from target identifi ca-
tion to strike at less than fi fteen minutes.91 This speed depends on an intricate 
web of data-relay satellites, such as the Milstar, TDRSS, and NAVSTAR systems, 
the equivalents of which China does not yet possess.
At present, neither country has the capability to watch a target continuously 
from space, even in a regional confl ict. The United States has put forward plans 
to build space-based radar and imaging systems that approach global, near-
continuous coverage, but the two proposed projects have encountered funding 
disagreements and exceeded budgets.92 Both projects are currently stalled, and 
their futures remain uncertain.
Most useful to China, particularly in the context of acquiring targets for an 
ASBM, would be capabilities similar to the Discoverer II project, such as satel-
lites equipped with both SAR and the Ground Moving Target Indicator sys-
tem (which uses Doppler pulses to locate moving objects in a wide fi eld of view, 
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making it particularly useful for watching ocean traffi c).93 However, while Chi-
na would not need the full constellation of twenty-four satellites proposed in 
the U.S. system to support a regional confl ict, the cost would still be prohibitive. 
Including the extensive complementary ground systems required, the U.S. Con-
gressional Budget Offi ce estimated the total cost of the Starlite/Discoverer II 
project to be between $25 and $90 billion.94 However, if the PLA intends to deter 
the U.S. Navy credibly with conventional missile programs, China may indeed 
need to make extravagant expenditures in space. The American military’s de-
pendence on satellite imagery is tempered by a highly developed UAV program 
and overwhelming air superiority, but China presently lacks such advantages.
BEYOND AN ANTISHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE
Is China developing an antiship ballistic missile? The literature is fairly con-
clusive that China’s military is keenly interested in the system and could le-
verage a number of off-the-shelf technologies, particularly with regard to the 
DF-21 missile system itself, in developing one. However, the theoretical and 
less-than-systematic nature of technical studies indicates that the research and, 
in some cases, testing of component technologies remain in their early phases. 
Furthermore, a fully operational and effective ASBM is a complex system that 
requires a network of ground, air, sea, electronic, and information infrastruc-
tures, most of which lag far behind the missile technology itself. Among these, 
a key underdeveloped system is precision targeting of a maneuverable object at 
long range, particularly the space-based segment. Real-time, continuous cover-
age of the maritime regions where China would most likely engage a U.S. carrier 
strike group would require a far better developed early-warning, imaging, and 
communication space architecture, along with more ground support, than it 
currently has. China’s imaging capability alone remains far from suffi cient to 
provide the high revisit rates needed for an effective ASBM capability. There 
are remedial short-term options, such as rapid launch of additional satellites or 
use of the full suite of civilian and government satellites, but all have strategic 
drawbacks for China.
The most immediate obstacle to utilizing China’s full spectrum of space assets 
lies in the fact that this is a highly dual-use area. Interservice and interagency 
cooperation, particularly coordination in the areas of technology development, 
data sharing, command, and future investment in on-orbit assets, all raise thorny 
problems for application to a specifi c military mission.95 The example of Beidou 
and the long development process that has plagued it testifi es to the diffi culties 
inherent in an expensive and complex dual-use project.96 For these and many 
other reasons, these critical components of space-based support will collectively 
represent a diffi cult and slow sector in the development of a battle-ready ASBM. 
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In fact, much of the thinking on how to accomplish this has only just begun. Yet 
in an optimistic estimate based on China’s current trajectory of military space 
asset programs, as well as its overall plans for a variety of imaging and commu-
nication satellites, a system competent to provide near-real-time regional cover-
age could be fi ve years away, while global coverage could be attainable within 
ten years.
Most of the attention in military circles has been narrowly focused on China’s 
ASBM. But what are the broader implications of this “system of systems” for 
China’s military modernization? If China eventually acquires a complete tar-
geting network to complement an ASBM capability, the Chinese military could 
conceivably adapt the system to other launch platforms (e.g., ships), other mis-
siles (short-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles), or relevant technologies 
(missile defense). The parallels with the conventionalization of U.S. strategic 
weapons (“global strike”) become unavoidable.97 While it is merely conjecture, 
one could infer—from the advances made in China’s short-range ballistic mis-
sile numbers and capabilities facing Taiwan, in addition to ASBM and even 
antisatellite testing—an emerging PLA strategy aimed more at missile-based, 
asymmetrical deterrence than parity in hardware. Do these trends point to a 
growing missile-centric PLA doctrine? Perhaps, but there are just as many voic-
es clamoring for a strategy of mimicking American weapons platforms (such 
as an aircraft carrier) as there are proponents of a greater reliance on deterrent, 
asymmetrical systems.
While an operational ASBM may be some time away, the impact of such a 
system on the stability of U.S.-China strategic relations and on the region would 
be substantial. Short of using it in a confl ict—a scenario nearly impossible to 
imagine—a number of questions arise regarding the effect an ASBM capability 
might have on both Chinese and American behavior. How would an ASBM alter 
China’s perception of its strategic environment? Would an operational ASBM 
merely provide greater assurance against American intervention in a Taiwan 
confl ict, or would it embolden Beijing to act more aggressively? What about Chi-
na’s deterrent posture, which it consistently frames as solely defensive? It is in 
this sense that Chinese and American perspectives perhaps clash the most. Chi-
na argues that intent, not merely capabilities, decides behavior.98 China would 
thus contend that an additional weapon capability will not infl uence its future 
actions. The United States would hold that capability is far more important to 
infl uencing behavior and that a better-armed China might pursue objectives it 
otherwise would not. For nuclear weapons, with an extremely high threshold 
for use, the Chinese position has been tenable and believable. However, conven-
tional weapons lower the threshold for use, and crossing that threshold is easier 
to imagine.
111
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
 106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Furthermore, the deployment of antiship ballistic missiles would logically 
seem to blur the lines between offensive and defensive strategy.99 The most ef-
fective use of the ASBM would be a strike on a carrier strike group at long range 
as it steams toward waters east of the Taiwan Strait, before its cruise missiles 
and air-strike capability could be employed. Once the CSG came close enough 
to launch strikes, the asymmetric advantage of the ASBM would be limited. In 
other words, China might have to decide whether to strike fi rst, perhaps even 
preemptively. This could greatly impact crisis stability in a confrontation be-
tween China and the United States, as well as infl uence longer-term competi-
tion. The dangers of escalation would be grave, since the United States would 
need to consider China’s options and respond accordingly. Over the longer term, 
an arms race is a very real possibility: the United States, which still holds a sig-
nifi cant lead in naval power and most military technologies, would not sit still 
while China developed the ASBM.
The advent of an ASBM would be more than an incremental advance in 
weaponry; it could be a strategic “game changer,” as others have dubbed it.100 
Accordingly, the impact an ASBM capability will have on security perceptions, 
deterrence strategies, and escalatory control point to the need for a much more 
intensive and sustained military-to-military dialogue than is currently under 
way. As yet another sign of China’s growing might, the missile would be an 
important, singular development in the continuing shift away from U.S. stra-
tegic dominance in the western Pacifi c. Such a transformation would not go 
uncontested, and will bring a number of risks that could draw the two sides 
into heightened competition and even confl ict. But there will also be repeated 
opportunities to stave off military competition in favor of mutual accommoda-
tion and a cooperative regional approach. This process is dependent on build-
ing trust through transparency, as each side becomes more confi dent about the 
other’s capabilities and intents and as facts, not fears, can inform the actions and 
responses of decision makers on both sides.
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CLEAR PURPOSE, COMPREHENSIVE EXECUTION
Raymond Ames Spruance (1886–1969)
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
As operational commander of hundreds of ships and aircraft, Admiral Ray-mond A. Spruance had the capacity to distill what he observed—and
sometimes felt—into its essence and to focus on the important details by a
mental synthesis. He would then charge his staff with comprehensive planning
to achieve his purpose. Often the plan would be rent asunder, but it would re-
tain its “tyranny of purpose”—roughly, the mission—as Spruance’s staff and
commanders adapted to the circumstances. Although this seems always to
have been the case from the battle of Midway to the extended battle of Oki-
nawa, his first test, fought over Midway Island, foreshadows his wartime lead-
ership. In part this is because we see his strategic acumen in the critical year of
1942; in part because we see his grasp of the decisive factors in the battle; in
part because we see him as a “lucky” admiral; and in part, and not least, be-
cause the battle is well known and oft-studied.
What did Rear Admiral Spruance see and feel as he arrived on the station that
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had selected for his tiny, two-carrier Task Force (TF)
16? How did he deal with the disorganized staff he had inherited from Admiral
William F. Halsey? What ran through his mind when Rear Admiral Frank
Fletcher joined on 2 June and assumed command to execute the explicit plan
Nimitz had detailed for Fletcher and Spruance just six days before? How did he
deal with the disparate and inconsistent scouting reports? How did he team with
his inherited aviator chief of staff, the difficult and sometimes overwrought
Captain Miles Browning? What ran through his mind as he watched the cum-
bersome effort to dispatch the Enterprise and Hornet air wings in a compact
pulse of power, the goal of every carrier commander but unachievable at this
early stage of carrier warfare?1
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Imagine Spruance as he walks into Nimitz’s office on 26 May 1942, only to be
told that Halsey is hospitalized and Task Force 16 is his. Within minutes
Spruance learns that in forty-eight hours he will sail to fight, with 100 percent
certainty, the first naval battle of his life, outnumbered eighty ships to
twenty-six, against an enemy who has not lost a battle since 7 December 1941.
Nimitz says that his mission will be to take calculated risks to attack and punish
the Japanese, yet without losing his own force.2 Spruance learns that if
Yorktown’s damage at the battle of the Coral Sea can be patched up, Fletcher will
join on the very eve of battle and assume tactical command. It is a mission de-
manding exquisite responsibility and adaptability. “Elated,” says one historian of
Spruance’s reaction to the news. If you think like Spruance, “sobered” is a better
term.3
The intricacy of the battle is instructive. Regarding Spruance’s leadership,
historians have paid excessive attention to whether it was Spruance or Browning
who selected the moment to launch TF 16’s portion of the decisive strike. In
truth, Spruance expected the two to be a team. More important, the American
and Japanese navies both had to solve extraordinary problems of carrier-deck
management, the weight, range, and geographic direction of their scouting ef-
forts, and the execution of a concentrated air attack—problems imperfectly
solved on both sides but in the case of the Japanese fatally so. Each problem was
multifaceted, and each in its own way was decisive.
Most important at the operational level was the cooperation between Nimitz,
Fletcher, and Spruance. Spruance was entirely justified in his trust of Fletcher as
tactical commander of TFs 16 and 17. Fletcher, in turn, had no hesitation in
turning over tactical command to Spruance at 1800 (that is, six o’clock in the
evening) on 4 June after his single carrier, Yorktown, was attacked and crippled.
The outcome cannot be properly understood without recognizing that Nimitz,
the theater commander, was on this occasion in effect his own tactical com-
mander.4 Nimitz told his two subordinates where to position themselves north-
east of Midway and passed on his best estimate of the timing of the Japanese
attack. Nimitz specified the roles for TF 17 (to scout vigorously and act as a
fighting reserve until it is clear that the Japanese carriers are not executing a
two-pronged attack) and for TF 16 (be the cocked pistol, as a two-carrier strik-
ing force ready to dispatch an enormous pulse of power as soon as Admiral
Chuichi Nagumo’s carriers are within range). Nimitz directed the preliminaries
because only his staff had the latest information from cryptanalysis; because he
would have direct scouting reports from long-range PBY seaplanes and B-17
bombers; because he alone of the three could influence the attacks from, and de-
fense of, Midway Island; and because TFs 16 and 17 had to keep radio silence un-
til the Japanese discovered their presence.
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Nimitz also told Fletcher not to combine in one formation but to keep two
distinct dispositions. In 1942 this was wise. When Enterprise and Hornet
launched their aircraft, Spruance’s two carriers separated, the screen com-
mander splitting his cruiser and destroyer escorts between them. Fletcher re-
mained within visual communication of Spruance, but when the action started
it was inevitable that the two formations would lose contact.
The great climax came just after the third wave of torpedo bombers, those un-
der Lieutenant Commander L. E. Massey from Yorktown, sacrificed itself in an-
other fruitless attack while Yorktown and Enterprise dive-bombers arrived
overhead, simultaneously but inadvertently. At 1025 (10:25 AM) on 4 June, the
American aircraft fatally damaged three Japanese carriers in ten minutes. It is
well known that the three torpedo-bomber attacks brought the defending Japa-
nese fighters down “on the deck” and so opened the door for the American SBD
dive-bombers, but historian John B. Lundstrom’s recent research uncovers the
fact that the Imperial Japanese Navy’s combat air patrol comprised forty-one
fighters, none of which was in position to thwart the fatal dive-bomber attack.5
Many have said, correctly, that to win the Americans needed intelligence from
cryptanalysis, astute leadership, great courage among the aviators, and just plain
H U G H E S 1 1 9
Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (center) ashore at Kwajalein, with Admiral Chester Nimitz (right), in February 1944
Photo courtesy of Naval Historical Center, Photo NH62233
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luck. Another factor, scarcely noted in the histories, was the American radar ad-
vantage.6 Give Nagumo and his aviators the U.S. air-search radar, and most of
the Japanese combat air patrol would have been at an altitude to break up the
Yorktown (under Lieutenant Commander M. F. Leslie) and Enterprise (Lieuten-
ant Commander C. W. McClusky) dive-bombers.
A final factor was also essential to the American victory. The island of Midway
served like a fourth carrier. Because of code breaking, Midway Island’s air ele-
ment had been beefed up. The aircraft, about 125 of them, were a hodgepodge
and did no damage whatsoever, but they occupied Nagumo’s attention. The fu-
tile attacks kept the Japanese striking force busy while breeding overconfidence
in its air defense. It was Midway Island and poor Japanese scouting that pro-
duced the chain of events that caught Nagumo’s carriers loaded with armed and
fueled aircraft. At 1020 on 4 June they were powder kegs waiting for the lighted
American match. Midway, immobile but unsinkable, was the fatal attraction of
the Japanese striking force.
Spruance emerged as the hero of Midway, and properly so. Yet later, when his
authority grew—and he built his own team—so did his operational effective-
ness, the comprehensiveness of his victories, and the swift pace his Fifth Fleet
achieved as it drove through the Central Pacific. Strange to say, the sole decision
at Midway that was unequivocally his and only his was one for which he was un-
justly criticized at the time. That night, after finishing off Nagumo’s fourth car-
rier in the afternoon, and against his staff ’s advice, Spruance withdrew to the
east. He calculated that a Japanese surface force could reach him during the
night if he headed west to chase the “withdrawing” enemy fleet. Critics immedi-
ately after the battle thought he had been too prudent. It wasn’t until much later
that it was discovered that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commanding the Com-
bined Fleet, had done just what Spruance feared he would do—try to compen-
sate for Nagumo’s dreadful defeat by sending a surface formation to meet the
American fleet that everyone but Spruance thought should be driving west.
Immediately after Midway and for the next thirteen months, Spruance served as
chief of staff to Nimitz, becoming conversant with Nimitz’s campaign plan and
watching the way he dealt with Admiral Ernest J. King and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in Washington, and with General Douglas MacArthur in the South West
Pacific theater. Halsey had relieved Vice Admiral R. L. Ghormley, adding vigor to
the Navy’s support of the Guadalcanal operation. From afar, Spruance vicari-
ously soaked up the tactical lessons of this pivotal campaign: the importance of
reconnaissance, the rewards of coordinated land- and sea-based air operations,
and the severe constraints imposed by operational logistics. As American indus-
trial might took effect and King made his case that the primacy of Europe must
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not preclude a vigorous offensive in the Pacific, Nimitz and King decided that
Spruance was the leader best suited for the coming sweep across the Central Pa-
cific. In August 1943 he was promoted to vice admiral, designated Commander,
Central Pacific Force, and Commander, Fifth Fleet, charged with planning and
executing the assault on the Gilberts in November 1943.
In Spruance we have an extraordinarily wide lens to study the rewards of
sound leadership in a panoply of operational and strategic settings. Unlike at
Midway, he could now assemble his own combat team. On one hand, Spruance
was lucky in having had opportunities to identify promising subordinates well
before the war. On the other, he did not hesitate to choose the talented, forceful,
and opinionated ones, among them Carl Moore, Kelly Turner, and Holland
Smith.7 He could quickly take the measure of other flag officers assigned to him,
such as Marc Mitscher and Harry Hill.8 Also important, Spruance knew when to
stay out of the often fierce confrontations of his subordinates, or when he had,
usually with great reluctance, to intervene. Spruance’s power to delegate effec-
tively arose from his shrewd judgment of character.9
With his handpicked staff and volatile subordinates, Spruance and his Fifth
Fleet began their rapid sweep across the Pacific. Each operation had its own
characteristics: the first significant Marine assault, at Tarawa in the Gilberts in
November 1943; the rapid seizure of the Marshalls in an efficiently run cake-
walk; the neutralization with carrier air strikes and bypassing of the great Japa-
nese bastion at Truk; and in June 1944 the difficult invasion of the well defended
Marianas, along with the naval battle of the Philippine Sea. Halsey then took the
fleet to Peleliu in September and the Philippines in October, after which
Spruance returned to lead the cruel battle for Iwo Jima in February 1945 and the
titanic two-month struggle for Okinawa two months later.
When Spruance took tactical command at Midway he never had more than
twenty-six warships and 233 aircraft. Less than three years later, at Okinawa, he
commanded over three hundred fighting ships with countless aircraft, 1,200
amphibious ships carrying 180,000 assault troops, and more than two hundred
service-force vessels. Also present was a British contingent of twenty-two ships,
including four carriers and two battleships.10
Raymond Ames Spruance was born on 3 July 1886 in Baltimore, Maryland. His
maternal ancestors came from Maryland and New Jersey, but his father was from
Indianapolis, Indiana. Thus, until he entered the Naval Academy in 1903, his
early years were divided between the East and the Midwest. It is an indication of
Spruance’s aptitude that he had nominations to the academy from congressmen
in both New Jersey and Indiana. The teenage Spruance wanted to accept the
nomination from New Jersey, because he had placed first in a competitive
H U G H E S 1 2 1
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examination there, but to please his family he accepted the appointment from
Indiana. One would have to interpret the influences of Spruance’s childhood
with too much hindsight to foresee his destiny in that episode, but it is fair to say
that shyness, intelligence, and firmly held but thoroughly considered opinions
were all evident from an early age.
The Naval Academy was expanding rapidly in those years to match the
buildup of the Navy and accepted 266 plebes into his class of 1907. Spruance was
to rank twenty-fifth among 209 surviving graduates. He would be one of the top
third of his class who were graduated early, in July 1906, because the growing
fleet needed career officers. Spruance reported first to Iowa but a year later was
transferred to the new Minnesota, which was one of the sixteen ships of the Great
White Fleet that circumnavigated the globe in 1907 and 1908.
What were the sources of Spruance’s leadership? To begin with, his technical
experience is understated by historians. In 1909, while still an ensign, he wan-
gled a year at General Electric. His aptitude for electrical engineering having
been recognized, he served in three engineer officer tours afloat and in three
technical tours ashore, at Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock, the New
York Navy Yard, and the Bureau of Engineering.11 In fact, Spruance found him-
self in danger of becoming a de facto engineering duty officer. Almost too late,
Spruance fought his way back toward his first love, command at sea. But his
knowledge of engineering and technology—for instance, in appreciating the
operational potential and limitations of radar, IFF (Identification Friend or
Foe), homing beacons, and the central role of combat information cen-
ters—were to be vital ingredients of his future success.
A second cornerstone was experience gained in two Naval War College staff
tours. He would remember in the second one resisting Rear Admiral Edward C.
Kalbfus’s approach to education as too ritualistic. He told Kalbfus that his pet
doctrinal publication, Sound Military Decision, was an elaborate cookbook of
form over substance, in which an orderly process was veritably an end in itself
rather than an aid to apprehending in all their dimensions the fullness and es-
sence of an operation. Kalbfus neither lost respect for Spruance nor changed his
mind.
The third cornerstone of Spruance’s greatness was his experience as a com-
manding officer. He commanded six ships—the first, Bainbridge, while still a
lieutenant (junior grade), and the last, Mississippi, at the time he was promoted
to rear admiral, in December 1940. Spruance never ran aground or suffered a
collision. Meanwhile, he won the respect of his peers, seniors, and juniors for op-
erational competence. That he learned high-speed shiphandling under Com-
mander William F. Halsey, his destroyer squadron commander, dispels any
notion that Spruance was being too cool, too sure of himself, when as
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commanding officer he would retire to his sea cabin with what his best biogra-
pher, Thomas B. Buell, seems to have regarded as excessive sangfroid.
Spruance believed his greatest value was as a strategist, though he never as-
pired to serve in Washington, D.C.12 His leadership is significant both as a re-
minder that excellence in combat is the pinnacle of military achievement and in
showing how a great leader grows quickly into each new role. No one trans-
formed himself more consciously than Spruance, as he went from ship captain as
late as December 1940; to flag officer subordinate to Halsey in the critical period
immediately before and after Pearl Harbor; to task force commander, tactical
commander, and chief of staff to Admiral Nimitz, all in June 1942; to vice admi-
ral and Fifth Fleet commander in August 1943; and to admiral in February 1944,
in command at the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. His flag lieutenant de-
scribes his first and most critical transformation, just before the battle of Mid-
way. Literally overnight Spruance changed from a detail man—who, for
example, “watched the chief signalman like a hawk” when he was Halsey’s screen
commander—to a maker of major decisions, as Task Force 16 commander in
Enterprise, where he “took himself out of the details completely.”13
Buell called Spruance “the quiet warrior,” but he was neither silent nor reti-
cent. We know this because of a large and frank correspondence with his wife,
Margaret, and with intimates like his former chief of staff and lifelong friend
Captain Charles J. (Carl) Moore. We know it because Spruance communicated
forcefully throughout his career, both in junior officer days and during his rapid
wartime advancement. His views were esteemed by his juniors, his peers, and his
seniors. With his staff he talked endlessly, often while walking back and forth on
his flagship’s forecastle. Talking, he said, was how he shaped his thinking. Then
he would disappear while his staff responded with thorough, detailed plans.
In communicating with seniors, Spruance restricted his issues to the few he
thought were critical. His clearly expressed positions were not always accepted,
nor was he always right, but from ensign to admiral he was listened to for wis-
dom and objectivity. Spruance’s unostentatious mode of communication com-
pares well with that of the far more charismatic Horatio Nelson. Both leaders
not only motivated their followers but instilled an extension of the mind of a
master into what Nelson described as a “band of brothers.”
Admiral Ernest J. King considered Spruance to be “the most intelligent officer
in the Navy,” but Spruance was not an intellectual.14 Rear Admiral E. M. Eller,
then Director of Naval History, called him “self-possessed,” but Spruance was
never self-sufficient.15 He was relentless but not vicious in his unflagging deter-
mination to defeat his talented, unyielding, and resourceful Japanese enemy.
Nimitz said of him, “Admiral Spruance fought the war with his entire being.”
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In response to those who said Spruance might have done better at Midway, at
Tarawa, or in the battle of the Philippine Sea, Lundstrom says: “The constant was
that every time Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded an operation
against the Japanese, they lost.”16 He never let the Japanese navy, army, or kami-
kazes, or the weather, or logistics defeat him, even under the direst circum-
stances. Naval War College historian and strategist George Baer offers that
Spruance “perfectly characterizes Clausewitz’ notion of military genius.”17
Illustrative is Spruance’s execution as Fifth Fleet commander at the battle of
the Philippine Sea. Some later thought he was too cautious because he protected
the beachhead on Saipan. He had positioned his fighting fleet within easy reach
of it, because he knew the Japanese propensity to split their forces in previous at-
tacks. He believed they might draw the American fast carriers and battleships to-
ward the west with one force while sneaking in with the other to crush the
beachhead. Four months later, this was in fact the Imperial Japanese Navy’s plan:
it drew away the more impetuous Admiral Halsey and his Third Fleet (the same
ships with a different commander) in the battle of Leyte Gulf.
Spruance hugged the beachhead, as Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo expected him to
do. With a flank attack foreclosed, the Japanese admiral conceived a perfectly
sound plan, which was to launch all his strike aircraft, 450 of them, from the west
and well beyond the range of the Americans. He could do that because his air-
craft would not have to return to their carriers, as an American strike would; in-
stead, they would cripple the U.S. carriers and then fly on eastward to Japanese
airfields in the Marianas, from which they would then reattack. Simultaneously,
substantial land-based naval air forces would attack the Fifth Fleet from Guam
and Saipan, in the Marianas, reminiscent of our own attacks on the Japanese car-
riers from Midway Island.
The Japanese plan might have been effective in June 1942, but it could not be
in June 1944. Task Force 58 had already destroyed all Japanese airpower in the
Marianas and established air supremacy. By thinking defensively—a scandal-
ously poor strategy in 1942 but perfect for 1944—Spruance empowered
Mitscher to assemble all his fighters for defense. Nor did Mitscher need to deal
with decks cluttered with armed and fueled dive-bombers and torpedo bomb-
ers. Task Force 58 struck those aircraft below and concentrated on mounting a
defense so formidable that it used more fighters on hand than the Japanese had
in total aircraft for the attack. The American defense comprised fifteen fast car-
riers in four tight formations ringed by cruisers and destroyers carrying scores
of antiaircraft weapons. The ships shot down or drove away the trickle of bomb-
ers not destroyed by the American combat air patrol. The few Japanese aircraft
that survived and flew to the Marianas had no place to land and were destroyed.
This was the famous “Marianas Turkey Shoot,” in which 435 of 450 Japanese
1 2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
130
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss4/1
aircraft were destroyed at the cost of thirty American fighters.18 By 1944 the Pa-
cific air war had been transformed from a battle to destroy air bases afloat and
ashore into a battle to destroy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
In the Philippine Sea Spruance vacillated between staying close and steaming
west in an attempt to attack effectively first, as Mitscher fervently begged him to
do. Spruance chose the right course of action, and in so doing he won the most
decisive battle in the history of naval air warfare, Midway not excepted. The Jap-
anese carriers never recovered and were thereafter floating airfields without air-
craft. The result was kamikaze attacks for the rest of the war.
Spruance had to an extraordinary degree the mental equivalent of peripheral
vision. Not only did he visualize the situation he confronted in 360 degrees, but
he did so in n dimensions—that is, in all aspects. When Spruance was in his sixth
shipboard command, just before promotion to rear admiral, a lieutenant with
whom he had once had theological discussions was officer of the deck (OOD),
“conning Mississippi through complicated maneuvers in company with other
battleships.” Spruance calmly said, “Tell me more about reincarnation, evolu-
tion, and karma.” The hapless OOD was sure that he had to safeguard the ship
from an absentminded skipper. To the contrary, it is safe to say that Spruance
was testing the young officer’s mental capacity to address two problems at once.
While grilling the OOD, Spruance, with his “peripheral vision,” would not only
have seen everything going on around them but anticipated anything that might
happen.19 On another occasion, in January 1939, a Panama Canal pilot gave a
logical order, right rudder, but the idiosyncratic Mississippi swung left toward
shoal water and a moored dredge. Spruance took the conn from the pilot and
saved his ship.20
With the war over, after brief tours as Commander, Naval Forces Japan, and
Pacific Fleet commander, in March 1946 Spruance returned to the Naval War
College as President. He emphasized two things. First, he wanted to enhance of-
ficer education in operations and strategy. Spruance accepted that planning
needs a process—something less tendentious than the one Kalbfus had es-
poused—but he thought that beyond process, and more important, come com-
prehensive thinking and clarity of purpose. For example, doctrine said you win
command of the sea before exploiting it with an amphibious operation, but
Spruance would have seen this as a trap of theory, because in his experience a
practical enemy would not come and fight until the landing had taken place and
the opposing fleet was tied to a beachhead.
Second, Spruance introduced operational logistics to the curriculum. He had
first seen the dominance of logistics at Guadalcanal, lived logistics from Tarawa
to Okinawa, and suffered its restraints in the summer of 1945 when he was plan-
ning, with profound reluctance, the invasion of Japan scheduled for November.
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Spruance knew from personal experience that the prewar plan to construct ad-
vance bases across the Pacific had been a cumbersome failure and that a key to
his bold sweep through the Central Pacific had been the act of collective genius
embodied in the mobile logistics support force that followed on the heels of his
fleet wherever it went. Indeed, the Pacific campaign had been governed by re-
source allocations, between the European and Pacific theaters and, in the Pacific,
between Nimitz and MacArthur. Spruance could contrast from firsthand expe-
rience the extraordinary success of the U.S. Navy’s logistical support with the
ever more devastating logistical frustrations suffered by the Japanese army and
navy from 1943 onward.
Spruance was only partially successful at the Naval War College. Educating
military officers in how to shift from following orders to creating them proved to
be no easy task. Persuading future leaders that logistics dominate opera-
tions—and even strategy—was a challenge that is still with us over sixty years
later.
The best way to understand Spruance’s leadership is not to show how he fol-
lowed doctrine, principles, or an elaborate process, for as we have seen he did
not. His four major attributes were luck, ambition, skills acquired from study
and experience, and innate talent.
Napoleon said he wanted only lucky generals. Branch Rickey once said (of
baseball), “Luck is nothing more than the residue of design.”21 In these terms,
Spruance was lucky. We know the Midway story and why he was a “lucky gen-
eral” in his first battle. Halsey insisted on Spruance as his replacement because
he knew him intimately. Nimitz thought his calm demeanor and “peripheral vi-
sion” were what would be needed in the crucial battle. Luck played in the deci-
sive dive-bomber attack at 1025 on 4 June, but mutual confidence between
Nimitz, Fletcher, and Spruance had established the conditions fulfilled by the
courageous American pilots. Good luck entered in when the Bureau of Naviga-
tion ordered fledgling Rear Admiral Spruance to the Pacific in mid-1941—and
the bureau chief was Chester Nimitz. Nimitz gave Spruance a cruiser division.
Spruance was keenly disappointed that he did not get a battleship division. As
luck would have it, his cruiser division was assigned to Halsey. In this way
Spruance had six months to understudy carrier operations in the direst circum-
stances, while escaping the inconsequentiality of battleships in 1942. Nimitz for
his part had no way of knowing when he gave Spruance his vital assignment that
he himself would soon replace Admiral Husband E. Kimmel as Pacific fleet com-
mander and that Spruance would become his most valuable subordinate.
What of Spruance’s desire to achieve? Self-serving ambition is characterized
by forcefulness, even ruthlessness, in advancing one’s own interest. Spruance
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was just as forceful, and it is fair to say ruthless, in his prosecution of the war, but
he prosecuted it selflessly. His ambition was for the success of his forces, his navy,
and his country. Selfless ambition entails an extra measure of talent, both your
own and that of the subordinates you choose. When Rear Admiral Arthur Davis,
an aviator, took over as chief of staff from Carl Moore during the Fifth Fleet
staff ’s brief respite in the last half of 1944, he made it his task to unburden
Spruance of concern for the detailed planning both knew would be their recipe
for success at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Buell said, “Davis was awed by Spruance’s
intellect and regarded the admiral as modest, shy, unassuming, and
unconceited.” Davis later wrote, “I made up my mind I would do all in my power
to keep his mind free of all the deadening inconsequentialities that can waste
time and take attention from the things that really matter.”22 The historian Sam-
uel Eliot Morison thought “Spruance’s leading characteristics were attention to
detail, poise, and the power of intelligent decision.” Yet Spruance appraised him-
self late in life differently: “When I look at myself objectively, I think that what
success I may have achieved through life is largely due to the fact that I am a good
judge of men, I am lazy, and I never have done things myself that I could get
someone to do for me.”23 There is no contradiction between Morison’s admira-
tion of Spruance’s “attention to detail” and the latter’s self-evaluation “I am
lazy”—keeping in mind Spruance’s knack of propitious delegation, accompa-
nied by his comprehensive, n-dimensional peripheral vision. Spruance was pru-
dent but not cautious in formulating and executing operations.
Spruance’s early education and experience have been addressed. A Naval
Academy foundation, student and two staff tours at the Naval War College, and
technical training at General Electric gave him a well rounded education. Six
tours in engineering billets and six commands gave him well rounded opera-
tional experience. An indication of his professional temperament is that, serving
under his fair share of good and mediocre leaders, he seems to have won the re-
spect of them all.
As to Raymond Spruance’s inherited characteristics, one must regard his fa-
mous reserve as innate, as well as his selfless desire for excellence. These charac-
teristics were seen and remarked on even when he was an ensign and were the
foundations of the universal respect in which he was to be held. Spruance em-
bodied both shyness and stoicism. Probably in the early days shyness predomi-
nated, but as the war grew progressively bloodier, stoicism would help him keep
focused on his command responsibilities. Those who knew him best say his eyes
gave away his sense of humor and sensitivity but he kept those traits concealed
under a grave demeanor. He was famous for preserving his energy. The emotion-
ally draining two-month campaign for Okinawa exhausted his staff and ships’
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companies, yet his flag secretary, Charles Barber, later insisted that Spruance
looked as fresh at the end of the campaign as the day it started.24
His natural proclivities were not unerring. For example, after taking Tarawa
in the Gilberts in November 1943, he did not want to go directly at Kwajalein in
the heart of the Marshall Islands but argued for taking the outer atolls first.
Nimitz, however, thought the Japanese would not have time to build up their de-
fenses if he struck quickly. Two months later Nimitz was proved right when
Spruance took Kwajalein against light opposition.
Spruance’s most important leadership trait seems to have been inherent
rather than acquired. On one hand, he had very high standards of effectiveness,
for himself and everyone he esteemed. On the other hand, he expected no one,
including himself, to perform flawlessly. Spruance believed that a goal of perfec-
tion stifles timely decisions and inhibits the pace of action, whether in himself,
his staff, his subordinates, or his peers. He had low regard for anyone who when
judging effectiveness could not distinguish molehills from mountains. This trait
shines like a beacon in everything he wrote, said, and did. Morison perhaps best
summed up Raymond Ames Spruance: “He envied no man, regarded no one as
rival, won the respect of all with whom he came in contact, and went ahead in his
quiet way winning victories for his country.”25
NOTE S
1. Depending on your capacity for empathy you
may approach an understanding of the battle
after reading, say, the chapters on Midway in
Herman Wouk’s War and Remembrance,
John Lundstrom’s recent three-chapter ac-
count of the battle in Black Shoe Carrier Ad-
miral, and the early but still masterful
narrative in Samuel Eliot Morison’s History of
United States Naval Operations in World War
II.
2. His flag lieutenant said Spruance told him af-
ter being briefed by Nimitz: “It appears . . . I
have two sets of orders. [First] a written order
to meet and defeat the Japs. [Second] My oral
orders are not to lose my force. If things go
badly I am to withdraw and let them have the
place because they can’t hold it and we will
get it back.” Robert J. Oliver, letter, 5 August
1971, Naval War College Historical Collec-
tion, Spruance Papers [hereafter Spruance
Papers], MS 37, box 3, folder 12.
3. This despite correspondence with E. P.
Forrestel, 19 December 1962, in which
Spruance wrote, “Needless to say, I was very
pleased.” Spruance Papers, MS 37, box 3,
folder 4.
4. For a more thorough treatment, see Hughes,
“Naval Tactics and Their Influence on Strat-
egy,” Naval War College Review 39, no. 1
(January–February 1986), pp. 2–17.
5. J. B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral:
Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and
Guadalcanal (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2007), p. 260.
6. A recent book does so very well, however,
and in great detail: Jonathan Parshall and An-
thony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold
Story of the Battle of Midway (Washington,
D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), for example,
pp. 137, 186.
7. Rear Adm. Carl Moore was Spruance’s chief
of staff in 1944; Vice Adm. Richmond Kelly
Turner was to command Amphibious Force,
South Pacific Force; Lt. Gen. Holland M.
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Smith, USMC, commanded V Amphibious
Corps in the Central Pacific.
8. Vice Adm. Marc Andrew Mitscher com-
manded the Fast Carrier Strike Force, and
Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill amphibious forces,
both in the Central Pacific campaign.
Mitscher did not live up to Spruance’s expec-
tations as commanding officer of USS Hornet
at Midway. Not until after Task Force 58’s air
strikes to neutralize Truk in early 1944 did
Mitscher earn Spruance’s full confidence.
9. Buell, Spruance’s best biographer, reports
only one instance in Spruance’s six warship
commands when a subordinate took advan-
tage of his trust, and that was not an opera-
tional matter but an administrative one,
involving the petty theft of provisions.
Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior (Annap-
olis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp.
74–75.
10. Ibid., chap. 22. Also see E. P. Forrestel, Admi-
ral Raymond A. Spruance, USN: A Study in
Command (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), chap. 15.
Forrestel, who had served on Spruance’s staff
in the Pacific, takes a less personal approach
than Buell.
11. His afloat engineer-officer tours were in USS
Connecticut, USS Cincinnati, and USS
Pennsylvania.
12. Spruance’s two theses on command and pol-
icy, written when he was a student in 1927
and today in the archives at the Naval War
College, are ample evidence that he had the
talent of a great strategist. The first deserves
to be republished today for its concise de-
scription of command responsibilities. He
designed organizational relationships for a
proper “Navy general staff” in a way that one
might wish were in effect today. Both exem-
plify his crisp, clear, concise style of thinking.
13. Oliver letter.
14. Buell, Quiet Warrior. To ease his mind under
pressure Spruance read detective stories and
the like, but never the great classics.
15. E. M. Eller, introduction, in Forrestel, Admi-
ral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, p. viii.
16. J. B. Lundstrom, introduction, in Buell, Quiet
Warrior, p. xvii.
17. George Baer, personal correspondence to
Hughes, 17 April 2007.
18. Late in the afternoon Mitscher persuaded
Spruance to send a strike. The fleeing Japa-
nese ships were at the extreme attack range of
three hundred miles. Most of the American
aircraft lost that day, a hundred of the 216
Mitscher dispatched, ran out of fuel and had
to land in the water.
19. Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 38.
20. Ibid., pp. 89–90. To stop the strange swing to
port, Spruance dropped and held the star-
board anchor while backing full the starboard
engines.
21. Quoted in a review of Rickey, Baseball’s Fero-
cious Gentleman, by Lee Lowenfish, Weekly
Standard, 9 April 2007, p. 38.
22. Buell, Quiet Warrior, p. 338.
23. Ibid.
24. C. F. Barber, oral history, 1 March 1966,
Spruance Papers, series II, box 17.
25. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United
States Naval Operations in World War II, vol.
3, New Guinea and the Marianas: March
1944–August 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown,
1953), pp. 235–36.
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MIDWAY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
Jeremy Black
While we are at war with Germany and Italy we do not possess the na-
val resources necessary to maintain the command of the Indian Ocean
against any heavy detachment from the main Japanese fleet.
WINSTON CHURCHILL
Winston Churchill’s remark to the Secret Session of the House of Com-mons on 23 April 1942 provides the key to this article, an attempt to fo-
cus on the strategic significance of Midway.1
American victory atMidwaymaywell be a self-evident proposition to Ameri-
cans and others contemplating the course and significance of the struggle be-
tween America and Japan between 1941 and 1945 for dominance of the Pacific.
Yet that struggle does not exhaust the importance of that battle, and it particu-
larly behooves a non-American to comment on the wider significance of Mid-
way. Such a task could be profitably repeated for other battles seen as turning
points, notably Stalingrad, El Alamein, the Atlantic convoy battles of the spring
of 1943, and Kohima (in northeastern India in April 1944, where British and In-
dian forces repulsed the Japanese). Each is too readily
approached in terms of the particular combatants
who fought the battle, with a tendency to underplay
its wider significance.
As far asMidway is concerned,my general perspec-
tive is the issue of the prospects for, and success of, co-
alition warfare during the SecondWorld War, and my
specific concern is serious British weakness in the In-
dian Ocean region. Coalition warfare faces problems
and creates irritations, but it can also be a crucial force
multiplier. In the Second World War, the Allies con-
fronted multiple issues, both political and military, in
Professor Black, of the University of Exeter (United
Kingdom), specializes in early modern and modern
British history, continental Europe, military history,
military studies, and historical geography. He has
authored, coauthored, or edited over seventy books on
various historical topics. Recently, he served as the gen-
eral editor of the Ashgate selected volumes of essays and
articles on military history and as general editor of the
Routledge Military Studies series. In support of the Na-
val War College programs over the past several years,
he has presented many case-study lectures, including
the war for American independence, Napoleon, the
Cold War, Vietnam, World War I, theorists, and
World War II.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009, Vol. 62, No. 4
137
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2009 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
pursuing coalition warfare. A coalition that included Joseph Stalin, Chiang
Kai-shek, and Charles de Gaulle was scarcely going to be easy, and alongside the
inherited distrusts and special interests that they represented, there were also se-
rious problems in Anglo-American relations, both political and military. In-
deed, there is a rich literature on the subject.2
In contrast, there is no such extensive literature on the deficiencies of Axis co-
alition warfare, and this is appropriate, because despite the extent to which the
totalitarian regimes of the Axis had more in common than the Allies, they failed
as an effective alliance.3 In particular, the two leading Axis powers, Germany and
Japan, were unable to create a military partnership, nor to provide mutual eco-
nomic assistance that in any way matched that of the Allies, strained as relations
among the latter were. German and Italian submarines were to link up in the In-
dian Ocean with the Japanese, but they did not mount any large-scale concerted
operations.4 German plans for war with the United States made little of the pros-
pect of Japanese assistance and preferred to focus on the possibility of using na-
val power and, subsequently, when that ceased to be even remotely plausible, on
the prospect of “wonder weapons.”5
Germany and Japan indeed fought what were in essence two separate wars,
and there was little in the way of coordination or cooperation between them,
and still less between Italy and Japan. In Eritrea, Italy had a colony on the Red
Sea, with a port at Massawa, where destroyers were based, and, in Somalia, an-
other on the Indian Ocean, with a port at Mogadishu; both, however, were con-
quered by the British before there was any prospect of cooperation. Mogadishu
was captured by a force from Kenya on 25 February 1941, Massawa following on
8 April, falling to a force from Sudan, while Berbera in British Somaliland, which
the Italians had conquered in August 1940, was recaptured on 16 March 1941 by
a force from Aden, in an amphibious operation.
The Italian navy was large and modern and included six battleships, nineteen
cruisers, and 113 submarines, although no aircraft carriers. This fleet, however,
was largely confined to the Mediterranean, although Italian submarines took
part in the Battle of the Atlantic from 1941. With the British in control of Egypt,
the Italians were in no shape to intervene in the Indian Ocean, irrespective of the
problems posed by a lack of fuel, air cover, or determined leadership.
The high point of German-Japanese coordination was Germany’s decision to
declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor, an attack Hitler had sought
to encourage by pressing forward military operations against Moscow. This dec-
laration of war, however, was essentially the product of the deterioration in
American-German relations, rather than a means to assist Japan;6 the declara-
tion of war did not lead to any concerted attempt at grand strategy.
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The only sphere in which such an attempt might have been possible was the
Indian Ocean, with German pressure on the Middle East interacting with Japa-
nese advances on India and in the Indian Ocean. British policy makers, indeed,
feared joint pressure in the form, for example, of a possible German advance
through Turkey, prior to the launching of Operation BARBAROSSA, or, subse-
quently, through the Caucasus.
These concerns were a second tranche of earlier fears about the Germans ex-
ploiting support in Iraq and (Vichy) Syria, as they had sought to do. This had led
to the British invasion of both in the summer of 1941.
The fears of an advance through Turkey did not materialize. The Germans
did not invade, and had they done so, they would have found the Turkish army
capable of mounting a formidable resistance. Moreover, any advance through
Turkey would have encountered serious logistical and transport limitations and
problems. Pressuring Turkey into granting transit rights would have been a dif-
ficult question, but the situation would have had to be more dire for such pres-
sure to succeed.
In the event, the planned German advance to the Azerbaijani oil fields near
Baku in late 1942 was thwarted by Soviet resistance and by Hitler’s focus on the
capture of Stalingrad. By then, anyway, the British and Soviets had occupied Iran
(from 25 August), capturing Tehran on 17 September. Persia provided a crucial
route for Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union, as well as giving British India
considerable defense in depth in the event of German success in the Caucasus or
the Middle East.
In practice, the German threat to the Indian Ocean came most directly via
Egypt. The Germans had driven back the British in Libya in 1941, and, having
been forced to fall back in November 1941, returned to the offensive in early
1942. On 20 June 1942, following the German success in the battle of Gazala,
the key Libyan port of Tobruk, a forward defense for Egypt, fell, and the Afrika
Corps then advanced into Egypt. In July and September, however, Erwin
Rommel tried and failed to break through the British defenses in order to ad-
vance on Alexandria and the Suez Canal. The German advance created consid-
erable pressure and led to an atmosphere of crisis, as well as to the departure of
the Mediterranean fleet from Alexandria. Yet the attacks were held, while the
pro-British ministry in Egypt kept the significant Axis elements that existed
there at bay.
As a consequence, the Axis threat to the Indian Ocean region came from Ja-
pan. This region was crucial to a number of strands in the Allied war effort. Via
the Indian Ocean came Allied aid to both China and the Soviet Union, as well as
oil from the Middle East. The Indian Ocean was also central to the defense of
Egypt and the Middle East, as well as to the articulation of the British imperial
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system, notably the deployment of Indian, Australasian, and South African
forces. Indeed, in his Rulers of the Indian Ocean (1927), Admiral George A.
Ballard noted:
As regards its present form or fabric the Empire may be roughly divided into an occi-
dental half—including the British Isles—and an oriental; which are held together
commercially and strategically by the Imperial lines of communication across the In-
dian Ocean; the whole being kept in contact with foreign lands throughout the East
by the trade routes traversing the same water–space. If those connections are cut, the
two halves of the Empire will fall apart as surely as night follows day.7
Born in India, Ballard (1862–1948) was a product of empire, who had served in
Sudanese (1884), Burmese (1885–86), and Chinese (1900) waters, as well as be-
ing director of the Operations Division of the Admiralty War Staff.
The vulnerability of the British Empire to Japanese attack had been a major
theme in prewar planning and had led, in particular, to the scheme for the devel-
opment of a major naval base in Singapore. As early as 1919 an Admiralty mem-
orandum had warned that the Royal Navy was likely to be weaker than that of
Japan in the Far East. It suggested that using Hong Kong as a base would expose
the fleet and that instead Singapore should be developed, as it was sufficiently far
from Japan to permit reinforcement without peril.8
By the 1930s, the British planned to send a major fleet to Singapore in the
event of war with Japan.9 In 1940, however, the naval situation deteriorated
sharply. Germany’s victory over France took the latter’s navy out of the Allied
camp, greatly increasing British vulnerability. This issue was greatly exacer-
bated by Italy’s entry into the war in June 1940, which exposed Britain’s posi-
tion in the Mediterranean. The establishment of forward submarine bases in
the German conquests of Norway and France made Britain’s Atlantic supply
routes far more exposed than in the First World War. In 1941, the Royal Navy
took heavy losses in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. In such circum-
stances, it was unsurprising that the First Sea Lord complained in September
1941 of a shortage of cruisers, adding that “the destroyer situation is even
worse,” when explaining why he could send none to the Far East.10
Concerned about the war with Germany, the British mistakenly hoped that
the defense of Malaya and Singapore would benefit from the strength of the
American fleet in the western Pacific, and they also seriously mishandled their
own naval units in the face of Japanese airpower. A powerful squadron, though
without any carriers (due to the damage suffered by the intended one), was sent
from Singapore to contest the Japanese landings in Malaya, but on 10 December
Japanese land-based naval bombers sank the key units, the battleship Prince of
Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. These were the first ships of these types
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sunk in open sea solely by air attack, and their loss demonstrated the vulnerabil-
ity of capital ships without air cover against air attack. The poorly conceived and
executed plan of the force commander, Sir Tom Phillips, also reflected wider is-
sues, including deficiencies in air-sea coordination.11
Two months later, in the battle of the Java Sea (27 February–1 March), Allied
naval forces unsuccessfully attacked a Japanese fleet en route to Java. The Japa-
nese fleet was well coordinated, enjoyed superior air support, and benefited
from better torpedoes; for their part, the American, Australian, British, and
Dutch warships lacked an able commander and experience of fighting together.
The Allied fleet was destroyed.
By then, Singapore had fallen to Japan (on 15 February), followed on 8 March
by Rangoon in Burma. With their conquest of Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, and
Burma, the Japanese were best placed to advance into the Indian Ocean region,
where indeed they occupied the Andaman and Nicobar islands in March, which
had been evacuated by the British.
In April, the Japanese under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, with five carriers
and three hundred planes, launched an expedition into the Indian Ocean. The
main Japanese strike force advanced to the south of Ceylon, raiding the port of
Colombo, sinking a destroyer, and downing twenty-seven British aircraft for
nine of their own. On the 5th, at 1:55 in the afternoon, the Japanese also sank
two British heavy cruisers, Devonshire and Cornwall, to the southwest of Ceylon.
Nagumo followed on 9 April by an advance to the east of Ceylon, from which a
raid was launched against the key naval base of Trincomalee. Caught at sea, the
small carrier Hermes and the Australian destroyer Vampire were sunk at nine
o’clock that morning. (Commissioned in 1924, Hermes had a tonnage of only
9,765 and an overall length of 181.8 meters, not quite six hundred feet, and car-
ried only twenty-five aircraft.) The Japanese then withdrew.
A separate squadron—Malaya Force, under Vice Admiral Jisaburo
Ozawa—sailed from Mergui, in southern Burma, steaming west between the
Andaman Islands and the Nicobars. On 6 April, from off the coast of eastern In-
dia, Ozawa launched raids on the ports of Cocanada and Vizagapatan and at-
tacked shipping in the Bay of Bengal, sinking twenty-three merchant ships,
twenty in one day. (Ozawa had been in operational control when the British
warships were sunk on 10 December 1941 and was to go on to command the
First Mobile Fleet during the battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944.) In addition, in
April 1942, off India’s west coast, Japanese submarines sank thirty-two thousand
tons of shipping.
The British Eastern Fleet, under Admiral Somerville, was a considerable
force, with three carriers (two of them new), five old battleships, and five cruis-
ers, but the Japanese attack had come when it was off its cruising area south of
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Ceylon, to refuel and rewater at Addu Atoll in the distant southern Maldives.
The warships sunk by the Japanese had been sent to Ceylon for repair and escort
duties, and their loss made Somerville uneasily aware of his weakness. He cor-
rectly thought that his carrier aircraft were unable to compete with the more nu-
merous and better Japanese aircraft and that this deficiency left the battleships
vulnerable. As a result, Somerville sent the battleships to Mombasa, in Kenya.
Had the Japanese been able to establish a permanent naval presence in the In-
dian Ocean, they would have threatened not only the British position in India
but also that in the Middle East, challenging Britain’s oil supplies from the Per-
sian Gulf and its routes to Australia. The buildup of Ceylon’s garrison to a
strength of two divisions by the close of March 1942 was a response. As there was
to be no Japanese landing, this force was not tested, and it is easy for historians,
when space is at a premium, to ignore such moves. However, they throw light on
strategic preferences. The troops deployed in Ceylon could not be sent to protect
India against an advance from Burma, as Field Marshal Wavell, the commander
in chief in India, wished; also, the decision reflected the determination of the
Chiefs of Staff to maintain oceanic links. Had the Japanese landed an invasion
force on Ceylon, it is difficult to see why they should not have repeated earlier
successes: British fighting quality was no stronger, although the civilian popula-
tion was resolved to resist the Japanese. In his war diary, Admiral Sir Geoffrey
Layton, Commander in Chief Ceylon, noted, “Ceylon, on my arrival there on
21st January [1942], was virtually defenceless. . . . [T]he problem of retaining
control of the coastal waters of Burma was quite beyond our powers in the ab-
sence of either air superiority or fast patrol craft with good AA [antiaircraft] ar-
mament so numerous that we could afford substantial losses.”12
The Japanese advance forced Somerville to think about the need to protect
the Arabian Sea, and thus tanker sailings from the Persian Gulf, as well as the
routes from both the Gulf and the Red Sea down the coast of East Africa to the
Cape of Good Hope. This was done by withdrawing the fleet to Bombay (mod-
ern Mumbai) and Mombasa, which seemed advisable not least as the main Japa-
nese fleet, without a base in Ceylon, was forced to rely on distant Singapore.
Nevertheless, there was acute concern about the security of Ceylon, even of the
whole of India. The navy was no longer in a posture of forward defense and, cru-
cially, was unable to prevent an invasion. As there was no effective air cover to
protect India, the situation appeared more dire than that facing Britain in 1940
when threatened by German invasion.
In response, the British were encouraged to press forward their plan to seize
Madagascar from Vichy French forces. In March, intercepts had indicated that
Germany was urging Japan to occupy the island, and the British feared the bas-
ing of Japanese submarines there. On 5 May, the main port of Diégo Suarez was
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attacked; its defenders surrendered on 7 May, although additional operations
from September were necessary to achieve the island’s final surrender on 5 No-
vember. This was Britain’s first major amphibious success of the war.
The fate of Madagascar was indicative of that of Ceylon, as air superiority
supplied by two carriers was important to British success at Diégo Suarez, the
British being faced by no significant airpower on the part of Vichy, and cer-
tainly by no carrier. The crisis ended with most of the Japanese warships’ being
deployed for the attack on Port Moresby planned for early May, the attack that
was to lead to the battle of the Coral Sea.
The Japanese raid into the Indian Ocean is not only one of the great
counterfactuals (what-ifs) of the war but also a key indication of the impor-
tance of Midway. There was a greater vulnerability in the Indian Ocean than
that of the United States in the far larger Pacific. Instead, however, of pursu-
ing their potent advantage against the secondary enemy and possibly pre-
empting the invasion of Madagascar and crippling British oil movements,
the Japanese sent their carriers into the Pacific theater against their strongest
opponent. Of course, had the Japanese concentrated on the Pacific theater
throughout and not launched the raid into the Indian Ocean at all, they
might have been in a better position to exploit their initial advantage in the
Pacific, not least by putting pressure on the remainder of the American Pa-
cific Fleet.
As it was, four of the carriers Nagumo had taken into the Indian Ocean
were destroyed at Midway. This defeat led the Japanese to postpone their
plans to advance in the southwest Pacific, toward New Caledonia, Fiji, and
Samoa. Losses at Midway also reduced Japanese strategic options for future
campaigns in the Indian Ocean, while also making it less dangerous for the
Americans to prepare to mount attacks in the Pacific, which in turn further
reduced Japanese options in the Indian Ocean.
After Midway, the Japanese still had a large navy that was particularly
strong in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Yet their losses in 1942 cost the
Japanese their lead in carrier strength, and by the spring of 1943 only one
fleet carrier (as against light carriers) was prepared for conflict. The others
were damaged. Three more fleet carriers were due for completion that year,
but the Americans were planning or building far more. There was also a ma-
jor disparity as far as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were concerned.
The marked difference in industrial capability and effective war mobiliza-
tion of the two powers was readily apparent, and this difference was to be ac-
centuated by naval action. Whereas the Japanese navy could not strike at the
American economy, the inroads of American submarines greatly affected the
movement of raw materials to Japan and, therefore, its industrial capability.
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The contrast between the two economies was also seen in the construction of
merchant shipping, in which the Americans opened up a massive lead.
As a result, they could attack with greater safety. Off the island of
Guadalcanal in the southwest Pacific, from August 1942 to February 1943,
there was a struggle for the naval dominance correctly seen as crucial to the
struggle there on shore. In the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October
1942, a strong Japanese fleet, including four carriers, attacked an American
fleet containing only two carriers, and the Americans lost one of them. How-
ever, the heavier loss of Japanese aircraft and, even more important, aircrew
was a major blow. From mid-November, however, the Americans were success-
ful in defeating the Japanese off Guadalcanal.
Thanks to Midway, and the war in the Pacific generally, the British were
obliged to deploy only limited naval strength against Japan until the closing year
of the war. The total Japanese concentration on the Pacific from May 1942 en-
sured that there were no more raids into the Indian Ocean, and no British war-
ship was lost there in 1943. Instead, the British fleet focused on the
Mediterranean and the Atlantic, notably in supporting the invasion of Italy in
1943. Whereas the British had had two carriers to cover the attack on Madagas-
car in May 1942, from January 1943 there were none in the Indian Ocean until
October, when an escort carrier arrived. In turn, after D-Day, Britain was able to
transfer much of its navy to take part in the war with Japan.
This contribution looked toward Britain’s subsequent naval cooperation
with the United States, both in NATO, which was to be created in 1949, and dur-
ing the Korean War (1950–53). The Indian Ocean remained a key area of British
naval activity and leadership until Britain’s withdrawal from “East of Suez” from
the late 1960s, but this presence was dependent on the extent to which alliance
with the United States covered British maritime interests in the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean. Similarly, the British naval position in the Indian Ocean helped
the Americans to focus on the Pacific.
Midway therefore can be understood as a crucial episode in the geopolitics of
the war and as a vital contribution to coalition politics and warfare. It was of a
part with the movement of American fighters to northern Australia from 17
March; the battle of the Coral Sea (7–8 May) helped strengthen the defense of
Australia, but in the meantime there had been plans to abandon the north and to
focus on defending a line north of Brisbane.
As Churchill was the first to note, American support for the continuation of
the British Empire was limited and conditional. Yet, even if indirect, it could be
crucial. Once the empire was gone and Britain’s position in South Asia changed
dramatically with Indian independence in 1947, it became difficult to think
back to the geopolitics of the situation, let alone to appreciate the value of India
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to Britain and others. The United States and the Soviet Union would probably
have defeated the Axis even had the situation in India and the Indian Ocean be-
come far worse, but Britain, understood as the British Empire, would have been
able to contribute far less. Moreover, the possible domino effect on the Pacific
War of a weakening of the Chinese position as a result of greater instability in In-
dia is worthy of contemplation. The Americans would have had to focus on air
attacks on Japan from the Pacific rather than, as originally, from China.
These points serve as a reminder of the degree to which strategy involves an
understanding of the relationships between different spheres of operation and
the associated prioritization of tasks and commitments. The Axis powers proved
deficient in such understanding compared to the Allies, although the latter faced
grave difficulties in trying to manage their responses to these relationships.
Counterfactualism, the what-ifs of history, has a bad academic press.13 Let me
therefore close with entries from the diary of General Sir Alan Brooke, the chief
of the Imperial General Staff, to remind us of the sense of threat felt at the high-
est level of British decision making. For 6 April 1942:
On reaching COS [the Chiefs of Staff Committee] I discovered that most of the Japa-
nese fleet appeared to be in the Indian Ocean and our Eastern Fleet retiring west-
ward. Up to present no signs of transports. I don’t like the situation much as we are
very weak in the Indian Ocean. I have been trying to get First Sea Lord to fix up with
the Americans some counter move toward Japan to cover this very predicament that
we are in, but he has failed to do so up to present.14
Brooke was even gloomier next day: “COS at which we looked into the un-
pleasant situation created by entrance of Japanese fleet into Indian Ocean. Just
what I had been afraid of and had been trying to get First Sea Lord busy about
during whole of last week. Also frantic calls for air support from Wavell, which
according to Portal there is little chance of meeting. I suppose this Empire has
never been in such a precarious position throughout its history!”
On 10 April, he added, “Usual COS meeting, mainly concerned in trying to
save India from the Japs. A gloomy prospect with loss of command of sea and
air.”15
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FRESH THINKING FOR AN OLD PROBLEM
Report of the Naval War College Workshop on
Countering Maritime Piracy
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy
The problem of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia has escalated over thepast year, beginning with the seizure of the very large crude carrier Sirius
Star in November 2008. The supertanker was carrying two million barrels of oil,
and a ransom of three million dollars was paid for the release of the $100 million
cargo and the twenty-five crew members being held hostage. The Sirius Star mo-
tivated a number of important international initiatives to counter piracy.
More progress occurred in counterpiracy diplomacy during the ninety days
between the end of October 2008 and end of January 2009 than had transpired
in the previous ninety years. During this time the
United Nations finished a comprehensive report on
the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the Se-
curity Council adopted Resolutions 1846 (on 2 De-
cember) and 1851 (on 16 December). Resolution 1851
encouraged creation of a multinational Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia; the “Con-
tact Group,” as it is known, consists of more than
twenty nations and met for the first time in January
2009. Since then, the Contact Group and subordinate
working groups have met on a number of occasions,
with the fourth meeting, in September, to be chaired
by Japan. The United Kingdom signed a bilateral
agreement to hand over pirates to Kenya in December,
and the United States signed a similar agreement in
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January. (The European Union and Kenya signed a similar accord on 6 May. The
Arab and African states in the region reached agreement on the nonbinding Dji-
bouti Code of Conduct to facilitate greater regional cooperation against piracy.
Both the Contact Group and the Djibouti Code nations acknowledged the need
to create a regional counterpiracy center modeled on the sixteen-nation re-
gional counterpiracy Information Sharing Centre in Singapore.
In early 2009 the expectation was that these efforts would soon begin to pay off,
reducing the number of attacks from 2008. Nearly nine hundred seafarers had
been taken hostage in 2008, and pirates had seized more than forty vessels. But by
May 2009 the number of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia already had
eclipsed the figure in 2008. The blueprints for a more effective international-law
framework have largely been drafted; reducing piracy now requires that the next
steps be taken.
With this in mind, the International Law Department of the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, conducted
a counterpiracy workshop on 7 and 8 April 2009.1 Comprising fifty legal and
policy experts from across the globe, the workshop captured a number of find-
ings and vetted recommendations for continuing the effort against maritime pi-
racy. The participants “took away” four major findings. First, it was apparent to
them that piracy in the Horn of Africa has emerged from a complex political,
economic, and cultural milieu. No single response will solve the problem. Sec-
ond, regional capacity building and collective maritime action will be required
to contend with the challenge of piracy so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctu-
ary in Somalia. Proposals to stop piracy by “fixing” Somalia, however, beg the
question of how to go about the task, as it is doubtful that the international com-
munity has the capability or will to transform Somalia quickly into a stable and
viable state.
Third, the participants were convinced that only the major maritime powers
have the skill and resources to help the regional states expand coastal and littoral
maritime-security capability rapidly. Security assistance to the regional states,
including training and provision of patrol craft, can shift responsibility for
counterpiracy to the states of the neighborhood. Eventually, these states should
acquire and operate offshore patrol vessels, even corvettes. Shifting responsibil-
ity for maintaining rule of law at sea to the regional powers, the workshop felt,
benefits everyone. Finally, the civil shipping industry should take a greater role
in protecting merchant vessels, including integrating passive design measures
that make it more difficult for pirates to board a ship. In some cases, this means
that provision of private armed security may be appropriate.
The workshop was designed to take a fresh look at the threat of maritime pi-
racy off the Horn of Africa, assess the tremendous progress in international law
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and diplomacy that has transpired to address the problem, and consider the way
forward. By collecting many of the world’s top experts to consider the threat of
maritime piracy and by providing a forum in which they could discuss the issue
in a frank and open way, the workshop challenged some conventional thinking
and explored new approaches. The participants brought significant diversity
and depth of expertise. Many are involved in day-to-day decision making on
counterpiracy operations, policy, and international law in Europe, Asia, and the
United States.2 The workshop comprised participants from South and East Asia,
Europe, and the United States. The participants represented a variety of eclectic
professional backgrounds; they included international-law attorneys; advisers
in the areas of oceans policy, irregular maritime warfare, and maritime piracy,
from several continents; representatives of the international civil shipping in-
dustry; and maritime piracy and naval experts from academic and policy re-
search institutions. The work was facilitated by a state-of-the-art briefing
center—the Naval War College’s Decision Support Center—that can anony-
mously tabulate participants’ responses to issues under consideration, creating a
nonattribution record of the proceedings.
THE THREAT
The workshop opened with a presentation by a prominent irregular mari-
time warfare expert, who provided a threat assessment for the group. The
threat assessment concluded that although Somalia is a failed state, it is not a
failed society. Central government has collapsed, but other forms of author-
ity remain. Some forms of authority are local, restricted to individual towns
and villages. Others derive from clan or subclan status and from elders able to
exercise their authority using traditional means. Power also flows from polit-
ical figures, who exercise authority through negotiation or the patronage of
largely self-interested supporters or allies. Finally, militias and Islamic courts
exercise considerable influence in Somali society. Clan organization, then, is
a context rather than a determinant of piracy.
On 21 November 2008 the UN released a report by the special representative
of the secretary-general on piracy off the coast of Somalia, based on meetings
held in Nairobi, Kenya.3 The Nairobi report suggests that piracy off the coast of
Somalia is driven by the volatile security and political situations inside the coun-
try, rampant poverty, and other factors. Using the Nairobi report as a point of
departure, the workshop considered the leading contributors to maritime piracy
in East Africa. The workshop participants considered the causal factors con-
tained in the Nairobi report as potential drivers of Somali piracy, independently
scoring them by perceived importance.
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Among the factors considered as potentially contributing to Somali piracy
were poverty; lack of employment; environmental hardship; a reduction in
pastoralist and fishing resources; illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU)
fishing; and the volatile political and security situations. The experts were asked
to score these factors in order of importance. On average the participants scored
factors highest in relation to the volatile security and political situations in So-
malia and lowest in regard to environmental hardship. Several workshop experts
suggested additional factors that they considered important in fostering condi-
tions in which piracy can flourish. First, a sanctuary ashore provides a haven
from which pirates can operate with apparent impunity. Second, the opportu-
nity to conduct piracy is enhanced by the geographic location of the nation of
Somalia and close proximity of the major piracy hubs of Haradhere and Eyl to
the international shipping route through the Suez Canal. Third, the presence in
Somalia of legions of destitute young men and of numerous unpaid, or under-
paid, complicit and corrupt officials populates the piracy enterprise. Finally, the
low level of risk of getting either caught or killed while committing piracy, and
the prospect of high rewards, continues to draw Somalis into the illicit business.
The risk/reward calculus is favorable to piracy, attracting more than two hun-
dred teams, and the number is increasing.4 It has to be changed.
A number of nations have readily paid ransoms in order to obtain the release
of their nationals and ships held by Somali pirates. Some states, including Den-
mark, have themselves released captured pirates unpunished due to legal and
diplomatic confusion or difficulty in detaining and prosecuting the perpetrators
in criminal court. The Nairobi study suggests that these practices have encour-
aged piracy. Although the wider international community has universally con-
demned piracy off the coast of Somalia, the Nairobi report indicates, the same
nations have been tolerant of piracy by either sanctioning the crime or facilitat-
ing payment of ransoms. Some nations have deployed warships to the area ap-
parently without giving them authority to take robust action to arrest or detain
pirates or to use force to disrupt attacks. The workshop experts were asked to
characterize whether they agreed with the Nairobi report’s description of the re-
sponse by the international community. Most of the experts—thirty of
thirty-four—either agreed or strongly agreed with the report’s characterization
that the international community has either sanctioned or tolerated maritime
piracy off the coast of Somalia. Only four experts either disagreed or strongly
disagreed with the report in this regard.
The workshop received a detailed brief on the political, social, and economic
motivations of Somali pirates. Pirates are exploiting the vacuum created by an-
archy in Somalia. The lack of rule of law inside the nation spills offshore. Somali
pirates are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain. Moreover, the crime of
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maritime piracy has some amount of acceptance in a society whose values have
been distorted by conflict and violence. Piracy in the offshore areas of Somalia is
perpetrated by organized criminal gangs that benefit from political protection,
so solutions will have to account for the wider political context inside the coun-
try. The rational risk/reward calculus of the pirate gangs has to be changed by
making piracy less rewarding and at the same time more risky. So far there has
been a high tolerance for piracy because costs are diffuse throughout the inter-
national system, with no single nation bearing the burden. Consequently, orga-
nizing a response to thwart piracy represents a classic collective-action problem.
The need to shift the outcome of this equation is obvious, but the means to do so
are debatable. This conclusion gives rise to the division of responsibility among
regional states, distant states, and the private sector.
The experts carefully considered a series of questions posed to them over the
course of the two-day workshop. Many of the queries were designed to capture
the sense of the group by placing a proposition on the table and then asking the
experts to respond. Generally, participants categorized their replies into quin-
tiles—strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree.
The experts provided individual assessments of the likely impact of Somali
piracy on international trade from Europe to Asia through the Suez Canal and
the Gulf of Aden over the next five years. Twenty of thirty-four experts agreed
that the impact of Somali piracy is likely to be severe on Europe-to-Asia mari-
time trade through the Suez Canal, the strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of
Aden over the next five years. Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly disagreed,
and one expert was neutral on this question. In sum, there was a lack of consen-
sus on the severity of the impact of Somali piracy along the critical trade route
connecting Europe and Asia.
The workshop also considered the anticipated impact of Somali piracy on
global shipping over the next five years. The participants’ views were even
more circumspect than on the previous question. A greater number of ex-
perts—sixteen—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition
that the likely impact of Somali piracy on global shipping will be “severe.”
Seven participants registered a “neutral” response, and no expert was in strong
agreement with the statement that the impact of piracy will be severe.
Similarly, the workshop experts were not in agreement on the number of pi-
racy attacks expected to occur in the region in 2012. In 2008, more than a hun-
dred vessels were attacked, and more than forty were hijacked off the Horn of
Africa. When asked, “By 2012, how many vessels do you expect to be success-
fully hijacked in the region?” the experts gave estimates ranging from a low of
two or three per year to a high of 450, with most responses in the 50-to-250
range.
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There was, however, quite strong agreement that if Somali piracy is to be suc-
cessfully addressed, the rule of law has to be restored in the Puntland region of
Somalia. Puntland serves as the primary staging area for most piracy emanating
from the country. Thirty-three out of thirty-four experts agreed or strongly
agreed that restoration of the rule of law in Somalia was essential for curbing pi-
racy. Only one expert disagreed with the statement that “in order to curb piracy
in the offshore region, it is necessary for law and order to be restored in Puntland
and the coastal areas of Somalia.”
The next question considered by the experts posed a broader challenge: If it is
necessary to restore law and order in Somalia, how can that goal be achieved?
There is an absence of international consensus on how to engineer the stabiliza-
tion and reconstruction of Somalia; some analysts are so discouraged that they
doubt the country can be stabilized any time soon. The elusive quest for a “So-
malia policy” has persisted since the collapse of the country in 1991; neither the
United States nor other nations have found a coherent approach to revitalizing
the country. The issue of piracy, however, has now attracted public attention to
the plight of Somalia. On 23 April 2009, thirty nations participating in a UN
meeting in Brussels developed a $250 million plan to restore stability in the frac-
tured state. Strengthening regional maritime security in order to reduce piracy
was among the top concerns at the conference. The international community,
the conference attendees felt, has a chance to turn adversity into opportunity
and perhaps bring some measure of law and order to the country. It remains to
be seen whether the donors’ conference that was conducted in Brussels will
make a positive and marked difference.
REGIONAL RESPONSES
During the past five years, a large group of Asian states have cooperated to
counter piracy in the straits of Malacca and Singapore and throughout South-
east Asia. Many observers credit these efforts with reducing the incidence of
piracy throughout the Asia-Pacific, and such cooperation has knit the nations
together in a regional counterpiracy community. Asian counterpiracy cooper-
ation has emerged from three mutually supporting initiatives.
First, under the leadership of Japan in 2004, sixteen nations signed the Re-
gional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP).5
ReCAAP, the first treaty dedicated solely to combating piracy, established an or-
ganization that operates an advanced information fusion and sharing center in
Singapore. The Information Sharing Centre helps individual nations take action
to avoid piracy attacks and respond more effectively when they occur. Second,
beginning in 2005, more than twenty-five states that regularly use the straits of
Malacca and Singapore—including the large trading nations of China, Japan,
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the United States, and Korea—began meeting with the littoral states of Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore to develop a combined framework for improving
maritime safety in the straits.6 The meetings were sponsored by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN specialized agency for maritime
matters and shipping regulation, located in London. After several years, the user
nations and littoral states signed the Cooperative Mechanism, an agreement that
enables user states to help littoral nations develop maritime-security capacity
for better management of the straits.7 Third, the three littoral states along the
straits of Malacca and Singapore also began coordinating surface and air patrols
in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand has joined the effort.
The workshop experts considered whether these three East Asian initiatives
could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of do-
ing so were potentially significant, the responses indicated that the experts
were quite divided on the feasibility of transplanting the “Asian model” of
counterpiracy cooperation and international institutions to the Horn of Af-
rica. Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly disagreed that the Asian initiatives
were a suitable model for East Africa. On the other hand, twelve experts either
agreed or strongly agreed that such institutions could be transplanted from
Southeast Asia to the Horn of Africa. Seven experts were neutral on this issue.
Relatedly, the experts were nearly unanimous in rejecting the notion that no
key differences exist between piracy off the coast of Somalia and in Southeast
Asia. Seventeen experts strongly disagreed, and thirteen disagreed, with the
proposition that no key differences existed between piracy in Africa and piracy
in Asia. Only one expert agreed (and one expert strongly agreed) with the
statement. Somalia is a failed state, embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal con-
flict, and endemic corruption and woefully lacking effective governance, pre-
dictability, and rule of law. Its social fabric and governance are in disrepair. Its
neighboring nations of East Africa are more functional, but even they face
startling defects in governance, security, and bureaucratic capacity. The region
is not economically dynamic, like East Asia. Consequently, the area suffers
from a low tax base, low penetration of technology, and difficulty in integrat-
ing populations of various backgrounds.
Similarly, nearly all of the discussants disagreed or strongly disagreed with the
idea that no modifications would be required if the Asian model of fighting piracy
could be transplanted to Africa. Clearly, if East Asian approaches and institutions
are to be adopted in East Africa, they will have to be tailored to local conditions.
Only one expert suggested that no modification would be needed for transplant-
ing the Asian model to the Horn of Africa. Eighteen experts strongly disagreed
and thirteen experts disagreed with the statement that no modifications to the
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Asian model of counterpiracy cooperation would be necessary in order to trans-
plant it to the coast of Somalia.
DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES
Given that it is unlikely that quick progress can be made in changing the funda-
mental conditions that abet piracy, the immediate focus must be on containing
it and taking cost-effective measures to reduce or manage the risk. The interna-
tional community already has achieved significant diplomatic success in coun-
tering piracy.
Recent efforts include, as previously mentioned, release of a UN study (the
Nairobi report); formation of the UN Contact Group; negotiation of the Dji-
bouti Code of Conduct; bilateral agreements between the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the European Union, respectively, with Kenya; and Secu-
rity Council Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851, under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter (authorizing states to take “all necessary measures”). With a view
toward building on this progress, the experts were asked to consider how much
responsibility various global actors had for addressing the problem of piracy off
the coast of Somalia. Among the categories of actors were regional states, the
shipping industry, flag states, and nations with the most registered vessels at risk
of piracy attack. Interestingly, the workshop experts assigned fairly similar levels
of responsibility to regional states, the shipping industry, and flag states.
The workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various in-
ternational institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa.
The experts each assigned values to the relative importance of particular inter-
national institutions in addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia. The UN Security Council topped the list of the most important global
institutions for countering maritime piracy, followed by the IMO and the Euro-
pean Union.
Furthermore, the workshop considered the question of whether the diplo-
matic efforts now under way were well integrated with the naval efforts to sup-
press piracy. The responses to this question indicated a lack of widespread
agreement among the experts on the point. Twelve experts agreed or strongly
agreed that the efforts were well integrated, eleven experts were neutral on this
point, and ten experts either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposi-
tion. In addition to responding to these questions, the experts provided rec-
ommendations on other diplomatic initiatives that might offer promise. It was
noted that the Djibouti Code of Conduct was a nonbinding instrument and
some experts suggested that the Arab and African states that negotiated it
should make it a binding treaty. Furthermore, participants felt states from out-
side the area should be encouraged to provide assistance in the form of
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training, communications, small boats, and infrastructure to improve the
maritime-security capacity of the nations of the Horn of Africa. Just as Japan
provided leadership in construction of a regional counterpiracy center in Sin-
gapore, one or more nations should assist the regional states in the construc-
tion and operation of a regional maritime-security coordination center. In this
regard, Egypt and Saudi Arabia possess the means and the interest necessary to
develop greater maritime security in the region.
The UN Security Council, the experts suggested, should consider authorizing
naval forces operating in the area to seize the accoutrements of piracy, such as
high-horsepower outboard motors mounted on the sterns of Somali skiffs. The
Security Council could declare a specifically tailored maritime exclusion zone
adjacent to the Somalia coastline, forbidding the use of large outboard motors
within it. Fishermen and other civil boatmen have little need for high-powered
outboard motors, which enable the small and fast pirate skiffs to overtake large
merchant vessels. By banning the use of such powerful engines, the international
community can reduce the availability of the means of pirate attack. Such en-
gines should be subject to seizure and destruction on sight by the international
naval forces operating in the area.
Further, the Contact Group should adopt a means of decoupling the Somali
piracy gangs from the tribal and social structure of the country through targeted
aid and increased support to alternative centers of authority inside the country.
The donors’ conference is a first step toward realizing this approach. Further-
more, the international community, possibly working through INTERPOL,
should implement a counterpiracy “rewards for justice” program to identify and
apprehend the leading offenders.
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa, off of which are over two million
square miles of water at risk of piracy, a factor that complicates naval strategy.
The experts were divided as to whether the world’s naval forces are effective in
addressing piracy off the Horn of Africa. Not one expert strongly agreed that na-
val forces are effective and sixteen experts either disagreed or strongly disagreed.
Four experts were neutral on the proposition, and ten experts agreed, that naval
forces were effectively responding to piracy.
Moreover, the deployment of large numbers of warships from distant states
into the area is probably not sustainable. Many of the nations that have sent war-
ships are unaccustomed to operating them far from home waters and without
logistical support in unfamiliar regions. Furthermore, it is not clear that such a
large area can realistically be patrolled at all, even by a large multinational force.
It would take more than sixty warships to provide an effective presence over the
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length of a single, narrow transit corridor. Until other, more effective ap-
proaches are developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no imme-
diate substitute for operational patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, a
majority of workshop experts—eighteen out of twenty-two—either agreed or
strongly agreed that out-of-area naval forces should be doing even more than at
present to counter piracy.
The workshop experts offered additional operational options that might be
implemented:
• Deception: warships disguised as civil merchant shipping (like the World
War II Q-ships).
• Land strike: armed assault upon safe havens and logistics activities on the
shore. (However, it was argued that land strikes against identified pirate
staging areas would be difficult to conduct and likely ignite anti-Western
reaction and inflame Muslim sensitivities, making the cure worse than the
disease.)
• Blockade: monitoring the entrance and egress of shipping into and out of
Somalia in order to cut pirates off from their bases on land.
• Embargo: preventing the introduction, by land, sea, or air, of weapons,
communications devices, and other equipment destined for use by pirate
gangs.
• Tailored exclusion zone: prohibition (as noted above) of the use of certain
items or devices, such as high-horsepower outboard motors, in designated
areas, such as Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.
• Unmanned systems: greater use of unmanned systems for detection and
monitoring of piracy activity. (It was felt that such technology might re-
duce warship requirements and serve as a force multiplier for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.)
It was argued that smaller warships, such as offshore patrol vessels and cor-
vettes, should be employed for combating piracy over the long term. Fast patrol
boats are more efficient platforms than large warships for the task, and regional
capabilities can be more easily aligned with small boat security operations. Until
such time as regional maritime-security capacity can complement or eventually
replace the foreign presence, nations could operate offshore patrol vessels from
within the region. If safe port facilities are unavailable, such boats could be sea
based, with logistics vessels. The limitations of smaller vessels, which include
lower endurance and lack of organic aviation, can be offset by operating them in
greater numbers from multiple ports and using land-based maritime patrol
aircraft.
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Further, the experts felt, there is in the near term a need to identify a single
contact point—such as United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, in
Dubai—for vessels facing immediate threats. Over the long term, creation of a
regional maritime-security coordination center to fuse intelligence and share
information is essential to shifting responsibility toward regional states. This
need presents an opportunity for regional states dependent on the safety of
freedom of navigation in the Horn of Africa—specifically Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and the Gulf states—to provide funding and training to that end. In one step in
the right direction, at a maritime-security conference in Riyadh during the last
week of June, delegates from eleven states of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea
reached an agreement on creation of an Arab naval task force to address the
threat of piracy to oil and gas tankers that transit the Red Sea and Suez Canal to
and from the Mediterranean. Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen are expected
to provide forces for the task force.
Finally, the workshop found, the development of an organic area coastal
force, a Somali coast guard, is a necessary, if long-term, goal. The U.S. Africa
Command and Central Command should consider creative approaches for in-
ternational coalition commitments to training and equipping such a force. One
opportunity for security assistance and capacity building is the nascent Somali
coast guard. After two decades without a maritime force, the nation is develop-
ing a coast guard by training five hundred Somali sailors on the grounds of the
old port in Mogadishu.8
ADDITIONAL FOCUS AREAS
Programs within Somalia
Regional and maritime action is required to contend with the challenge so long as
pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. The last time the international com-
munity took military action to change the situation in Somalia, it did not go well.
As for the future of governance in that nation, it was unclear to the participants
whether a stronger central government, on one hand, or stronger clan system, on
the other, would yield greater stability and governance. The dichotomy replicates
all of the promise—and difficulty—experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. None-
theless, providing greater development assistance to Somali clan elders who may
have some influence in reducing piracy was suggested. Relatedly, the potential for
disrupting the piracy financing and ransom system through coordinated banking
security was argued. (A month after the workshop, INTERPOL announced a plan
to track piracy financing.)
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Industry and Shipping Security
The international civil shipping industry, participants argued, will have to take
additional steps to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the areas of greatest
risk. Merchant ships should continue to broaden their defensive responses, to
include such passive measures as barbed wire strung on the lifelines and, poten-
tially, assignment of security personnel (either organic or under contract) on
board certain ships, such as slow vessels (dredgers and barges) or those carrying
sensitive cargoes. At the third meeting of the Contact Group, in New York City
on 29 May, Bahamas, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama, signed the New
York Declaration, committing to bringing their large merchant fleets into com-
pliance with the self-protection measures contained in the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code. Combined, these four states account for half the
world’s international shipping gross tonnage. A majority of experts—a total of
twenty—either agreed or strongly agreed that the counterpiracy approaches
taken by the merchant shipping industry were well aligned to the threat.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
In considering the American interagency process, the experts had mixed views
on whether the disparate departments and agencies were working together ef-
fectively to address Somali piracy, with most experts characterizing the level of
success as neutral or as successful but not “strongly” so. Finally, the majority of
experts believed that the interagency community was working well to combat
piracy. The experts, which included the lead representatives for antipiracy oper-
ations and diplomacy from within the agencies and departments of the U.S. gov-
ernment responsible for American policy, considered this statement: “Within
the U.S. government, the interagency community is working together success-
fully to counter piracy.” Ten agreed with the statement. Six experts disagreed or
strongly disagreed with it, but eight experts were neutral on the issue, so there
was little consensus on the point.
In a follow-up question, sixteen of the experts held the view that the U.S. ex-
ecutive branch interagency community was working well together whatever the
success such work produced. Five experts were neutral on this point, and three
disagreed.
However, the experts rejected the idea that no impediments have to be over-
come to facilitate interagency cooperation. When asked to evaluate the state-
ment “There are no impediments to U.S. government efforts to achieve
interagency cooperation,” nineteen experts either disagreed or strongly dis-
agreed. Four experts were neutral on this proposition, one agreed, and one
strongly agreed. The sense, then, is that effective interagency coordination
against maritime piracy within the government faces an uphill struggle. This is
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somewhat surprising, and discouraging, because American maritime-security
policy is coordinated through the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Com-
mittee (MSIPC), under policy set forth in National Security Presidential Deci-
sion Directive 41 of December 2004. The departments of Defense, State,
Homeland Security, and Transportation, as well as the intelligence community
and other agencies, participate in regular meetings of that committee. The com-
mittee led development of the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, an-
nex B to that document, the 2007 Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy, and the
December 2008 Action Plan to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.
The depth of the discussion and the variety and originality of the discourse, con-
ducted in a nonattribution environment, were productive. The seizure of the
Maersk Alabama, in particular, has elicited from numerous commentators such
prescriptions as “it’s time to get tough,” or “we have to change the risk/reward
calculus” of the pirates. Ultimately, everyone agrees that the best solution is for a
restoration of law and order within the country of Somalia, but neither the in-
ternational community nor the United States has been able to produce such an
outcome. Hard realities lie behind those platitudes, and they require that spe-
cific courses of action be patiently thought through, on the basis of an accurate
picture of the causes and motivators of Somali piracy. Furthermore, the work-
shop demonstrated, there is no single solution to the problem of Somali piracy.
At least the rampant piracy off the coast of Somalia from the seizure of the
Sirius Star to the attack on the Maersk Alabama in April 2009 has focused world
attention on an often ignored corner of the globe. In May 2009 the Netherlands
and Russia suggested creation of an international piracy court. But perhaps a
more promising alternative would be to build the rule of law and capacity for
governance and maintenance of security in the states throughout the region.
Roughly five hundred men have recently joined the emergent Somali coast
guard, but without fast patrol boats, radar, or communications equipment, the
force is overmatched by the pirates.9 All, Somalia in particular, would benefit
from increased security assistance. Just as important, capacity building would
generate long-lasting benefits in economic and security partnerships and facili-
tate closer security integration with neighboring states, friends, and allies.
Operationally, the threat of piracy has presented the first test of the concept of
a spontaneous “global maritime partnership” and of the U.S. sea services’ Coop-
erative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.10 By any measure, the concepts are be-
ing validated, and the test is being passed. The follow-through, the movement
from coordination among the larger out-of-area naval forces toward regional ef-
forts and local capacity building, will require commitment, generous resources,
and political resolution in East Africa and throughout the globe.
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NOTE S
An earlier version of this text has been circu-
lated in pamphlet form as Commander James
Kraska, JAGC, USN, The Report on the U.S.
Naval War College Workshop on Somali Pi-
racy: Fresh Thinking for an Old Threat (New-
port, R.I.: Naval War College, 28 April 2009).
1. The workshop was sponsored with generous
support from the Naval War College Founda-
tion, SAIC Corporation, and Booz Allen
Hamilton. Professor Dennis Mandsager,
chairman of the International Law Depart-
ment, provided strategic guidance for the
project, and Commander Sandra Selman,
USCG, was a principal organizer of the event.
2. This point was underscored on the second
day of the workshop, when a number of at-
tendees joined a U.S. government interagency
phone conference to plan a course of action
for dealing with the overnight hijacking and
ensuing hostage standoff involving the M/V
Maersk Alabama.
3. Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah,
comp., Piracy Off the Somali Coast: Final Re-
port: Assessment and Recommendations (re-
port of Workshop Commissioned by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-
General of the UN to Somalia, Nairobi,
Kenya, 10–21 November 2008).
4. Richard Meade, “Pirate Threatens Increased
Violence,” Lloyd’s List, 8 July 2009, pp. 1–2.
5. The sixteen countries were the People’s Re-
public of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the
Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic
of China, the Republic of India, the Republic
of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Repub-
lic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singa-
pore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the So-
cialist Republic of Viet Nam.
6. Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO
Doc. KUL 1/4, 20 September 2006 (report of
Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety,
Security, and Environmental Protection,
18–20 September 2006), available at
www.imo.org/.
7. The Singapore meeting also recognized the
contributions of the straits states in the devel-
opment of Malacca Strait security initiatives.
8. Alisha Ryu, “Analysts Skeptical New Somali
Navy Can Fight Piracy,” Voice of America
News, 18 June 2009, available at www
.voanews.com/english/.
9. Jamal Osman and Lauren Gelfand, “Somalia
Trains Navy Recruits in Anti-piracy Strug-
gle,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 June 2009, p.
25.
10. See James Kraska and Brian Wilson, “The
Co-operative Strategy and the Pirates of the
Gulf of Aden,” RUSI Journal 74, no. 81 (April
2009), and James Kraska and Brian Wilson,
“The Global Maritime Partnership and So-
mali Piracy,” Defense & Security Analysis 25,
no. 3 (September 2009). The strategy was re-
printed in the Naval War College Review
Winter 2008 issue, available at www.usnwc
.edu/press/.
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REVIEW ESSAYS
MORE THAN THREE LAWS OF ROBOTICS
John Edward Jackson
Singer, P. W. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Con-
flict in the 21st Century. New York: Penguin, 2009. 499 pp.
$29.95
“May you live in interesting times” is frequently used as shorthand for enduring
periods of tumultuous change. Few would dispute that global events during the
opening decade of the twenty-first century have indeed been “interesting.” In his
carefully researched and cleverly written book Wired for War: The Robotics Rev-
olution and Conflict in the 21st Century, Brookings Institute senior fellow P. W.
Singer postulates that technological advances in artificial intelligence and ro-
botics engineering (which together create the robotics revolution) are des-
tined to guarantee that conflict in the twenty-first century will indeed be
“interesting”! He effectively argues that the voracious appetite of tech-savvy
consumers and the outrage of casualty-averse citi-
zens (and, to a degree, military leaders) will combine
to generate an explosion of highly capable robotic
systems in the home, office, and battlefield. Society’s
tolerance for casualties in war has evolved from the
public’s general acceptance of over five hundred
thousand casualties in just five days at the first battle
of the Marne at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury to the attitude widely held in the Western world
that in the twenty-first century few, if any, young
warriors should be required to perish in defense of
the republic. The potential for machines to fight to
Professor Jackson is the manager for the Naval War
College’s Navy Professional Reading Program and a
member of its National Security Decision Making fac-
ulty. Prior to his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1996,
Captain Jackson was a supply and logistics specialist,
serving in his last active-duty assignment as the Naval
War College’s Frederick J. Horne Military Chair of Lo-
gistics. He holds advanced degrees from Providence Col-
lege and Salve Regina University and is a graduate of
the Management Development Program at Harvard
University. Professor Jackson is the curriculum devel-
oper and moderator of the course “Case Studies in
Technology and Warfare: Unmanned Systems.”
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their last circuit board while their human masters remain safe is an intoxicat-
ing, if unrealistic, scenario for future war.
Many observers believe that the combination of supercomputing technology
and cutting-edge robotic engineering will drive changes within the military en-
vironment equal to the impact of the widespread use of gunpowder in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries and of steam propulsion for ships in the
nineteenth century. These changes relate not only to the development and man-
ufacture of highly capable future systems but also to issues regarding their ethi-
cal use and the manner in which command and control will be exercised.
Chapter by chapter, Wired displays the history, current status, and possible fu-
ture of the relationship between man and machine. In a chapter entitled “Smart
Bombs, Norma Jeane, and Defecating Ducks: A Short History of Robotics,”
Singer blends playful prose with extensively annotated research to highlight
three hundred years of robotic development. In answering the self-imposed
question “Why a book on robots and war?” Singer simply states that “robots are
frakin’ cool.”
For those who may not recognize this version of the ubiquitous “F-word,” it is
a censor-friendly expletive that peppered the dialogue of the wildly popular re-
make of the science-fiction classic Battlestar Galactica. Singer’s unbridled decla-
ration is the first, but by no means the last, reference to science fiction in Wired.
In fact, when you search for the term “science fiction” in an electronic copy of
Wired for War on a Kindle e-book reader (which sure seems like a piece of gear
Spock would have used in the original Star Trek series), you get 196 hits. Singer
notes that “science fiction [sci-fi] is more than just popular; it is also incredibly
influential, to an extent that is often surprising.” He goes on to say that “part of
the popularity of science fiction comes from its remarkable skill at foreshadow-
ing the future.” He makes his point that would-be futurists should be avid con-
sumers of science fiction by citing the predictions of such writers as H. G. Wells,
Jules Verne, and Robert Heinlein, whose visions of the future have in many ways
come to pass. Sci-fi fans can be found in the strangest places, and Singer notes
that the Joint Chiefs chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, “proudly describes how
the Navy’s Professional Reading Program, which he helped develop to guide his
sailors, includes the science fiction novels Starship Troopers [1959] and Ender’s
Game [1985].” As a point of interest, Wired for War is now also a recommended
supplemental selection in the Navy’s Reading Program.
To be clear, this book is far more than a paean to science fiction, for Singer
does a remarkable job of cataloging the ways in which the military forces of the
world have adopted robotic technologies. He speaks of the thirteen thousand
ground-based robots, six thousand aerial systems, and hundreds of sea-based
systems in the active inventory of soldiers, sailors, and airmen around the world.
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Singer also describes such sophisticated systems as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, a
thirty-two-thousand-pound unmanned reconnaissance airplane with a
130-foot wingspan and a 5,400-mile operating radius. Putting the Global
Hawk’s operating envelope into more familiar terms, Singer states, “Global
Hawk can (in effect) fly from San Francisco, spend a day hunting terrorists in the
entire state of Maine, and then fly back to the West Coast.” In reality, the RQ-4s
fly from bases in the Middle East while being monitored and controlled by pilots
sitting at command consoles at Beale Air Force Base, in California. The U.S.
Navy is now operating a maritime version of Global Hawk, as part of the Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) program. Though the aircraft are
launched, recovered, and maintained in the Middle East, all are controlled from
Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. In addition to these reconnaissance
tasks, the nightly news is filled with coverage of armed Predator and Reaper un-
manned aircraft systems regularly attacking targets in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other locations, in the service of both the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Singer goes from these large-scale aircraft to the micro, un-
manned air vehicles (some weighing less than a pound) at the opposite end of
the size spectrum, to other tactical systems that are literally tossed into the air by
soldiers in the field.
On the ground, robots have become indispensable partners to the men and
women who risk their lives on a daily basis to locate, disarm, or destroy the pri-
mary weapon of the Iraqi insurgency—the improvised explosive device (IED).
Singer opens chapter 1 with a touching story about the loss of an explosive-
ordnance-disposal technician in Iraq, but he provides a happy ending when he
discloses that it was a robot that took the blast—no letter had to be written
home to grieving parents. He provides vignettes of troops working side by side
with PackBots, SWORDS, throw-bots, TALONS, and even an experimental
system called the Robo-Lobster. His forty-five pages of notes provide countless
resources for readers who seek to learn more about these systems.
The real strength of this work, however, is that it goes well beyond the science
and technology of unmanned robotic systems, delving into the legal and ethical
ramifications of their use. Singer weighs the arguments for and against greater
autonomy for robotic systems and considers the pros and cons of “keeping a
man in the loop” to provide a degree of human judgment in potentially lethal
operational decisions. The problem, however, is that decision loops of less than a
second make this impossible. He quotes a U.S. Army colonel who says that “the
trend towards the future will be robots reacting to robot attack, especially when
operating at technologic speed. . . . As the loop gets shorter and shorter, there
won’t be any time in it for humans.” One wonders, however, who is responsible if
a robot accidently kills the wrong person. The programmer? The operator? The
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vendor who sold the product? Singer does not try to answer these questions but
rather encourages the reader to think about them in the context of future wars.
Singer does not limit his learned discussions to war-bots but touches also on
robots in the home (more than three million Roomba robotic vacuums have
been sold), in research (NASA flies several Global Hawks), and in everyday life
(ATMs, security robots, and automated systems in our cars). These topics inevi-
tably lead to a discussion of artificial intelligence and the question of how smart
should we allow these machines to become, at what point they might become a
threat to their creators. A half-century ago, the noted author Isaac Asimov pos-
tulated his famous “Three Laws of Robotics,” which sought to ensure the safety
and superiority of the human race. In reality, securing our future may require far
more than three simple laws.
This book is a must-read for futurists, fans of technology, and students of war.
It is, in fact, the required text for a new course at the Naval War College entitled
“Case Studies in Technology and Warfare: Unmanned Systems,” which was first
offered in the 2009–2010 semester.
Singer closes with some sobering food for thought: “And now we are creating
something exciting and new, a technology that might just transform humans’
role in their world, perhaps even create a new species. But this revolution is
mainly driven by our inability to move beyond the conflicts that have shaped hu-
man history from the very start. Sadly, our machines may not be the only thing
wired for war.”
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IVORY TOWER MEETS JAMES BOND
David C. Foley
George, Roger, and James Bruce, eds. Analyzing Intelligence:
Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown Univ. Press, 2008. 230pp. $29.95
As I look at the intelligence community, it should not “support”
or “oppose” an administration. It should be professional, factual
and give the best possible analysis, regardless of where the chips
may fall.
SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Senator Feinstein’s comment, found on a November 2004 memo written by
then–CIA director Porter Goss regarding potential politicization of intelligence
analysis, could serve as the preamble to this book. The editors, Roger George and
James Bruce, themselves respected career intelligence analysts, have assembled a
compendium of essays by leading lights of the U.S. intelligence community, es-
says that examine the history, efficacy, pitfalls, and achievements of U.S. intelli-
gence analysis roughly from World War II to the present. They also make a
number of recommendations for improving analysis, thereby reducing the like-
lihood of “intelligence failures” that have so frequently been in the media spot-
light over the past several years.
Curiously enough, in their introduction George and Bruce cast this book as
one of a precious few that examine intelligence as a profession, and indeed they
pose the direct question: “Is there a professional discipline known as intelligence
analysis?” As a career intelligence officer myself, my initial reaction to this ques-
tion was that it is unworthy of serious discussion, as intelligence craft in the
United States has been institutionalized (most nota-
bly) within the CIA since 1944, or as far back as the
creation of a distinct Office of Naval Intelligence in
1882. Yet upon further reflection, I can attest that this
is a fair question, and this book takes a crack at an-
swering it.
Over the course of my career, I have frequently en-
countered the debate of science versus art regarding
the field of intelligence. Few doubt the science behind
the technologies committed to intelligence collection
Captain Foley is a career naval intelligence officer, cur-
rently assigned as the Officer in Charge of the Office of
Naval Intelligence Detachment at the Naval War Col-
lege. He graduated from Miami University (Ohio) with
a degree in political science. His operational experience
includes tours in tactical aviation and on afloat staffs.
He has served on the Joint and Navy staffs and has con-
ducted overseas tours in Korea, Japan, and Russia. He is
an honors graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, and of the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C.
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and to exploitation of the data. From satellites to cross-referenced computer da-
tabases to unmanned vehicles, the U.S. intelligence community has been at the
cutting edge of technology and has pushed the limits of the ability of science to
collect and turn myriads of data points into value-added knowledge for decision
makers. Yet it is on the analytic side, which is what George and Bruce largely ad-
dress, that art enters. Even the most accurate raw data must ultimately be synthe-
sized and interpreted by human minds, and thus varying conclusions, let alone
predictions, are inevitably drawn. Even with today’s advanced computing
power, life factors of the analyst and the analyzed are many and unpredictable,
and they do not lend themselves well to straight-line logic or laboratory replica-
tion. So a consideration of the degree of professionalization of intelligence anal-
ysis is welcome.
While the editors declare that the major thrust of this work centers on intelli-
gence analysis as a professional discipline, only a single chapter actually ad-
dresses it. The book examines the fields of law, medicine, and library science as
exemplars of a defined “profession.” In short order, chapter 3 concludes that “to
the extent that intelligence analysis has remained idiosyncratic and lacks over-
sight mechanisms by which all its practitioners systematically acquire, share,
and produce knowledge, it is not yet recognizable as a full-fledged discipline.”
This, of course, is debatable. There are many factors that argue otherwise, not
the least of which is the large number of individuals who have dedicated the
better parts of their lives to producing intelligence. Others include a common
lexicon that exists across the intelligence community and a similarity of ap-
proach toward assessment making among most intelligence organizations. Yet
this provocative conclusion gets the reader’s attention, and it serves George and
Bruce well as a point of departure for the rest of the volume. Organized into six
sections of three chapters each plus a conclusion, Analyzing Intelligence ends up
being much more than an excursion into the issue of intelligence analysis as a
professional discipline. In fact, it covers a broad array of intelligence issues, in-
cluding a short history of U.S. intelligence, the matter of professionalization of
the discipline, and a number of lessons learned, methodologies, and manage-
ment approaches that can serve to improve the quality of intelligence analysis.
Taken as a whole, George and Bruce have succeeded in providing a book that is
more primer than an effort to answer the question of professionalization of the
discipline. (Indeed, it has recently come to my attention that the volume is re-
quired reading for new analysts at the Office of Naval Intelligence.)
The first two chapters briefly outline the history of U.S. intelligence for the
uninitiated, and those from chapter 4 on effectively review the bidding of some
of the key pitfalls of intelligence analysis, as well a number of recommendations
toward improving the objectivity, quality, and predictive nature of the analysis
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produced by the intelligence community as a whole. From the perspective of a
career intelligence officer, I found most intriguing the chapters “Policy-Analyst
Relationship” and “Enduring Challenges.” These pieces are written from the
benefit of hindsight by some of the most senior and experienced intelligence of-
ficers and analysts in the community. To name a couple, there are John
McLaughlin, former deputy director for intelligence at CIA, and James
Steinberg, former deputy national security adviser to the Clinton administra-
tion. They lay out several keen insights, such as the inherent dichotomies be-
tween the analytic and policy-making communities. For example, McLaughlin
makes the point that the policy world is by necessity a culture of optimism,
where obstacles, including contrary intelligence assessments, are meant to be
overcome. Intelligence analysts, on the other hand, are focused on threats and
dangers, leading to a darker culture, more marked by skepticism. Steinberg
points out that this natural friction between policy makers and intelligence ana-
lysts is exacerbated by unrealistic expectations and lack of appreciation. Policy
makers and other intelligence consumers crave clarity and certainty, whether in
execution of political initiatives or military operations, and often do not under-
stand the limitations of intelligence. Analysts, for their part, often do not appre-
ciate the many factors, of which intelligence is but one, that weigh upon policy
makers.
McLaughlin and Steinberg offer several strategies to overcome these frictions,
such as embedding intelligence analysts into policy-making circles, informing
leaders of intelligence limitations, and producing and presenting intelligence as-
sessments as tools that help policy makers think through the problems, rather
than as data dumps. McLaughlin makes a particularly salient point where he as-
serts that surprise (the thing most irksome to leaders) “is almost never the result
of an easy-to-predict shift. It almost always creeps up on you.” Clearly, one of the
greatest services analysts can perform is keeping leaders a step or two ahead of
major changes.
Several contributing authors use the failure of the intelligence community
to warn of the events of 9/11 and the inaccurate assessments of Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) prior to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion as central les-
sons for improved analysis in the future. One chapter focuses on the impera-
tive for the analyst to avoid politicization yet remain relevant to the issue at
hand. Another chapter reviews the analytical dangers of foreign denial and de-
ception, which was clearly evident and effective in the case of the nonexistent
Iraqi WMD programs and stocks. A point is made that though denial and de-
ception is more about the limitations of intelligence collection than analysis,
the savvy analyst must remain cognizant of these limitations throughout the
analytical process—easier said than done. Surprisingly (in that I am a career
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intelligence professional), by the end of the book I was better informed regard-
ing what went wrong with intelligence support surrounding 9/11 and the Iraq
War, a benefit of taking the time to read this book.
I would be remiss not to comment on chapter 9, which concerns challenges to
U.S. military analysis. David Thomas, a senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence
Agency, points to several “perennial” problems, such as the ponderous, bureau-
cratic behavior of military organizations, which in his view impedes creativity
and dissemination. He also points to “new” problems, such as the increased
speed of modern military operations, the diminished analytical capabilities of
defense intelligence agencies due to numerous reorganizations, excessive focus
on current intelligence, and (perhaps as a result) the attrition of experienced an-
alysts, both in uniform and out. I can attest to some of these points, especially
the one about the detrimental impact of reorganizations. I experienced this dur-
ing tours with the Joint Staff, Navy Staff, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Some of these initiatives had positive outcomes, but they were clearly taxing to
the organizations, especially to the long-term civilian workforce.
Wrapping up their book, George and Bruce are cautiously optimistic that the
intelligence lessons of the past several years, combined with a better apprecia-
tion of collection limitations and some new approaches to analysis (e.g.,
computer-aided analysis of competing hypotheses and others), will lead to more
objective and reliable intelligence assessments. Yet they also admit that “fixing
analysis seems a perennial and elusive goal,” even given the several reasonable
fixes proposed in this book. One of these recommendations involves greater ed-
ucational opportunities for analysts, to include job rotation for analysts into
American academia, and likewise for academics to take up temporary residence
within intelligence community organizations. This should resonate with, at a
minimum, the military service colleges and the National Defense University,
convenient places for the integration of academia and intelligence analysis. Call
it Ivory Tower meets James Bond. Call it what you will, but it is an idea whose
time has come, and Analyzing Intelligence, although not fully convincing about
the lack of a “professional” discipline of intelligence analysis, is worth the read
for those concerned with effectively “connecting the dots” ahead of the next cri-
sis on the horizon.
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BOOK REVIEWS
WHAT MAKES A LEADER?
Sheehan, J. Kevin. A Leader Becomes a Leader: Inspirational Stories of Leadership for a New Generation.
Belmont, Mass.: TrueGifts, 2008. 230pp. $27.95
At first glance, this book seems to be
something much like a book of virtues.
It is a series of brief biographical
sketches that might be mistaken as a re-
turn to a simpler and more forgiving
literary genre—one where leaders are
joyfully portrayed in the most positive
light and any trait or act that could be
considered detrimental is ignored.
Sheehan seems truly to admire his sub-
jects, and his lyrical facility with verbal
imagery is so rich that the narrative at
times approaches poetry. The book is
copiously illustrated and loaded with
biographical observations and quotes.
Taken in its entirety, it is hard to imag-
ine how A Leader could get farther from
the in-depth, “warts and all” treatment
that modern biographers have come to
embrace.
Yet this is not, appearances perhaps to
the contrary, a simple book. It provides
real value to a spectrum of disparate au-
diences on very different levels. Readers
who do put down the volume after a
quick glance-over should not be sur-
prised to find themselves returning later
to its pages. This is a work that tends to
raise questions after the book is back on
the shelf.
Its list of “leaders” is long and covers a
broad range of professions and pur-
suits. Some readers will have trouble ac-
cepting all the showcased people as true
“leaders.” There are scientists, presi-
dents, philanthropists, artists, athletes,
political activists, and religious figures.
There are relatively few business ty-
coons and soldiers. While war leaders
are not completely absent, as attested by
the inclusion of Churchill and Lincoln,
the book boasts only one military
leader, General George Marshall. (Mar-
shall’s virtue is “command presence.”)
Whether or not each of the individuals
identified in the book is a leader may be
debated, but there is no doubt that they
are all exceptional.
This book raises several intriguing
questions, some of which it attempts to
answer; others silently accompany the
material. What makes a “leader,” and
just who is a leader? Is the ability to in-
spire the same as the ability to lead?
Does emulation equate to followership?
Should possession of additional, less
positive attributes detract from a
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person’s positive reputation as a leader?
Is it possible to pick out a single stron-
gest virtue in a leader? How can oppos-
ing leadership characteristics both be
virtues? Were Grandma Moses, Bob
Marley, and Nadia Comaneci truly
leaders, or did they simply inspire? Was
Churchill’s “instinct” truly his most
dominant leadership virtue? As for feet
of clay, some of the leaders identified in
this book may have inspired millions
but also cheated on their wives. Anwar
Sadat was a peacemaker, but he became
one only after he had ordered his army
to wage an offensive war against Israel.
Sheehan identifies the opposite traits of
“flexibility” and “determination” as
leadership virtues, begging the question
of when each is a virtue.
The fact that this volume may lead the
reader to ask these questions is in itself
a virtue. A discussion about whether
there are better choices than some of
the men and women in the book is
bound to be interesting and could well
become passionate––another good
thing. If Marie Curie is included, why
isn’t Stephen Hawking? If George Mar-
shall could make the cut, why didn’t
John Archer Lejeune?
At another, younger level of readership,
A Leader serves as a marvelous gateway
book. Many that have been named will
be unknown to the current rising gener-
ation of readers. We can only hope that
Sheehan will inspire these young schol-
ars to learn more about these remark-
able people, making this a book it
would be good to see on the shelves of
junior and senior high schools across
the United States.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Murphy, Martin N. Small Boats, Weak States,
Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in
the Modern World. New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2009. 411pp. $60
In the past year the public’s fascination
with piracy has grown as piracy has
manifested itself as a more tangible
threat to commerce and individuals
with the incidents off the Horn of Af-
rica. Whether it was the 2009 pirate at-
tack on the containership MV Maersk
Alabama or the terrorist attack on the
USS Cole in 2000, the media found it-
self at a loss to understand the issue in
depth and often turned to similarly
misinformed commentators to feed the
twenty-four-hour news cycle. Fortu-
nately, the timely Small Boats, Weak
States, Dirty Money puts to rest miscon-
ceptions about modern piracy, survey-
ing as it does the real threats posed by
terrorists at sea.
The author asks three questions: What
form does piracy take in the contempo-
rary world? What is maritime terror-
ism? Are the two similar or linked?
Although seemingly simple, these ques-
tions constitute a necessary launching
point for any serious discussion.
Readers will be hard pressed to find a
more methodical and better researched
book on piracy and maritime terrorism.
The bibliography comprises an addi-
tional hundred pages, and one chapter
alone has five hundred footnotes. Mar-
tin Murphy is a senior fellow at the
Center of Strategic and Budgetary As-
sessments, and his extensive academic,
professional, and writing credits on lit-
toral warfare and maritime terrorist
threats more than sufficiently rank him
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among the experts in this small but
growing field.
Murphy takes a bifurcated approach
that proves beneficial to both the au-
thor and the reader. Each half of the
book could easily stand on its own, but
the pairing is important to distinguish
similarities or differences and provides
the means for Murphy to discuss the
reasons behind these activities and the
challenges they engender.
The section on piracy adequately ad-
dresses worldwide incidents and pro-
vides appropriate regional perspectives.
Readers will also benefit from Murphy’s
evenhanded treatment of the various
forms of maritime terrorism, as well as
their potential for unintended conse-
quences. His treatment of the 2002 at-
tack on the French supertanker Limburg
discusses not only the method of attack
used by terrorists but the subsequent
impact upon the Yemeni port involved,
which lost some three thousand jobs
due to reduced commerce from an in-
ternational industry hesitant to place
ships at risk. Murphy’s discussions of
other possible threats, such as divers,
swimmers, submersibles, and small
boats, as well as of the particular case of
ships carrying hazardous cargo (such as
liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied
natural gas) are particularly helpful in
explaining, realistically and dispassion-
ately, the difficulties.
However, this book still offers opportu-
nities for continued debate. Murphy
notes, for example, that piracy in the
Strait of Malacca was reduced from
2004 to 2005 due to increased coopera-
tion between international navies. Else-
where, he suggests that the Free Aceh
Movement was impacted by the tsu-
nami of December 2004. Would not the
tsunami have had a similar effect on
pirates as terrorists, given the devasta-
tion it wreaked?
This book sets the standard for future
serious works on piracy and maritime
terrorism. Murphy’s work is a must for
both journalists and the military, to
gain a proper understanding of these
issues.
CLAUDE BERUBE
U.S. Naval Academy
Vlahos, Michael. Fighting Identity: Sacred War
and World Change. Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2009. 245pp. $49.95
Michael Vlahos is a senior member of
the National Security Analysis Depart-
ment at the Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory. He was re-
cently a visiting faculty member in the
Strategy and Policy Department at the
Naval War College. He has written ex-
tensively on culture and war, includ-
ing various projects on Iraq and
counterinsurgency.
In Fighting Identity (the latest title in
the “Changing Face of War” series from
Praeger Security International, series
editor James Carafano), Vlahos offers
an excellent analysis of how war shapes
the collective identity at the societal
level. Combining a variety of disci-
plines, including anthropology, history,
political science, and philosophy, he
builds his argument on a foundation of
postmodernist theory, expertly merging
social identity, theory, and military his-
tory. Treading where social theorists
disdain to be and military historians
avoid, Vlahos provides essential
scholarship.
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The construct of the book is cogent.
Vlahos outlines his rationale for the
project before he delves into theory and
definitions. He turns to methodology
and research, offering guidelines for fu-
ture scholarship. His content chapters,
“Them,” “Us,” and “Fit,” represent the
substance of the book, encompassing
his analysis on the development of
identity through war. Vlahos’s argu-
ment centers on the idea that the inter-
active nature of warfare creates, and
changes, identity.
In his view, war is a “sacred ritual” that
has been practiced throughout history
and that in turn shapes social identity.
These rituals have semireligious under-
tones and come to represent “human-
ity’s dark liturgy.” Further, war and
interactive conflict shape the identities
of participants, cultivating cohesion,
motivation, and awareness. Vlahos ar-
gues that interaction creates common
narratives and also leads to an acquisi-
tion of legitimacy. Finally, interactive
conflict emerges as a central component
of social identity (both national and
nonstate), which shapes historical hind-
sight as well as future policy decisions.
This book draws on Vlahos’s extensive
knowledge of history. He flows from
the ancient to the contemporary with
ease, drawing on past and present ex-
amples to support his arguments. In the
final chapter, “Where I Come Out,” he
argues that the United States is facing a
crisis of identity in its own sacred nar-
rative, as it transitions from the Cold
War to something new. Finally, he sug-
gests that the social identity of the na-
tion will evolve as it faces the challenges
of the twenty-first century.
Overall, this is an exceptional work of
scholarship on the creation of social
identity, as well as a critique of
American social construct. Vlahos pro-
vides an analysis of inestimable value
based on an impressive grasp of history
and philosophy. Written primarily for
scholars, Fighting Identity is a modern
philosophical treatise on war’s influ-
ence on the development and evolution
of sacred identity. While I recommend
this book for a wide audience, the sub-
tleties of its analysis and the structure of
its argument are complex and elaborate.
This book is easily read but not easily
understood.
S. MIKE PAVELEC
Naval War College
Goodman, Michael S. Spying on the Nuclear Bear:
Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb.
Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 295pp. $50
The Cold War was a real war, marked
by complexity. The nation-states mak-
ing up the international system (the
United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union) that emerged in
the wake of the atomic age were com-
pelled to avoid a general conflict and to
protect civilization from nuclear extinc-
tion. As such, a variety of instruments
were utilized by these great powers.
One of those instruments was the col-
lection and analysis of intelligence and,
in particular, nuclear intelligence.
The fact is, Goodman, a lecturer in the
Department of War Studies at King’s
College London, states, that “intelli-
gence was in some ways the cold war
waged by other means.” A little known
aspect of the Cold War involved the
Anglo-American intelligence communi-
ties’ intense focus on the development
of Soviet nuclear weapons. Goodman’s
main contention is that despite the
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strictures of the American Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946 (the McMahon Act),
which forbade the transfer of American
scientific and technological knowledge
of the atomic weapon to any other
power, Anglo-American nuclear intelli-
gence cooperation nevertheless went
ahead. These two governments used
this intelligence to predict outcomes,
and what proved to be even more suc-
cessful, the detection of Soviet nuclear
weapons testing.
Goodman’s narrative of this effort fo-
cuses on long-distance monitoring, as
well as acoustic, seismographic, and
electromagnetic monitoring of the So-
viets’ nuclear weapons program. This is,
in itself, an excellent insight into the
Cold War nuclear intelligence from
1945 to 1958, an invaluable mirror into
these efforts.
What sets this work apart, however, is
Goodman’s placement of what is essen-
tially one mirror behind another—his
revelation of the strategic implications
of nuclear intelligence-sharing on the
Anglo-American special relationship it-
self, along with the impact of that rela-
tionship on the Soviet Union. To
understand the dynamics involved,
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass is worth recalling, as Alice de-
clares that it is like a huge game of chess
that is being played all over the world.
But what of the Soviet Union, the con-
ventionally understood object of all the
covert intelligence monitoring and de-
tection efforts? Goodman answers this
question in his conclusion. He argues
that while extensive literature exists on
the Soviet threat and the American per-
ception of it, these works often deal
with what he calls an alleged “bomber
gap” and “missile gap.” He states that
“both gaps were figments in the
imagination of the U.S. intelligence
community, based in the main on over-
stating the Soviet potential in order to
procure greater funds for military de-
velopment.” While this is a standard
critique, Goodman applies what he
terms “counterfactual history,” a third
look into the mirror behind the mirror.
Counterfactual history, he argues, “is a
tool that often can be used to great ef-
fect. The Soviet Union, it seems, would
never have seriously contemplated war
with the West. Given the American
atomic arsenal, it is also unlikely that
even if Britain had not developed a nu-
clear deterrent, the Soviet Union would
ever have dared risk war.” Goodman
then measures the capabilities-to-
intentions calculus so familiar to stu-
dents of the Naval War College, as fol-
lows: “In the minds of those who
mattered, Soviet capabilities were inti-
mately linked to Soviet intentions.
Therefore, while the Soviets were with-
out the capability to wage war, their in-
tentions were perceived to be far less
aggressive.”
Goodman has produced a definitive
work, in that it validates the United
Kingdom’s unequivocal commitment to
an independent nuclear deterrent, and
by doing so he has given us a seminal
work, a landmark effort in its devotion
to prodigious research and commit-
ment to truthful inquiry.
MYRON GREENBERG
Defense Contract Management Agency
Aeronautical Systems Division Ohio River Valley
Brannon, Robert. Russian Civil-Military Rela-
tions: Military Strategy and Operational Art. Farn-
ham, Surrey, U.K.: Ashgate, 2009. 352pp. $114.95
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Kremlinologists were noteworthy for
describing decision making in the USSR
as comparable to cats fighting under a
large rug in a dark room—the only
thing the outside world could clearly
and correctly see was the emerging win-
ner of the struggle. Robert Brannon’s
Russian Civil-Military Relations suggests
that while Russia’s transition from au-
tocracy to nascent democracy has of-
fered observers more transparency,
some of the byzantine intrigues remain.
While Brannon summarizes his hypoth-
esis on the evolution of Russian
civil-military relations using political-
science theoretical literature, this book
is all about the three case studies that
Brannon brings to life, using his profes-
sional notes, along with interviews of
the principals and of experts on the
subject. The author was in position to
know many of the study’s protagonists,
serving as the U.S. naval attaché to Rus-
sia from 1998 to 2001. His proximity to
his subjects, however, does not blur his
vision. If anything, his harshest apprais-
als are directed at his closest Russian
counterparts.
Brannon illustrates his understanding
of Russian civil-military relations by ex-
amining the Russian race to Pristina
during the Kosovo conflict (1999), the
second Russian intervention in
Chechnya (1999), and the tragic sinking
of the submarine Kursk (2000). His
writing style enables the casual reader
to follow the exciting plots of the epi-
sodes with relative ease, each building
on the previous story. Some of the juici-
est material is in the footnotes, in which
Brannon recounts personal tales of har-
rowing experiences in exotic Russian
locales.
This is a book about a subject never
widely discussed in the Western press.
During the Bolshevik and communist
eras, the Soviet military was slavishly
controlled and obedient to domineering
and “intrusive” civil authorities, ren-
dering most civil-military discussions
irrelevant. However, the relationship of
Russian political and military leaders
after the fall of the Soviet Union is at
best problematic and at worst threaten-
ing. Samuel Huntington (the famous
American political scientist) held that
for a military establishment to act as a
profession, it must possess expertise, re-
sponsibility, and corporateness.
Brannon argues that the Russian mili-
tary leadership, while often both in-
competent and deceptive, has
consistently held to the belief that Rus-
sia should be suspicious of American
and NATO intentions, whereas the Rus-
sian military itself remains strong and
assertive, possessing the power to influ-
ence international affairs. In other
words, with all its flaws, it is a distinct
professional organization. However, the
author makes a persuasive critique of
Russia’s political leadership in the
1990s. The military adventurism docu-
mented in the three case studies may
have been caused largely by the Boris
Yeltsin administration’s fecklessness
while facing budding national security
struggles. Military men may simply
have been acting as Russian patriots in
the face of a political vacuum.
However, the book comes up short in
two areas. First, because Russia is
unique, it is questionable whether its
experience sheds much light on the de-
velopment of civil-military relations in
other postcommunist societies. Second,
one of the book’s central messages is
that the Russian military is in need of
reform. Yet as the United States has
witnessed over the last decade, terms
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like “reform” and “transformation”
mean different things to different par-
ties. Brannon never makes clear what he
means by his Holy Grail of “reform.”
Brannon sees in Vladimir Putin (and
the Dimitri Medvedev–Putin team) the
political leadership missing in the
1990s. He suggests that the military is
more likely to give its aggressive sup-
port and obedience to decisive nation-
alists who support military reform. This
may be both the good and the bad news
of this provocative study.
TOM FEDYSZYN
Naval War College
Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich at War. New
York: Penguin, 2009. 926pp. $40
This final volume of Richard Evans’s
trilogy on the Third Reich (the earlier
titles being The Coming of the Third
Reich, 2003, and The Third Reich in
Power, 1933–1939, 2005) is a disquiet-
ing masterpiece of scholarship. Al-
though many of the events recounted
here will be familiar to most readers,
Evans accomplishes the seemingly im-
possible by merging both the high poli-
tics (if one can use that term in
describing Hitler’s Germany) with the
best in contemporary social history of
the Third Reich. This sordid story has
never been told so powerfully or from
so many different perspectives. The
voices of the victims, perpetrators, and
bystanders, along with those of the ar-
chitects of the conquest and genocide,
are all heard in chilling detail.
Evans notes that Hitler’s Operation
T-4, his “euthanasia action” program,
directed against disabled, mentally ill,
and incurably sick Germans, laid the
foundation for the more dramatic,
Europe-wide extermination pro-
grams. To relieve the sense of despair
that permeates this book, one
searches for heroes, but they are few
in number. The sporadic camp and
ghetto uprisings were clearly heroic,
as was the resistance by such tiny
groups as the “White Rose” move-
ment. Although the Roman Catholic
bishop Clemens von Galen led the ef-
fort to halt the T-4 program, Evans
notes that the bishop was silent when
it came to the regime’s treatment of
Jews and Gypsies. Hitler learned a
valuable lesson from the T-4 episode:
limit the paper trail and speak in eu-
phemisms when dealing with state-
sponsored extermination programs.
There was, of course, resistance to
Hitler among some members of the
officer corps, men whose sense of
honor led them to recoil from the
atrocities they witnessed in the war in
the East. Another group, composed of
theologians, lawyers, and some social-
ist politicians, known to the Gestapo
as the Kreisauer Kreis (Kreisau Cir-
cle), failed to merge with the military
resisters, thus further diminishing the
already long odds that Hitler could be
deposed.
Unfortunately, more often than not, or-
dinary Germans reveled in Hitler’s early
victories and seemed to endorse, or at
least tolerate, Hitler’s annihilation poli-
cies. The notion that ordinary Germans
were unaware of the atrocities commit-
ted in their name is laughable. For in-
stance, in the fall of 1939 German
officers and enlisted men wrote home
of the incredible “dirt” and “filth” they
encountered among the “subhuman”
Poles; they began to exterminate parts
of the population within days of the
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invasion. The swiftness with which Ger-
many implemented a scorched-earth
policy designed to eliminate all traces of
Polish society is truly breathtaking. Ev-
ans convincingly argues that the “final
solution” was well under way by the
time the notorious Wannsee Confer-
ence convened in January 1942.
Wannsee was merely an attempt to
eliminate bureaucratic infighting and
reinforce the authority of Hitler’s point
man, Reinhard Heydrich, for the
Holocaust.
Evans has written the kind of book to
which all scholars aspire. It is a volume
in which a lifetime of research and writ-
ing comes together in a powerful, and
at times moving, manner. It is a book
that is sure to become a classic.
STEPHEN KNOTT
Naval War College
Adams, John A. If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific
War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy.
Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008. 472pp.
$34.95
It is said of Secretary of War Henry
Stimson that in World War II he “fre-
quently seemed to retire from the realm
of logic into a dim religious world in
which Neptune was God, Mahan his
prophet, and the United States Navy
was the only true Church.” Now we can
judge the validity of that comment,
thanks to John Adams’s If Mahan Ran
the Great Pacific War. Adams grades
both the U.S. force and its opponent,
the Imperial Japanese Navy (another
service professing Mahanian ortho-
doxy), according to their respective ad-
herence to the sacred text. The result is
a lively, interesting exercise in
counterfactual history, one that deals
both with what occurred and what
might have occurred had the high com-
mands of both navies been more true to
what one might call “the revealed
Word.”
Counterfactual history is suspect to
many historians, who feel they have
enough problems figuring out what ac-
tually happened, let alone considering
what could have happened. However,
the Strategy and Policy course at the
Naval War College thinks differently,
seeking a host of alternatives. Adams es-
sentially agrees, possibly because he is a
business executive and not a profes-
sional historian; he has written this ex-
cellent book as an avocation (more
power to him). “War is too important
to be left to the generals,” said Clemen-
ceau in World War I. History is too im-
portant to be left to historians, if they
will not write about counterfactual
contingencies.
My reservations about this book are
slight but do exist. Excuse my sacrilege,
but having taught for twenty years at
the U.S. Army Staff College, I cannot
help thinking that there might be occa-
sions when Mahan’s precepts could be
insufficient. Take his well known in-
junction, “Don’t divide the fleet.”
Admiral William F. Halsey took this to
heart when he was in command of the
Third Fleet at the largest naval battle in
human history—Leyte Gulf, in late Oc-
tober 1944. As all readers of this journal
know, Halsey took his entire force with
him to chase down a decoy rather than
divide it and provide a blocking force of
battleships and escort carriers to pre-
vent a Japanese exit from the San
Bernardino Strait. Since Mahan, pre-
sumably, cannot be wrong, the blame
must fall to Halsey, for not realizing
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that his fleet was so powerful that he
could divide it and still sustain local su-
periority. However, because Mahan
never considered a situation such as
this, one must judge him inadequate as
a guide in the last year of the great
Pacific War.
“No plan survives first major contact
with the enemy,” wrote Helmut von
Moltke the Elder, chief of the German
General Staff in the mid-nineteenth
century. If this be true of plans, which
are far less abstract than theories,
should one expect that Mahan provides
adequate direction through all the con-
tingencies that a warrior might face?
MICHAEL PEARLMAN
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(Retired)
Parkinson, Roger. The Late Victorian Navy: The
Pre-dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First
World War. New York: Boydell, 2008. 323pp.
$145
Roger Parkinson’s study of the Royal
Navy from 1878 to the 1890s provides a
useful overview of a period in British
naval history that is sometimes seen as a
neglected “Dark Age.” He takes issue
with the standard work of the period,
Arthur Marder’s first book, British Na-
val Policy, 1880–1905: The Anatomy of
British Sea-Power (1940). In this pub-
lished version of his University of
Exeter doctoral thesis completed under
Dr. Michael Duffy, Parkinson expands
on the insights of Oscar Parkes, Bryan
Ranft, Donald M. Schurman, Paul M.
Kennedy, N. A. M. Rodger, Jon T.
Sumida, and John Beeler with his own
detailed research work in parliamentary
papers, the Admiralty and Cabinet
Office files at the National Archives,
Kew, and the private papers of Lord
Salisbury, Britain’s prime minister in
1885, 1886–92, 1895–1902, at Hatfield
House.
Parkinson’s central focus is on the
background and the effect of Britain’s
Naval Defence Act of 1889 in the period
that has come to be called––and even
dismissed as––the “pre-Dreadnought”
era. He is reported to be preparing a
follow-up work that will focus on the
era of HMS Dreadnought from 1906 on-
ward. In the volume at hand, Parkinson
argues that most historians of the pe-
riod have accepted too easily Arthur
Marder’s picture of Britain’s relative
naval weakness in comparison with
other European naval powers. In partic-
ular, Parkinson shows that Britain was
not by any means a weak naval power
and that W. T. Stead’s famous articles
in the Pall Mall Gazette of 1884 were
based on a gross exaggeration of the ac-
tual state of affairs. The key consider-
ation, he points out, was maintaining a
naval force that was equal to that of the
next two largest naval powers, France
and Russia. The effort to maintain that
margin of supremacy in terms of naval
expenditures, tonnage, and warship
numbers resulted in the Naval Defense
Act in 1889. Parkinson maintains this
was the spark that ignited the naval race
that lasted until the Washington naval
arms-limitation treaty of 1922. As a re-
sult, Britain’s strategic situation
changed from one that was a relatively
stable balance between Britain facing
France and Russia up to the 1880s to
one of the late 1890s and early twenti-
eth century that became a “strategic
melting pot with not three but eight
major naval powers––Britain, France,
Russia, America, Germany, Japan, Italy,
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and Austria-Hungary.” The instigation
of this naval arms race, Parkinson con-
cludes, was the consistent overreaction
in Britain that resulted in the 1889 Na-
val Act due to the influence on naval
policy and strategy by the Royal Navy’s
“Young Turks” and panic mongers––
W. H. Hall, C. C. P. Fitzgerald, and
Lord Charles Beresford, abetted by
leading writers like the Colomb broth-
ers and the historian John Knox
Laughton, all of whom were
encouraged by older admirals such as
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas
Symonds and Sir Geoffrey
Phipps-Hornby.
In reaching these conclusions, Parkin-
son makes a useful contribution to
scholarship, and his original research in
British archives clearly sets his work in
the context of recent writings by other
scholars of British naval history on this
period. The weakness of his work lies in
his complete reliance on older, and of-
ten outdated, secondary works for his
chapter sections on competing navies,
such as the U.S. Navy, and the presence
in his sources of little, if anything, that
is not English on the Latin American
navies or on those of France, Germany,
and Russia. While readers may lament
these weaknesses, Parkinson’s book is,
nevertheless, an important and stimu-
lating contribution to the history of the
late Victorian navy.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College
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IN MY VIEW
THE HEART OF AN OFFICER
Sir:
Admiral Stravridis and Captain Hagerott’s thoughtful article (“The Heart of an
Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career De-
velopment,” Spring 2009) has identified an educational and training problem
faced by the United States Navy that also challenges most, if not all, of the navies
with which the USN operates. Achieving the right balance between the demands
of operating the Navy itself and of ensuring that the Navy is employed to best ef-
fect has puzzled naval leaders for hundreds of years. At the end of the eighteenth
century, Admiral Howe told King George III that “in our service [the Royal
Navy] the attention is carried so long alone to seamanship that few officers are
formed, and that a knowledge of themilitary is necessary to open the ideas to the
directing [of] large fleets” (cited in N.A.M.Rodger,The Command of the Ocean:
A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815 [London: Allen Lane, 2004]). As the au-
thors of this article implicitly suggest, if naval officers are not in the forefront of
Joint and Interagency operations, those activities will not receive the full benefit
which naval capabilities can bring to the exploitation of the maritime environ-
ment—nor will that environment ever receive the appropriate level of consider-
ation of its potential. Yet naval warfare, naval operations and the “raise, train
and sustain” elements of maintaining a navy have never beenmore complex and
never more demanding. If sufficient expert officers are not provided for these
absolutely fundamental requirements, then the very purpose of the navy is at
question. A navy that cannot go in harm’s way—whether that harm be due to
natural or human causes—is not a navy.
But how is it all to be fitted in? How can we be sure that a navy is effectively
operated and supported while at the same time officers are prepared and pro-
vided for appointments outside the sea service, which themselves require many
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skills which may not be of direct relevance to the vital day to day business of the
navy?
The USN is in some ways in a better situation than other naval services, in
others more difficult. It is so much larger than any other navy that it has the abil-
ity to sustain specialisation to a much greater degree—and with that an ability to
provide worthwhile careers for those who wish to excel in a particular area. But
its unrestricted-line concept is not something that the navies of the Common-
wealth in particular have ever felt it possible to adopt. They prefer to have spe-
cialist engineers with seaman (or warfare) officers who are very much the
operators, in terms of seamanship, navigation and maritime warfare. The Com-
monwealth argument, and there is a lot in it, is that the demands of the profes-
sion are so complex that it is too much to expect an officer to master engineering
duties, in particular those required for the ship as a platform (such as nuclear
power), as well as those of the seaman and warfare officer. It has been remarked
that the British system works best for a ship and the American best for a
navy—and there is justice in the observation. Even so, the Commonwealth na-
vies are being challenged by the same problems that face the USN as they move
into an increasingly Joint environment and necessarily acquire skill sets which
may seem to have little relevance to the bridge or combat information center of a
warship (or its engine room). Another and wider dimension of challenge for the
navies of the west which cannot go unremarked is how to meet the needs of the
increasing number of female officers, who may require more flexible career
structures in order to balance their family lives with those of their profession.
And, with increasing numbers of career couples, similar flexibility will need to
be available to their partners.
Some realities may need to be accepted. The first, as the authors suggest, is
that a degree of specialisation is necessary from the first. Officers cannot hu-
manly cover all the bases of the naval profession. Something has to be left to
others.
However, notwithstanding the caveats put by the authors about the dangers
of an ageing profession and the challenges of mixed-gender and partnered ca-
reers mentioned above, the second must be, even with specialisation, that the
professional formation of all but the most exceptional sea officer may still be
somewhat longer than those of the other services. This may only be a matter of a
couple of years but, if considered in terms of seagoing service, those years may be
vital to the maintenance of the necessary competencies. If there is one consistent
lesson from naval history it is that navies whose leaders possess extensive seago-
ing experience perform better than those without it. Even with the potential
benefits of increasing use of simulation and other “immersion” techniques for
training, this reality is unlikely to change.
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The third is that much more attention needs to be paid to the continuum of
naval education and training and the interaction between that continuum and
the acquisition of professional experience. Generation Y have a thirst for
self-improvement and for gaining qualifications. This needs to be encouraged
but it also needs to be guided. Any survey of the external degrees being at-
tempted by many naval officers in their own time would suggest that a signifi-
cant proportion have been embarked upon with an eye to a career outside the
navy, not the needs of the naval service. Navies need to pre-empt such selections
with encouragement of study programs that really do meet the service needs as
well as those of the individual.
The structure suggested by the authors provides an excellent basis for devis-
ing career streams and paths for education but more needs to be done to manage
each officer as part of the effort to formalize the intent of career development.
Individual guidance should relate not only to the formal qualifications that an
officer attempts to gain but, to put it formally, to encouraging an interior intel-
lectual life. Even the demands of long and arduous days at sea, with the accom-
panying watches, broken sleep and confined quarters, should not prevent
officers reflecting not only on what have been termed the “primary” elements of
their profession—their duties in the ship—but the “secondary” and “tertiary” as
well. The “primary” guidance will always be something to come from a Captain,
the Executive Officer and the Heads of Department (as well as the warrant offi-
cers and chiefs!), but modern communications and information systems offer
the potential for mentoring from ashore in ways that have never before been
possible. Retired and serving senior officers, academics and others with exper-
tise in the naval profession need to be enlisted to put such mentoring on a more
systematic basis. This aspect of career management is not a matter to be left to
the posters.
The fourth reality, and it has application to other countries than the United
States, is that a much wider conception of Joint Professional Military Education
(JPME) needs to be devised in order to recognize and provide for the technical
experts and their careers. There is much more to Jointery than operations and
operational planning, and strong arguments need to be developed to support
this proposition. The fact is that, as they become more senior, the navy’s techni-
cal experts have the potential to contribute across significant parts of modern
Defence organisations. Their technical expertise and management skills should
not confine them within their own organisation. The British indicated the po-
tential in this approach some years ago when a senior Army officer, with deep
technical and project management expertise, was placed in charge of the project
for the Type 45 air defence destroyer, now entering service. All the military
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services need to think harder about these technical specialists and achieve as
much alignment as possible in their professional development.
All in all, as the authors suggest, navies need to look hard at the ways they pre-
pare their people for the challenges of the future—and be seen, not only by their
own officers but by governments and other agencies, as doing so. If they do not,
they risk becoming marginalised in a world which is not quick to see the impor-
tance of the maritime dimension.
JAMES GOLDRICK
Rear Admiral, Royal Australian Navy
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program
As the Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) manager, I was re-cently interviewed for a very informative Web log (or “blog”) known as
Navy Reads. The blog, written by Bill Doughty, provides excellent book re-
views and commentary. It can be found at www.navyreads.blogspot.com.
Among the questions and answers in the interview are:
Do you have any anecdotes or stories about how the NPRP has helped individ-
uals? Have senior Navy leaders told you the program is helpful?
In 2007, a survey was conducted by the Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and
Technology organization. Seventy-five percent of the senior leaders surveyed
said that “the NPRP will make the Navy of tomorrow better than the Navy of to-
day.” Aboard USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), the CO established a “Heritage and His-
tory Leadership Essay” contest where sailors could win cash awards for writing
about books from the NPRP. The skipper of USS Stockdale (DDG 106) asked for
an NPRP library during the ship’s precommissioning workup, since he felt these
books would help shape his crew into the cohesive fighting unit it is destined to
become. We happily hand-delivered an NPRP library to the ship in Bath, Maine,
before it began sea trials.
Who is recommending additional titles as the program evolves? Would you ac-
cept recommendations from sailors and Navy civilians?
The program office at the Naval War College receives e-mails and letters nearly
every day with book suggestions. Our Advisory Group also exchanges messages
about new books, and we get suggestions from faculty members at the Naval
War College, Naval Postgraduate School, and the U.S. Naval Academy. Sugges-
tions can be forwarded to us at navyreading@nwc.navy.mil.
What’s on the horizon for the NPRP?
We are experimenting with e-book readers, such as Kindle, to see if this technol-
ogy is a good way to get our books in the hands of our readers. We have
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purchased Playaway-brand audiobooks for patients in Navy hospitals who can-
not read or hold a book but still want to participate in the NPRP. We also con-
tinue to provide downloadable e-books and audiobooks from Navy Knowledge
Online (NKO). We are hoping to sponsor author book signings with our part-
ners at the Navy Exchanges, and we continue to make our website,
www.navyreading.navy.mil, as interesting and functional as possible.
You’ve said you encourage people to renew their fighting spirit through the
power of professional reading. Why is reading important for our Navy and our
nation?
Reading is important because it allows people to benefit from the lessons
learned by others, going back literally thousands of years. An old sage once said,
“You can never live long enough to make all the mistakes yourself!” Good books
entertain, illustrate, and educate. They open a door to the past, they explain what
is happening today, and they project what may happen in the future. You need
only to read about the actions of the men and women in Navy blue who went be-
fore you to understand that we are all part of an organization much bigger than
ourselves and with a tremendous legacy on which we can build. Thomas Jeffer-
son once wrote, “I cannot live without books.” Every avid reader feels the same
way.
What brand-new titles would you recommend as good Navy reads?
Six Frigates, by Ian Toll (fairly new, reviewed in the Winter 2008 issue of this
journal)—about the founding of the U.S. Navy; Leave No Man Behind, by
George Galdorisi and Thomas Phillips, about combat search and rescue; Shat-
tered Sword, by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, on the battle of Midway;
and Lincoln and His Admirals, by Craig Symonds, on President Lincoln’s rela-
tionship with his naval commanders during the Civil War. We also recommend
Wired for War, by P. W. Singer (the robotics revolution, reviewed in this issue),
and Three Cups of Tea, by Greg Mortensen (promoting peace through
education).
NPRP books: You can read them in hard-copy—you can read them as
e-books—you can listen to them as audiobooks. The Navy Professional Reading
Program is accessible to everyone who wants to participate—and as the pro-
gram’s motto says, it will “Accelerate your Mind.”
JOHN E. JACKSON
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